外文翻譯--西班牙企業(yè)的融資偏好優(yōu)序融資理論的實(shí)證研究

1、<p>　　2600單詞，13600英文字符，4645漢字</p><p>　　外文題目： Financing Preferences of Spanish Firms:Evidence </p><p>　　on the Pecking Order Theory </p><p>　　出 處： Review of Quant

2、itative Finance and Accounting，</p><p>　　2005(25): pp341-355 </p><p>　　作 者：Javier Sanchez-Vidal， Juan Francisco Martin-Ugedo </p><p><b>　　原文</b

3、></p><p>　　Abstract :This paper analyses some of the empirical implications of the pecking order theory in the Spanish market using a panel data analysis of 1,566 firms over 1994–2000. The results show th

4、at the pecking order theory holds for most subsamples analyzed, particularly for the small and medium-sized enterprises and for the high-growth and highly leveraged companies. It is also shown that both the more and the

5、less leveraged firms tend to converge towards more balanced capital structures. Finally</p><p>　　Keywords: capital structure, pecking order theory</p><p>　　1、Introduction</p><p>　　A

6、 prime contribution on information asymmetry in capital structure theory is the Myers and Majluf (1984) model. Myers and Majluf observe that the empirical evidence is not consistent with a financial policy that is determ

7、ined by a trade-off of the advantages and disadvantages of market imperfections, mainly taxes, costs of financial distress, and agency costs. Rather, companies’ financial policies seem to be better explained by the behav

8、iour described by Donaldson (1961). He establishes a hierar</p><p>　　Although they tend to be taken as the same thing, the pecking order theory and the Myers and Majluf (1984) model are not strictly speaking

9、 the same. The pecking order theory is merely a description of companies’ financing policy, while the Myers and Majluf work represents the first model that attempts to describe this behaviour from a theoretical point of

10、view, based on the presence of information asymmetry. Moreover, the Myers and Majluf (1984) model assumes listed companies and markets where e</p><p>　　The aim of this paper is to provide evidence on the pec

11、king order theory in the Spanish market. The analysis takes two directions. First, we examine the evolution of the three largest accounting sources of funding for a company—retained earnings, equity issues and debt—using

12、 a model based on Watson and Wilson (2002). Second, we study the role of long-term debt in making up financing deficits, following the flow of funds deficit equation of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999).</p><p>

13、　　The results show that small and medium-sized companies behave consistently with predictions of the pecking order theory. When we divide the sample into subsamples on the basis of growth and the level of leverage, we se

14、e that high-growth companies base their growth on retained earnings, and firms with very high and very low debt ratios tend to converge towards more moderate debt ratios. Estimation of the flow of funds deficit equation

15、shows that fund deficits are met by the use of long-term debt.</p><p>　　The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the pecking order theory and briefly summarizes the previous empirica

16、l evidence. The models to be tested are presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes the sample and the methodology. Section 5 contains empirical results. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 6.</p><p&

17、gt;　　2. The pecking order theory: Theoretical base and empirical evidence</p><p>　　Evidence of stock market reaction to the announcement of financial offerings in the American market seems to support this ar

18、gument, because it shows an average 3% negative abnormal return to underwritten firm commitments of industrial firms (Kolodny and Suhler, 1985; Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Hess and Bhagat, 1986; Masulis and Korwar, 1986;

19、Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; and Muhtaseb and Philippatos, 1991, among others); nonsignificant reactions to bond issues (Dann and Mikkelson, 1984; Eckbo, 198</p><p>　　Yet empirical evidence in Spanish capital

20、 market issues is similar to that described by the Myers and Majluf model (1984) and also similar to the empirical evidence in the U. S. Both Rubio (1986, 1987) with monthly data and Arrondo (2002) and Martin-Ugedo (2003

21、) using daily data find negative market reactions to equity issue announcements; Gonz´alez (1997) finds positive market reactions to bond issues. </p><p>　　Finally, Holmes and Kent (1991) and Ang and Ju

22、ng (1992) use mail surveys to try to discern typical company financing policies. Both authors find that company managers follow a hierarchy of funding choices similar to the one described by the pecking order theory. Hol

23、mes and Kent (1991) find a stricter pecking order in place at SME than at larger companies.</p><p>　　In short, many authors have tried to test the pecking order theory, but the evidence is not conclusive.<

