外文翻譯--破產(chǎn)成本與融資租賃決策（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　1800單詞，1萬英文字符，3000漢字</p><p>　　外文題目： Bankruptcy Costs and the Financial Leasing Decision </p><p>　　出 處： Fm the Journal of the Financial Management Association, 1994, 23(2):

2、31-42. </p><p>　　作 者： Sivarama Krishnan and Charles Moyer </p><p><b>　　原 文：</b></p><p>　　Abstract: The theory of financia

3、l leasing views financial leases as substitutes for secured debt. Empirical studies have reported a high positive correlation between lease ratios and debt ratios and that lessors earn higher rates of return than lenders

4、. These results contradict traditional leasing theory. They are explained in this paper by recognizing the role bankruptcy costs play in the lease/borrow decision and the nature of the assets to be acquired by a firm. Le

5、asing is shown to involve lo</p><p>　　This paper re-examines the lease/borrow decision, giving explicit recognition to the role bankruptcy costs play and to the relative transactions costs of leasing and bor

6、rowing. Our focus is on noncancellable, long-term financial leases because they are most nearly the equivalent of debt financing. We limit our consideration of financial leasing to capital leases, as defined in FASB Stat

7、ement #13. Because capital leases generally do not meet the lease definition requirements of the Internal Reven</p><p>　　1.Literature Review</p><p>　　The theory of financial leasing (e.g.. Bower

8、 (1973),Brealey and Young (1980), Brick, Fung, and Subrahmanyam(1987), Lewellen, Long, and McConnell (1976), Miller and Upton (1976), and Myers, Dill, and Bautista (1976))traditionally has focused on the differential tax

9、 position of the lessee and the lessor as the primary rationale for leasing. Brick, Fung, and Subrahmanyam (1987) extended the tax-based analysis to consider economies of scale in Structuring lease contracts and the cost

10、 of managing cas</p><p>　　Empirical studies of leasing, including Crawford, Harper, and McConnell (CHM) (1981), Gudikunst and Roberts(1978), Roenfeldt and Henry (1979), Schallheim, Johnson,Lease, and McConne

11、ll (1987), and Sorensen and Johnson(1977) have reported high ex ante returns for lessors, and by implication, high lease rates paid by lessees. For example, Crawford, Harper, and McConnell found that lessors' ex ante

12、 rates of return were significantly higher than the yield on BBB-rated bonds during the same time perio</p><p>　　In addition, Ang and Peterson (1984) and Bowman (1980)found that debt and lease financing were

13、 significantly, positively correlated, implying that debt and lease financing are complements not substitutes. Ang and Peterson found that tax rate differences between leasing and non-leasing firms cannot explain the com

14、plementary relationship between debt and lease financing. Marston and Harris (1988)provide one possible explanation for this apparent anomaly. They studied changes in the debt ratio and </p><p>　　Finucane (1

15、988) also found evidence of a positive relationship between debt and lease financing. Finucane shows that firms in certain industries, including air transport</p><p>　　and retailing, rely more heavily on lea

16、se financing than others. A cross-sectional analysis revealed that the lease ratio(capitalized leases to total assets) is related to several variables, including the level of mortgage debt and the bond rating for the fir

17、m. Firms with lower bond ratings were found to lease more frequently—a result that is consistent with our expected bankruptcy cost hypothesis. Tax-related factors were not found to be important in explaining the level of

18、 leasing by a firm. V</p><p>　　Smith and Wakeman (1985) offer a comprehensive analysis of the rationale for leasing that helps to explain many of these seemingly anomalous empirical findings. For example, th

19、e high rates of return expected and actually earned by lessors may be attributed to either a comparative advantage of the lessor in disposing of assets at the termination of a lease or the ability of the lessor to exerci

20、se market power and to price discriminate among various asset user groups. Smith and Wakeman argue furth</p><p>　　Lewis and Schallheim (1992) model the debt/lease financing decision as a substitution between

21、 debt and non-debt tax shields. In their model, non-debt tax shields are sold, via leasing, thereby reducing the potential redundancy with interest deductions and making the marginal value of debt positive. The lessee re

22、sponds by issuing additional debt, which accounts for the positive relationship between debt and lease financing. The benefit from leasing in this model is realized even if the marginal </p><p>　　In the nex

23、t section we present a non-tax rationale for financial (capital) leasing that offers additional insight regarding the relationship between debt and lease financing.</p><p>　　II. A Non-Tax Rationale for Leasi

