外文資料翻譯---怨恨的戲劇性

1、<p><b>　　中文3370字</b></p><p><b>　　外文資料原文：</b></p><p>　　The Dramas of Resentment</p><p>　　By Amelie Oksenberg Rorty</p><p>　　(Adopted from Th

2、e Yale Review[J], Blackwell Publishers, INC, 2000. P 89~ 97)</p><p>　　The resentment whose drams I explore here is the resentment that is focused on a wound that has become infected and threatens to spread.

3、The injury is not perceived as necessary or as merely accidental: no one resents mortality or the common cold. Infected and enduring resentment can be directed to circumstances and situations, as well as to people or gro

4、ups. </p><p>　　Resentment and indignation. </p><p>　　Although resentment is often allied, and sometimes fused, with indignation, the two are nevertheless distinguishable by their typical scenari

5、os and consequences. Targeted resentment carries a story of grievance. The perpetrators are presumed to have been primarily responsible for an unwarranted injury that they could have-and should have-been able to avoid. W

6、hile it is possible to resent having been harmed by someone that one cannot identify, targeted resentment is generally expressed by charact</p><p>　　Unlike those who suffer targeted resentment, the indignant

7、 tend to take themselves to represent other, similar cases of dishonor or oppression. They often describe and justify their indignation in general terms, without necessarily targeting specific offenders as responsible fo

8、r their wrongs. Parents who resent the inequities of their children’s access to sound education or to adequate medical care can, without charging any particular official, implicitly justify their resentment by a general

9、pr</p><p>　　In itself, unalloyed by anger, resentful indignation need not motivate remedial action. But when it moves to anger or rage, it tends to thoughts of revenge and retribution. As Aristotle puts it:

10、“Anger may be defined as a desire for revenge for a painful, inappropriate, and undeserved slight towards oneself or one’s friends.” </p><p>　　Resentment and envy. </p><p>　　Envy and resentment

11、are cousins; they feed each other and are fed by one another. Both are sustained by claims of rights, benefits, or privileges that seem unfairly distributed. But whereas the pains and fantasies of the envious resemble th

12、ose of the resentful, the envious need not attribute the disparities of the natural or social lottery to intentional malevolence or collusive intrigue. They need not even believe that there has been a pattern of unfairne

13、ss or injustice. When a society is organ</p><p>　　Nietzsche was right about at least one thing: his description of those of us who do not share his dream of radically free and self-creative individuals is ac

14、curate and precise. We are objectively and practically dependent on one another. And although we moralizingly call comparisons odious, we live and move in a world of constantly tested and hotly contended hierarchical com

15、parisons of power. Even self-reliant, self-disciplined Emersonians find themselves internalizing what they take to be the g</p><p>　　In all its varied guises, resentment beings with a sense of injury at an i

16、mbalance of power, an unjust disequilibrium of goods, rights and privileges. As the criteria for the scope and distribution of justice and fairness vary, so do the dramas-and the grounds-of resentment, envy, and indignat

17、ion. Who holds the power to define and control the distribution of justice? Is it military might, political or economic dominance, financial control, intellectual authority, charm and charisma, the gift of </p>&l

18、t;p>　　The reigning motto of “better dead than defeated” seems virtually incomprehensible to those of us who, despite everything, still envision ourselves as absorbed in progressive Enlightenment projects: the extensio

19、n of education, just governance, and fair distribution. Even those of us who are uncertain about whether the Enlightenment vision is an ideal or an illusion are deeply disturbed by the endless cycles of resentful retribu

20、tion. Even when it occurs far from us-among peoples whose lives we ca</p><p>　　The varieties of resentment, their convergence with indignation and envy, arise from broken promises or from the denial of right

21、ful expectations. Like all attitudes, they can rest on genuine insight or on misapprehension; they can be excessive or insufficient; they can be expressed deftly or ineptly; they may have-or fail to have-an adequate ther

22、apeutic program. </p><p>　　The dramas of resentment raise further difficult questions. Is it appropriate to be resentful on behalf of others, especially if the oppressed protest that they do not believe them

23、selves injured? Certainly parents are often resentful on behalf of children who may not experience themselves as having been wronged. Political reformers often express resentment on behalf of an oppressed class, whom the

24、y believe to have bee duped into accepting their condition. To be sure, vicarious resentment borders</p><p>　　So far, I’ve acknowledged only the dark dynamics of resentment. It is time to turn to its defense

25、. Like all attitudes and postures, it is two-faced. Like all attitudes, it can be constructive as well as destructive, though it is admittedly sometimes virtually impossible to distinguish the two. </p><p>　

26、　The apologia for resentment applies to its unjust as well as to its just forms, and even to those that grow out of misapprehension. The defense consists of two observations. To begin with, whether or not it is just or a

27、ccurate, sullen resentment certainly beats burning down the house or demolishing the city. Before we attempt to suppress resentment, we should ask: What is the likely alternative? Sometimes smoldering resentment is prefe

28、rable to fiery rage. But-you might ask-what if the repression</p><p>　　The second step in the defense is an analogy. The symptoms of an illness-fever, chills, dizziness-are in themselves distressing. But it

29、is unwise to suppress or transcend them, unwise to attempt to rid ourselves of the capacity to feel them. They are indications that something is wrong. Because the primary sources of a disease are often unfortunately far