24、;/p><p>　　4. Sample and methodology</p><p>　　We use the BASI database from Informa, S.A., considering firms that have data for the entire sample period 1994–2000. We also include firms created afte

25、r January 1, 1994, if we have data for a firm from establishment through 2000. Firms must be either limited companies or private limited companies, and not in the banking or insurance economic sector.</p><p>

26、;　　Information provided by companies sometimes shows some inconsistencies. To minimize mistakes, we use several filters. Firms are excluded if: (1) total assets were not equal to the sum of equity and total liabilities;

27、(2) there were not positive sales figures for all years; (3) total assets increased more than 400% or declined more than 75% one year to another; (4) firms do not have a positive equity figure; and (5) firms do not have

28、a positive net profit for the entire period.</p><p>　　As company financing may be influenced by company size, we divide the sample into subsamples by size. In Euro-info 88/ES (1996), the European Commission

29、classifies firms as small, medium, and large according to four different criteria: (1) employee number; (2) sales; (3) total assets; and (4) independence. We do not use this last criterion because of lack of data. Small

30、firms are companies with fewer than 50 employees, with sales lower than 7 million, and total assets of less than 5 million. Med</p><p>　　We adopt our own classification system based on the first three criter

31、ia defined by the Commission. That is, we include a company in a specific category size if it matches 2 of 3 criteria for every year of the sample. If a company does not fit in any of the categories, we exclude it from a

32、nalysis. Our intention is to be both strict and flexible enough to take into account that: (1) the period of analysis is seven years long, but the criteria are numerically the same, so we work with asset and sa</p>

33、<p>　　The final sample is composed of 1,566 firms, 584 small, 792 medium-sized, and 190 arge. Table 1 provides information on the sample, including descriptive statistics on the variables used to classify firms by

34、 size, financing source percentages and return ratios , and changes in the major financing sources with respect to increases in total assets.</p><p>　　Panel B indicates that funding source proportions vary l

35、ittle with respect to company size. Percentages for equity issues and retained earnings for our whole sample come close to the Watson and Wilson (2002) percentages for the British market, but our figures for the Spanish

36、market for debt are higher both for total and long term. The ROA and ROE variables are negatively related to size, especially the ROE.</p><p>　　Panel C reveals that for both the whole sample and all subsampl

37、es, companies tend to finance their growth with debt and retained earnings.</p><p>　　The sample comprises a panel data of 1,566 companies for a seven-year period. The advantage of panel data is that we can t

38、ake into account the individual heterogeneity, with observations of variables for several years for each individual panel. The main point is to determine whether the model is a fixed effects or a random effects model, wh

39、ich in turn determines the most consistent and efficient way of estimation: intragroup estimation versus generalized least squares. In our case, the Hausman t</p><p>　　Another question in estimation of equat

40、ions (4) and (5) is the endogeneity of the explanatory variables. One requirement of ordinary least squares is that the explanatory variables must be independent, a condition that is not met if the variables are correlat

41、ed with actual or past error terms. For example, in equation (4), the fact that retained earnings grow means total assets also increase, but the causality works in the other direction too; an increase in total assets mak

42、es retained earnings,</p><p>　　Finally, estimation of the flow of funds deficit equation presents the possibility of subspecification bias (see Gujarati, 1997).This equation represents an accounting identity

43、 in which equity issues are absent (Chirinko and Singha, 2000). It examines the financing of long-term assets by long-term debt, considering retained earnings as exogenous.</p><p>　　Because the omitted varia

44、ble, equity issues, is correlated in some cases with the increase in long-term debt, we take into account the possible bias when we estimate the flow of funds deficit equation of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) below.</

45、p><p>　　We use Stata statistical software in the regression analysis.</p><p>　　5. Results</p><p>　　We present results separately for the two models.</p><p>　　5.1. Results

46、of Watson and Wilson (2002) model</p><p>　　Table 2 presents the results of the estimation of equation (4) for the whole sample and for the size subsamples. For the whole sample, retained earnings and debt ha

47、ve similar coefficients, higher than the equity issues coefficient, evidence of the duality of retained earnings and debt noted by Holmes and Kent (1991). Results for the different subsamples seem to indicate that small