24、ng</p><p>　　Barro (1976), Benjamin (1978), Jackson and Kronman(1979), Scott (1977), and Smith and Warner (1979) suggest that secured debt is a financial contracting mechanism aimed at reducing the potential

25、agency costs of debt. Stulz and Johnson (1985) formalize the earlier analysis and show that secured debt reduces potential risk-taking behavior of the borrower and thus reduces monitoring costs to the lender. Leeth and S

26、cott (1989) found that secured debt is positively associated with loan default probab</p><p>　　Many of the properties of secured debt can be extended to financial (capital) leasing, because capital leases im

27、pose consequences on a firm that are similar to secured debt financing. Following Leeth and Scott (1989) and Scott(1977), it can be argued that leases have lower expected bankruptcy costs for the lessor than secured debt

28、 has for the lender, thereby making leasing a preferred financing alternative for firms with a higher potential for financial distress. The legal treatment of the claim</p><p>　　The claims of the secured len

29、der enjoy priority in the distribution of the proceeds of the collateral. If the value of the collateral is less than the amount of the debt, the secured lender is entitled to the value of the collateral, and the differe

30、nce is treated as an unsecured claim. The secured creditor may suffer when the asset is retained in reorganization. In most reorganizations, the secured creditor must settle for an exchange of securities that erodes the

31、value of the secured creditor's</p><p>　　A lessor also suffers an erosion of rights in the event of bankruptcy by the lessee. Normally, it is not possible to take enforcement action during the period of

32、the automatic stay. Furthermore, the event of bankruptcy itself does not represent a default on the terms of the lease, per se. The 1978 Act provides that the debtor or the bankruptcy court can enforce continuance of a l

33、ease. While a debtor is in reorganization, the debtor must agree to assume the lease, subject to bankruptcy court appr</p><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p>　　破產(chǎn)成本與融資租賃決策</p><p&

34、gt;　　摘要：金融租賃理論觀點認(rèn)為金融租賃是融資租賃擔(dān)保債務(wù)的替代品。實證研究報告指出，租賃比率和債務(wù)比率有著一個很高的正相關(guān)性，出租人比放款人得到更高的回報。這些結(jié)果違背傳統(tǒng)的租賃理論。這些都將在，租賃/借進(jìn)情形中破產(chǎn)成本所扮演的角色被認(rèn)可和一個公司取得的資產(chǎn)的性質(zhì)中，被解釋。租賃比起借貸來，破產(chǎn)成本有所降低。我們的實證分析表明，有承租人的公司比起無承租人的公司，總資產(chǎn)方面有較低的留存收益，較高的成長率，較低的覆蓋率，和較高的經(jīng)營風(fēng)

35、險。總的來說，我們的結(jié)果表明，隨著破產(chǎn)潛力的增加，融資租賃變得越來越有吸引力。我們也找到證據(jù)來支持產(chǎn)業(yè)顧問在金融租賃業(yè)的影響。</p><p>　　本文重新審視如何做租賃/借用的決定，對破產(chǎn)成本和相對交易租賃及借貸成本所發(fā)揮的作用，給予了明確承認(rèn)。我們的重點是不可撤銷的長期的金融租賃，因為它們和金融債務(wù)最相像。我們限制金融租賃中資產(chǎn)租賃需要考慮的因素，如財務(wù)會計準(zhǔn)則委員會的第13號聲明。由于融資租賃一般不符合美國

36、國稅局租賃定義的要求，他們提供了一個獨特的機會來檢驗租賃的非稅收理論。該文件強調(diào)了承租人公司的特征，包括具體的租賃合同和重大的租賃行為的特征，而不是具體租賃合同的特點。租賃的定義證明，其它條件不變，承租人向出租人借款比借款人向貸款人借款，有較低的預(yù)期破產(chǎn)成本，這便造成了降低融資成本的結(jié)果。相對借款，租賃抵消了較低的破產(chǎn)與租賃相關(guān)的費用，有普遍較高的交易成本。破產(chǎn)成本和交易成本之間的權(quán)衡可以為越來越有信譽的企業(yè)接待和租賃公司的資信較差的偏

37、好作解釋。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)破產(chǎn)成本參數(shù)被作為解釋借用和租賃決定的一個依據(jù)。我們的研究結(jié)果符合融資順位理論，其他條件不變，企業(yè)會發(fā)現(xiàn)融資租賃的替代品無法一致則有更大的潛在的財務(wù)危機和高負(fù)債的杠桿作用。此外，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，金融租賃在資產(chǎn)專用性比其他主要行業(yè)更大的制造企業(yè)來說，是不普遍但作用顯著的一個辦法。</p><p><b>　　1.文獻(xiàn)回顧</b></p><p>　　金融租賃