48、to medium-sized enterprises do follow a pecking order of choices. The coefficients of retained earnings are higher t</p><p>　　Higher coefficients for equity issues in the SME than for large firms could be at

49、tributable to funds supplied by manager-owners or by families or acquaintances. In fact, Ang (1992) ranks equity issues like this that do not mean a shift of control from owner in second place in the hierarchy of funds b

50、ehind retained earnings.</p><p>　　High growth firms versus low growth firms. Fama and French (2002) and Lemmon and Zender (2002) have shown we need to consider companies’ money needs when we examine capital

51、structures. There are differences in financing between high-growth and low-growth firms. To examine this, we select the quintile of companies with the highest annual average growth rate of total assets and the quintile o

52、f firms with no growth or lowest positive growth (average annual growth rates of 0 to 4%).</p><p>　　Table 3 reports the results for the whole sample and the high-growth and low-growth quintiles. The remarkab

53、le differences in coefficients of the two quintiles show that growth is an important element in company financing decisions. As would be expected, the coefficients for all variables are very similar for the low-growth fi

54、rms. The high-growth firms, however, tend to finance their growth with retained earnings. They also follow the hierarchy of funds proposed in the pecking order theory more c</p><p>　　It is notable that we fi

55、nd lower values of t-statistics and the R2 in high-growth firms, indicating a more heterogeneous financing. This result is similar to that obtained by Hughes (1997) who finds for a sample of SME in the UK that high-growt

56、h companies tend to finance their growth with a greater variety of sources than low-growth firms.</p><p>　　High-leveraged versus low-leveraged companies. According to Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), we should

57、 expect that, even if firms do not follow a trade-off, they tend to revert towards moderate debt levels whenever they have previous very high or very low levels of leverage. As they say, “We do not believe that balance s

58、heets are irrelevant. We expect firms to find ways to add equity when debt ratios are painfully high, and to reduce equity when they fall near zero or the firm is a net lender” (Sh</p><p>　　To test this argu

59、ment, we compare the quintile of firms with the highest debt level ratios as of December 31, 1993, and the quintile with lowest debt levels at that date (Table 4). </p><p>　　We observe very different financi

60、ng patterns in the two quintiles, which would indicate previous debt level is an important factor in determining firms’ financing policies. The more leveraged companies follow the hierarchy of the pecking order theory. T

61、he most important result is that these companies tend to moderate their indebtedness; they have a lower debt coefficient than the low-leverage companies or the whole sample. In addition, they use retained earnings and eq

62、uity issues more than the l</p><p>　　5.2. Results of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) flow of funds deficit equation</p><p>　　In this subsection we estimate the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) flow o

63、f funds deficit equation. Given that the dependent variable is the long term debt, we have considered including an additional explanatory variable representing the cost of this financing; concretely, the yearly variation

64、 of the interest rate that the banking sector charge for loans of three years or more.</p><p>　　An increase in the financing costs of long-term debt could reduce the use of this source of finance. Therefore,

65、 a negative sign of bI is expected.</p><p>　　Table 5 reports the flow of funds deficit equation results for the whole sample and for the subsamples of small firms, medium-sized firms, and large firms; with t

66、he b coefficient corrected for the subspecification bias. The estimation takes into account the result of the Hausman test that the panel is a fixed-effects one.</p><p>　　For the whole sample and for all sub

67、samples, companies are financing their flow of funds deficit using long-term debt. The coefficients for bPO come close to those obtained by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), which range between 0.75 and 0.85. The high R2s s

68、upport the argument that most of the long-term debt variation is explained by the flow of funds deficit variable, especially for medium-sized and large firms. The lower R2s for the smaller firms may occur because they ha

69、ve long-term financial c</p><p>　　The interest rate coefficient is not significant for the whole sample. This result is opposite the results of Antoniou, Guney, and Paudial (2002). For the size subsamples, t

70、he coefficient is statistically significant for medium-sized and small firms, but has the expected sign only for small companies.</p><p><b>　　譯文（一）：</b></p><p>　　西班牙企業(yè)的融資偏好：優(yōu)序融資理論的實(shí)證