38、理論（如：鮑爾(1973), 巴里和約昂(1980), 貝利克,凡和蘇伯拉曼(1987),拉威力,隆,和麥克奈爾(1976),米勒和阿普頓(1976),和馬耶爾, 迪爾,和巴蒂斯塔(1976)）,傳統(tǒng)上側(cè)重在賦稅低位不同的承租人和出租人的不同租賃的主要理由上。貝利克, 凡,和蘇伯拉曼(1987)擴大了稅收基礎(chǔ)的分析，考慮規(guī)模在構(gòu)建租賃合同和管理中的違約風(fēng)險和利率的不確定性存在的現(xiàn)金流量的成本效益。達(dá)拉托里和本杰明(1991), 卡拉漢和

39、馬拉(1987),和里斯, 麥克奈爾, 和斯科菲(1990)考慮進(jìn)一步解釋承租人與出租人之間的信息不對稱給租賃資產(chǎn)的殘值租賃融資帶來的作用。</p><p>　　實證租賃的研究，包括克拉夫特, 哈勃, 和麥克奈爾(CHM)(1981), 古蒂卡斯特和羅伯特(1978), 羅菲特和亨利(1979),斯科菲,約翰,里斯和麥克奈爾(1987), 塞拉森和約翰森(1977)，報告了出租人事前的高回報，并暗示了由承租人支付

40、的高利率租金。例如，克拉夫特, 哈勃,和麥克奈爾發(fā)現(xiàn)出租人事前的回報率在同一時間段上明顯高于BBB級債券的收益率。里斯, 麥克奈爾和斯科菲(1990)記錄實現(xiàn)金融租賃合同的高回報，盡管現(xiàn)實收益均高于預(yù)期回報。此外，他們還發(fā)現(xiàn)，可實現(xiàn)的殘值往往大大超過以租賃合同為基礎(chǔ)實際殘值。</p><p>　　此外，昂、皮特森(1984)和鮑曼(1980)發(fā)現(xiàn)，債務(wù)和融資租賃成正相關(guān)，這意味著債務(wù)和融資租賃是互補的，而不是替代

41、的。昂和皮特森發(fā)現(xiàn)，在租賃和非租賃公司稅率差異不能解釋債務(wù)和融資租賃之間的互補關(guān)系。瑪斯頓和哈里斯(1988)提供了一個關(guān)于研究負(fù)債率和出租率隨著時間的推移的可能解釋，個別公司改變了這種明顯的差異，并發(fā)現(xiàn)它們可能是負(fù)相關(guān)，這就確認(rèn)了債務(wù)和融資租賃的替代品的觀點。也就是說，對于每個企業(yè)來說，債務(wù)是融資租賃的替代品，而采用租賃融資公司的債務(wù)通常要比不使用融資租賃的公司的債務(wù)高。</p><p>　　菲努克(1988)

42、也發(fā)現(xiàn)了債務(wù)與融資租賃正相關(guān)的證據(jù)，他指出，在某些行業(yè)包括航空運輸和零售業(yè)的公司，比其他行業(yè)更多地依靠租賃。一個橫斷面分析顯示，租賃比率（總資產(chǎn)資本租賃），是與包括抵押貸款債務(wù)水平和公司債券評級幾個變量有關(guān)的。債券評級較低的企業(yè)被發(fā)現(xiàn)租賃更加頻繁，這一結(jié)果與我們預(yù)期的破產(chǎn)成本假說是一致的。未發(fā)現(xiàn)與稅務(wù)有關(guān)的因素對一個公司的租賃水平的重要性的依據(jù)。維拉和阿澤爾(1991) 發(fā)現(xiàn)盡管承租人的稅率不一定比各自的出租人的低，但是他們發(fā)現(xiàn)了承租人

43、和出租人之間的重大利率差別，</p><p>　　斯密斯和維克曼(1985)提供了租賃存在原因理解性分析，這有助于解釋許多看似反常的實證研究結(jié)果并進(jìn)行綜合分析。例如，出租人預(yù)期的高回報率和實際獲得的回報，將歸因于出租人的比較優(yōu)勢在租賃資產(chǎn)處置的終止，或出租人行使市場權(quán)利的能力在各種資產(chǎn)之間的用戶群體的價格歧視。斯密斯和維克曼他們進(jìn)一步論證了昂和皮特森租賃和借貸是互補的發(fā)現(xiàn)，可以依據(jù)公司在審核企業(yè)的投資機會的特征來