71、研究</p><p>　　摘要：本文使用在1994-2000年間西班牙市場(chǎng)上1566家公司的面板數(shù)據(jù)，分析了影響啄序理論的實(shí)證。結(jié)果表明,啄序理論對(duì)于大多數(shù)次級(jí)樣本,特別是中小企業(yè)和高增長(zhǎng)和高杠桿率的公司是支持的。它還表明,無(wú)論是更高和更低杠桿的公司，都傾向于更加平衡的資本結(jié)構(gòu)。最后,我們觀察到企業(yè)的財(cái)政資金流動(dòng)赤字與長(zhǎng)期負(fù)債。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞：資本結(jié)構(gòu)，優(yōu)序融資理論</

72、p><p><b>　　1、介紹</b></p><p>　　在資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論中信息不對(duì)稱的主要貢獻(xiàn)者是邁爾斯和米勒(1984)模型。邁爾斯和米勒觀察到的經(jīng)驗(yàn)性證據(jù)是不符合融資政策,是由一個(gè)不完善市場(chǎng)的優(yōu)點(diǎn)和缺點(diǎn)平衡的，主要是稅收,金融危機(jī)的成本和代理成本。相反,公司的融資政策似乎是融資行為更好的解釋(唐納森，1961)。他建立了一個(gè)層次結(jié)構(gòu)描述公司相對(duì)于外部資金更偏愛(ài)內(nèi)部

73、資金;對(duì)于外部資金,公司更喜歡債務(wù),然后混合工具像可轉(zhuǎn)換債券,最終發(fā)行股票。此層次結(jié)構(gòu),被廣泛視為啄序理論,表明公司融資決策目的是實(shí)現(xiàn)最佳利用。</p><p>　　盡管他們往往被認(rèn)為是同一件事,啄序理論和邁爾斯和Majluf(1984)模型不是嚴(yán)格相同的。優(yōu)序融資理論只是描述一個(gè)公司的融資政策,雖然邁爾斯和米勒代表第一個(gè)模型,試圖從理論的角度基于信息不對(duì)稱的存在描述這種行為。此外,邁爾斯和米勒(1984)模型假

74、定上市公司和市場(chǎng)發(fā)行股票是通過(guò)公司承諾,比如美國(guó)市場(chǎng),而不是市場(chǎng)主要的分配方法，如西班牙和其他大多數(shù)國(guó)家。</p><p>　　本論文的目的是在西班牙市場(chǎng)提供啄序理論的證據(jù)。分析從兩個(gè)方向入手。首先,我們檢查演變的三大會(huì)計(jì)的資金來(lái)源，為公司發(fā)行股票、保留收益和債務(wù)。</p><p>　　結(jié)果表明,啄序理論的預(yù)測(cè)中中小企業(yè)的行為都是一致的。當(dāng)我們把樣本拆分到次級(jí)樣本的基礎(chǔ)上，我們看到, 高增

75、長(zhǎng)企業(yè)在留存收益增長(zhǎng)的基礎(chǔ)上, 債務(wù)比率非常高和非常低的公司傾向于更為溫和的債務(wù)比率。估計(jì)的資金流動(dòng)的赤字方程表明資金赤字的公司都使用了長(zhǎng)期債務(wù)。</p><p>　　文章是剩余部分主要由以下幾部分組成，如下所示。第二節(jié)解釋了啄序理論，簡(jiǎn)要概述了之前的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)。第三節(jié)給出了要測(cè)試的模型。第4部分描述了示例和方法論。第五節(jié)包含實(shí)證結(jié)果。最后，結(jié)論在第六節(jié)。</p><p>　　2、優(yōu)序融資理

76、論理論:理論基礎(chǔ)和經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)</p><p>　　股票市場(chǎng)對(duì)金融產(chǎn)品在美國(guó)市場(chǎng)的反應(yīng)這一個(gè)證據(jù)似乎支持這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)，因?yàn)樗砻髌骄?%的負(fù)向變動(dòng)會(huì)返還到承銷公司所承諾的工業(yè)企業(yè)(高樂(lè)德尼和蘇爾，1985；阿斯奎斯和幕勒斯表示，1986年，赫斯和巴加，1986馬斯勒和科沃， 1986；麥克爾森和帕奇，1986；和瑪特薩博和菲力帕托斯，1991等)；對(duì)發(fā)行債券不敏感性(丹和麥克爾森，1984；阿克博，1986；麥克爾森和帕

77、奇，1986；阿克黑比，伊斯托沃德和佩蒂特，1997)；與反應(yīng)介于兩者之間的可轉(zhuǎn)換債券問(wèn)題(丹和麥克爾森，1984；阿克博，1986；麥克爾森和帕奇，1986)。</p><p>　　但是，梅耶斯和梅吉拉夫（1984）的模型也有一定的局限性。首先，他們適用于像美國(guó)這樣的股票市場(chǎng)，發(fā)行股票主要通過(guò)承諾包銷，而不是通過(guò)在大多數(shù)其他市場(chǎng)普遍存在的方法——配股。在承諾包銷的情況下，股份同時(shí)向廣大公眾發(fā)售。因此如果股票被高

78、估，將會(huì)有財(cái)富從新的股東轉(zhuǎn)移到現(xiàn)有股東的身上。在配股時(shí)，現(xiàn)有股東享有優(yōu)先購(gòu)買權(quán)，這樣可以最大限度地減少財(cái)富轉(zhuǎn)移的可能性。因此，梅耶斯和梅吉拉夫（1984）認(rèn)為發(fā)行股票在企業(yè)的融資政策中是最后的選擇，而在貨幣市場(chǎng)上發(fā)行股票是股權(quán)融資的普遍做法。</p><p>　　然而經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)在西班牙資本市場(chǎng)問(wèn)題類似于邁爾斯和瑪基勒夫模型(1984)和經(jīng)驗(yàn)的描述，也類似于在美國(guó)盧比奧(1986，1987)用月度數(shù)據(jù)和阿榮迵 (20

79、02)和馬丁-尤歌多 (2003)使用每日數(shù)據(jù)所發(fā)現(xiàn)的消極的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)證券發(fā)行公告。</p><p>　　最后福爾摩斯和肯特（1991年）和安格和榮格（1992年）通過(guò)使用郵件調(diào)查來(lái)試用辨別典型企業(yè)的融資政策。兩位學(xué)者都發(fā)現(xiàn)，企業(yè)管理者選擇遵循一個(gè)類似優(yōu)序融資理論所描述的融資順序。福爾摩斯和肯特（1991年）發(fā)現(xiàn)中小企業(yè)比大型的企業(yè)更嚴(yán)格地遵循優(yōu)序融資順序。</p><p>　　總之，許多學(xué)

80、者試圖驗(yàn)證優(yōu)序融資理論，但證據(jù)不確鑿。</p><p><b>　　4、樣本和方法論</b></p><p>　　我們使用Informa，S.A.中的基本的數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)，將1994-2000年的公司數(shù)據(jù)考慮為整個(gè)樣本期。我們還包括公司自1994年1月1日創(chuàng)建以后的數(shù)據(jù)。如果我們有一個(gè)公司從成立到2000的數(shù)據(jù)，企業(yè)必須要么是有限公司要么是私人有限公司，而不是在銀行或保險(xiǎn)經(jīng)濟(jì)

81、部門。</p><p>　　公司提供的信息有時(shí)展示了一些矛盾。為了減少錯(cuò)誤，我們用幾個(gè)排除方法。如果公司滿足以下幾個(gè)方面的則排除:(1)總資產(chǎn)并不等于金額的股本和總負(fù)債；(2) 過(guò)去的所有年度中沒(méi)有積極的銷售數(shù)據(jù)；(3)從上一年到下一年總資產(chǎn)增長(zhǎng)超過(guò)400%或下降超過(guò)75%；(4)公司沒(méi)有一個(gè)積極的股本計(jì)劃；(5)在整個(gè)周期內(nèi)公司沒(méi)有一個(gè)積極的凈利潤(rùn)。</p><p>　　由于公司的融資可