44、解釋。</p><p>　　里維斯和斯科菲(1992)把債務(wù)/租賃的融資決策作為一種債務(wù)與非常債務(wù)稅盾的替代品的模型。在他們的模型中，非債務(wù)稅盾通過租賃進(jìn)行銷售，從而減少冗余與利息扣除額，使?jié)撛诘膫鶆?wù)積極的實現(xiàn)它的邊際價值。承租人通過增發(fā)債券的響應(yīng)，使債務(wù)和融資租賃之間成正相關(guān)。在這個模型中，租賃的好處是實現(xiàn)了承租人與出租人相同的邊際稅率相同。</p><p>　　在下一節(jié)中，我們提出一個

45、金融（資本）租賃關(guān)于債務(wù)和融資租賃關(guān)系的非稅的理由的額外了解。</p><p><b>　　2.租賃的非稅原理</b></p><p>　　巴羅(1976), 本杰明(1978),杰克森和克拉曼(1979),斯科特(1977),斯密斯和維納(1979)提出，金融承包機制的債務(wù)擔(dān)保是以減少潛在的債務(wù)代理成本為目的的。斯塔茲和約翰森(1985)早期的分析表明，擔(dān)保債務(wù)的行

46、為降低了借款人承擔(dān)的潛在的風(fēng)險，從而也降低了貸款人的成本監(jiān)控。李斯和斯科特(1989)發(fā)現(xiàn)，有擔(dān)保的債務(wù)正與貸款違約概率、資產(chǎn)市場化、和貸款規(guī)模有關(guān)。邁爾斯(1977)提出了有保留的選擇發(fā)行有擔(dān)保債務(wù)也控制了投資不足的問題。</p><p>　　有擔(dān)保債務(wù)的許多屬性可以擴展到金融（資本）租賃，融資租賃的范圍，因為擔(dān)保債務(wù)需要強加給一個公司，所以類似的擔(dān)保債務(wù)融資有不好的后果。繼李斯(1989)和斯科特(1977)

47、之后,它可以說，租賃期限為貸款人的擔(dān)保債務(wù)出租人比預(yù)期破產(chǎn)成本的有所降低，從而使融資公司中找到一個替代更高的潛在財務(wù)危機的首選的苦惱問題。對出租人索賠的法律待遇是與破產(chǎn)的有擔(dān)保放款債券的處理不同的。對有擔(dān)保債權(quán)人的債權(quán)被淡化的程度大大超過遵循出租人可索賠破產(chǎn)重組的比較條款。債務(wù)人可以根據(jù)破產(chǎn)法第11條的救濟(jì)申請或清算法第七章規(guī)定的以重組為目的，提交請愿書申請后，債務(wù)人便獲得了一個自動中止的時間，防止債務(wù)人對債權(quán)人的行為或執(zhí)法行動的形式的

48、即時援助。而在措施生效時，債權(quán)人（或出租人）不能執(zhí)行留置權(quán)。中止還可以防止取得任何不管是誰擁有占有財產(chǎn)的行為。中止命令會在法院破產(chǎn)命令的30天之后終止，除非破產(chǎn)法庭裁決繼續(xù)執(zhí)行。對出租人和擔(dān)保債券人的待遇似乎是與這個階段相同。可是，在重組程序之后的國家，有著顯著的差異。</p><p>　　有擔(dān)保貸款人享有優(yōu)先分配的抵押品債權(quán)收益的權(quán)利。如果抵押品的價值低于債務(wù)金額，擔(dān)保放款人有權(quán)對抵押物的價值及其差額作為無擔(dān)保

49、債權(quán)處理。在擔(dān)保債權(quán)人可能蒙受資產(chǎn)損失時，在重組中保留。在大多數(shù)重組中，有擔(dān)保債權(quán)人必須解決的一個問題是，證券交易侵犯了有擔(dān)保債權(quán)人的債權(quán)價值。華納（1997）討論了之前的通過的1978年的破產(chǎn)改革法（“1978年法案”）處理方法的影響。 1978年的破產(chǎn)法，提高了保護(hù)債權(quán)人提供的擔(dān)保，但擔(dān)保債權(quán)人的保護(hù)在類似情況下大大低于出租人給予的。</p><p>　　出租人還遭受了在破產(chǎn)事件中承租人的權(quán)利受侵犯的行為。通