82、能會(huì)受到公司規(guī)模的影響，我們把樣本數(shù)量降低到次級(jí)樣本的大小。歐盟委員會(huì)根據(jù)以下四種不同的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)將公司分為小、中、大三個(gè)等級(jí):(1)員工數(shù)；(2)銷售；(3)總資產(chǎn)；(4)獨(dú)立。我們不使用這個(gè)最后的準(zhǔn)則，因?yàn)槿鄙贁?shù)據(jù)。小規(guī)模公司少于50個(gè)員工，銷售額低于700萬(wàn)，總資產(chǎn)不到500萬(wàn)。中等規(guī)模的公司都在50到249名員工，從總銷售額為700萬(wàn)到4000萬(wàn)美元，而總資產(chǎn)從500萬(wàn)到2700萬(wàn)。如果他們擁有超過(guò)250員工，銷售額超過(guò)4000萬(wàn)，總

83、資產(chǎn)超過(guò)2700萬(wàn)，則公司被列為大型公司。</p><p>　　根據(jù)第一種委員會(huì)定義的三個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，我們采用自己的分類系統(tǒng)。也就是說(shuō)， 如果它符合每一年的示例中三分之二的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，我們就將這個(gè)公司定義在一個(gè)特定的類別中。如果一個(gè)公司不適合在任何的類別，我們?cè)诜治鰰r(shí)將它排除。我們的意圖是在考慮時(shí)既要嚴(yán)格又要有足夠柔韌性:(1)時(shí)期的分析是漫長(zhǎng)的七年，但因?yàn)闃?biāo)準(zhǔn)都是相同的數(shù)值，所以我們考慮資產(chǎn)和銷售額這種與通脹是異構(gòu)的數(shù)據(jù)。

84、(2)沒(méi)有雇員數(shù)據(jù)的一些公司。</p><p>　　最后的示例是由1566家公司、584個(gè)小公司，792中型規(guī)模的公司和190個(gè)大規(guī)模公司組成。表1提供了信息的示例，包括描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分類公司使用的變量的大小，融資來(lái)源百分比和回報(bào)比率，以及為了增加總資產(chǎn)所引起的主要融資來(lái)源的變化。</p><p>　　樣本B表明，不同資金來(lái)源比例對(duì)公司的規(guī)模影響很小。在我們整個(gè)樣本中股本發(fā)行比率和留存收益問(wèn)題

85、與沃森和威爾遜(2002)所研究的英國(guó)市場(chǎng)百分比十分接近，但我們關(guān)于西班牙市場(chǎng)的數(shù)據(jù)對(duì)整體和長(zhǎng)期的負(fù)債而言是相對(duì)較高的。資產(chǎn)回報(bào)率和股本回報(bào)率變量是與公司規(guī)模大小是負(fù)相關(guān)的，尤其是股本回報(bào)率。</p><p>　　樣本C顯示，對(duì)于整個(gè)樣本和所有次級(jí)樣本，企業(yè)傾向于債務(wù)融資和使用留存收益。</p><p>　　在示例中包括1566家公司在7年時(shí)間內(nèi)的一個(gè)樣本數(shù)據(jù)。樣本數(shù)據(jù)的優(yōu)勢(shì)是，我們可以考

86、慮個(gè)人的異質(zhì)性，以變量在幾年內(nèi)的變化為每個(gè)單獨(dú)的樣本數(shù)據(jù)。主要的一點(diǎn)是可以決定一個(gè)模型是究竟是一個(gè)固定效應(yīng)模型還是隨機(jī)效應(yīng)模型，進(jìn)而確定最一致的和最有效的估計(jì):社會(huì)團(tuán)體內(nèi)部的估計(jì)和廣義最小二乘法。在我們的示例中，豪斯曼試驗(yàn)表明，社會(huì)團(tuán)體內(nèi)部的估計(jì)是適當(dāng)?shù)?，因?yàn)樵撃Ｐ褪且粋€(gè)固定效應(yīng)模型。</p><p>　　另一個(gè)問(wèn)題在估計(jì)方程(4)和(5)是解釋變量的解釋。普通最小二乘法的一個(gè)基本要求是解釋性變量必須是獨(dú)立的。有

87、一種情況是不滿足條件的，那就是如果變量與現(xiàn)在或過(guò)去的錯(cuò)誤條件是相關(guān)的。例如，在方程(4)，事實(shí)上，留存收益增長(zhǎng)意味著總資產(chǎn)也會(huì)增加，但是在因果關(guān)系的另一個(gè)方向也同樣起作用；增加總資產(chǎn)會(huì)使留存收益，債務(wù)和股本發(fā)行增加。關(guān)于赤字的資金流動(dòng)對(duì)方程(5)有一個(gè)類似的效應(yīng)。因此，我們對(duì)這些滯后的解釋變量進(jìn)行了假設(shè)(安尼諾拉說(shuō)道，債券，1991)。豪斯曼規(guī)范的測(cè)試被再次證實(shí)，這個(gè)過(guò)程是一致的，比估計(jì)更有效的沒(méi)有納入考慮。</p>&l

88、t;p>　　最后，資金流動(dòng)的赤字方程的估計(jì)給出了不規(guī)范、有偏見(jiàn)的可能性(參見(jiàn)古吉拉特，1997)。這個(gè)方程表示一個(gè)會(huì)計(jì)恒等式，股權(quán)發(fā)行缺失(池琳鈳和幸哈，2000)。它用長(zhǎng)期債務(wù)來(lái)檢查融資的長(zhǎng)期資產(chǎn)，將留存收益視作外生變量。</p><p>　　因?yàn)樽兞窟z漏，股權(quán)問(wèn)題，在長(zhǎng)期債務(wù)增加的某些情況下，當(dāng)我們估計(jì)的資金流動(dòng)赤字方程我們考慮到薩姆-桑德?tīng)柡兔桌找韵驴赡艿钠?jiàn) (1999)。</p>

89、<p><b>　　5、結(jié)果</b></p><p>　　我們報(bào)告結(jié)果分別為兩個(gè)模型。</p><p>　　5.1沃森和威爾遜(2002)模型的結(jié)果</p><p>　　表2展示了估計(jì)方程(4)關(guān)于整個(gè)樣本和樣本的大小的結(jié)果。福爾摩斯和肯特(1991) 指出對(duì)整個(gè)樣本而言，留存收益和債務(wù)也有類似的系數(shù)，高于股本融資系數(shù)、證據(jù)的二元性的

90、留存收益和債務(wù)。不同的樣本結(jié)果似乎表明，中小企業(yè)做了一個(gè)遵循優(yōu)序融資理論的選擇。留存收益的系數(shù)均高于債務(wù)，債務(wù)融資系數(shù)反過(guò)來(lái)高于股本融資系數(shù)。這些結(jié)果與比楊，阿姆和卡普特(2002)、沃森和威爾遜(2002) 的發(fā)現(xiàn)很相似。這者獲得了中小企業(yè)的這個(gè)結(jié)論，后者獲得了股份有限公司的這個(gè)結(jié)論。象這樣的結(jié)果突出創(chuàng)造收益對(duì)中小企業(yè)融資增長(zhǎng)的重要性。</p><p>　　中小企業(yè)中比大公司更高的股本融資系數(shù)要?dú)w功于基金經(jīng)理所

91、有者提供的家庭或熟人。事實(shí)上，安(1992)對(duì)股票發(fā)行率排序，并不意味著所有者的控制權(quán)在第二位的一個(gè)轉(zhuǎn)變。</p><p>　　高增長(zhǎng)公司和低增長(zhǎng)的公司。法瑪和法蘭斯 (2002)和萊蒙和正德?tīng)?2002)已經(jīng)顯示在我們檢驗(yàn)資本結(jié)構(gòu)時(shí)我們需要考慮企業(yè)的資金需求。高增長(zhǎng)和低增長(zhǎng)的公司之間的融資是有差異的。為了研究這一點(diǎn)，我們選擇總資產(chǎn)年平均增長(zhǎng)率排位最高的公司和沒(méi)有增長(zhǎng)或者最低正增長(zhǎng)的公司 (平均年增長(zhǎng)率為0至4%

92、)。</p><p>　　表3報(bào)告結(jié)果反映了整個(gè)樣本和高成長(zhǎng)型與低成長(zhǎng)型的公司。兩組樣本在系數(shù)的差異表明成長(zhǎng)性在公司融資決策中是一個(gè)重要的元素。和預(yù)想的一樣，低成長(zhǎng)型的公司的所有變量系數(shù)都非常相似。然而高成長(zhǎng)型公司更傾向于用留存收益融資。很顯然他們也遵循這個(gè)優(yōu)序融資理論。</p><p>　　值得注意的是，我們?cè)诟叱砷L(zhǎng)型公司中發(fā)現(xiàn)了更低的t統(tǒng)計(jì)值和R2，這表明他們有一個(gè)更多樣化的融資結(jié)構(gòu)。

93、這個(gè)結(jié)果與休斯(1997)發(fā)現(xiàn)的一個(gè)結(jié)論是十分相似的，休斯(1997)發(fā)現(xiàn)在英國(guó)的中小企業(yè)，高成長(zhǎng)型公司比低成長(zhǎng)型的公司更加傾向于不同資金來(lái)源的融資方式。</p><p>　　高杠桿和低杠桿公司。根據(jù)薩姆-桑德?tīng)柡兔桌?1999)，即使公司不遵循一種權(quán)衡，我們也應(yīng)該期待，他們傾向于溫和的債務(wù)水平，無(wú)論他們以前喲較高水平的還是較低水平的杠桿。正如他們所說(shuō)的，“我們相信資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表不是無(wú)關(guān)緊要的。當(dāng)債務(wù)比率非常高我們希

94、望公司設(shè)法增加股本，當(dāng)公司降至接近零或是一個(gè)凈貸款公司時(shí)能減少股本”(薩姆-桑德?tīng)柡兔桌眨?999，第226頁(yè))。</p><p>　　為了驗(yàn)證這個(gè)論點(diǎn)，我們將與在1993年12月31日債務(wù)水平最高的公司進(jìn)行比較，將數(shù)據(jù)與在那個(gè)日期最低債務(wù)水平的公司進(jìn)行比較 (表4)。</p><p>　　我們觀察融資模式非常不同的的兩個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)，這表明之前的債務(wù)水平在決定公司的融資策略是一個(gè)重要的因素。更高

95、的杠桿公司遵循優(yōu)序融資理論。最重要的結(jié)果是，這些公司傾向于較低較穩(wěn)定的負(fù)債率；他們比低杠桿公司或整個(gè)樣本有一個(gè)更低的債務(wù)系數(shù)。此外，他們比低杠桿的公司更多地利用留存收益和股權(quán)融資。對(duì)低杠桿的公司而言最著名的發(fā)現(xiàn)是他們更多利用債務(wù)融資，沒(méi)有遵循優(yōu)序融資理論。</p><p>　　5.2. 薩姆-桑德?tīng)柡兔桌盏馁Y金流動(dòng)赤字方程的結(jié)果</p><p>　　在本節(jié)中我們將對(duì)薩姆-桑德?tīng)柡兔桌?19

96、99)的資金流動(dòng)赤字方程進(jìn)行判斷。鑒于因變量是長(zhǎng)期債務(wù)，我們已經(jīng)考慮了額外的解釋變量代表的融資成本；具體地說(shuō)， 銀行業(yè)三年或更長(zhǎng)時(shí)間的貸款利率作為年度變化的利率，。</p><p>　　長(zhǎng)期債務(wù)融資成本的增加能減少這種融資方式的使用。因此，一個(gè)負(fù)號(hào)的bI是在預(yù)計(jì)內(nèi)的。</p><p>　　表5的結(jié)果顯示整個(gè)樣本和次級(jí)樣本的小公司，中型公司和大型公司都符合資金流動(dòng)赤字方程，b系數(shù)修正出現(xiàn)了不

97、規(guī)范的趨勢(shì)。預(yù)估把豪斯曼的結(jié)果測(cè)試考慮進(jìn)去之后樣本是一個(gè)固定后果。</p><p>　　從整個(gè)樣本和所有次級(jí)樣本來(lái)看，企業(yè)使用長(zhǎng)期債務(wù)為他們的資金流動(dòng)赤字融資。bPO系數(shù)范圍在0.75和0.85之間，接近薩姆-桑德?tīng)柡兔桌?1999)，得到的測(cè)算。較高的R2s支持流動(dòng)資金赤字變量解釋了大部分的長(zhǎng)期債務(wù)變動(dòng)，尤其是對(duì)中型和大型企業(yè)這個(gè)論點(diǎn)。較低的R2s值，小公司就可能會(huì)發(fā)生，因?yàn)樗麄冇虚L(zhǎng)期的財(cái)政約束(Ang，199