30、 from its initial presentation, its symptoms set the hard, skilled work of diagnosis. </p><p>　　And so it is with resentment. It is a fever, a vertigo symptomatic of disorder. It is a universal human tragedy

31、 that the resentful are not often well placed to locate and articulate the fundamental sources of their condition. Expressions of resentment can be superbly eloquent, but when resentment is accompanied by envy, hatred, a

32、nd rage, its vehemence is not always persuasive. That combination often generates fear, the kind of fear that tends to produce further, more ingenious and stringent repr</p><p>　　A different, less dramatic,

33、but more tragic drama occurs when the resentful are ashamed-and sometimes made to be ashamed-of their condition. Indeed, dominant power moves to sheer malevolence when, in order to maintain its control, it attempts to ma

34、ke the resentful doubt their right to grievance. Compounding injury upon injury, it sometimes succeeds in silencing the resentful so as to render them virtually defenseless. </p><p>　　Of course, the dialecti

35、c of resentment does not always move toward self-conscious malevolence. The unjustified asymmetry of power that issues in disappointed expectations or broken promises can be quite accidental or genuinely innocent. Unfort

36、unately, even when the targets of resentment-a class of mindless oppressors-are moved by good will, their attempts to redress the causes of resentment sometimes only reinstate and reinforce the asymmetry that fuels furth

37、er bitterness.</p><p>　　Resentment can, under benign circumstances, nevertheless be creatively inventive as well as reactively destructive. The escalating cycle of mutual retribution can awaken a reasonable

38、fear of total, irremediable devastation. That fear can concentrate the mind, can turn it to the necessity-and, with luck, the ingenuity-of negotiation. But the will to negotiate is not enough. There is an awful irony in

39、the hope that arbitration can diminish, if not completely overcome, the cycle of destructive rese</p><p><b>　　翻譯：</b></p><p><b>　　怨恨的戲劇性</b></p><p><b>

40、　　艾美麗</b></p><p>　　我在這探討的怨恨是由感染并有可能傳染蔓延的傷口引發(fā)的怨恨. 這種傷害不是必要的, 也不是偶然的: 沒有人怨恨人生不免一死或最普通的感冒. 感染了而持久的怨恨可針對環(huán)境, 情況, 人或團體. </p><p><b>　　怨恨和憤慨. </b></p><p>　　雖然怨恨往往與憤慨并存,

41、并時時結合, 但是根據其典型的發(fā)生順序及產生的后果依舊可將兩者區(qū)分開來. 有針對性的怨恨的背后通常有著一個哀怨的故事. 犯過者被認定應為那些他們不應該也可以避免不犯的傷害承擔責任. 即使在被不明的人傷害的情況下, 受害者易可有怨恨, 那么有針對性怨恨通常都會在點名道姓指責犯過者時表現出來: 巴勒斯坦人不滿人們對 (在他們看來) 以色列占領他們土地的寬恕. 在這種情況下, 懷有怨恨的人往往把會極其細致地描述他們憤懣, 怨恨和不平; 他們往

42、往對侵犯他們的不懷好意, 但他們不需要有一個有關他們情況的普遍的正義論. </p><p>　　與忍受著有針對性的怨恨的人不同, 一些憤慨的人總試圖代表其他遭受了類似恥辱或壓迫的人. 他們不針對具體的犯過者, 而往往籠統地描述他們的憤慨, 概括地表明他們的怨恨是有理的. 比如在一些孩子不能得到良好的教育和足夠的醫(yī)療保障的時候, 他們的父母會在不怪罪任何一個特定官員的情況下, 通過一些寬泛的原則來發(fā)泄自己的憤慨

43、, 如:"不平等的歧視是不尊重、不公平、不公正的." 同樣, 一個有著在德國生活三代的家庭的土耳其人會在同樣一個在德國有生活了四代的南非人能得到所有公民的權利和利益感到自己權利被剝奪. 雖然土耳其人對公民身份的標準抱有很強硬的態(tài)度, 但他們不必對德國籍南非移民的后裔懷有積怨或希望他們受到任何傷害. 對環(huán)境不滿的人通常找替罪羊, 指責他們?yōu)橥? 批評他們在現狀面前裝傻, 自欺欺人. </p><p

44、>　　怨恨的憤慨本身, 在沒有攙雜怒火時, 是不需要采取什么補救措施的. 但當憤慨變成狂怒時, 它就滋生了報復和懲罰的思想傾向. 像亞里士多德所說的: “憤怒可以界定為對自己或身邊的朋友所遭受的痛苦的, 不應得的對待的報復”. </p><p><b>　　怨恨和嫉妒. </b></p><p>　　怨恨和嫉妒像一對兄弟, 你中有我我中有你. 兩者都是對不平

45、等分配的權益或特權的聲張. 但是, 當嫉妒的人的痛苦和幻想和與怨恨的人的相像時, 嫉妒的人不必把這種自然或社會的競爭選擇結果的不公平歸咎于惡意的破壞或串通的陰謀. 他們甚至不必認為有不公平、不公正的模式. 當一個社會建立于對資源和物質的競爭基礎上時, 其產生的欲望促使嫉妒的產生-不管對財富還是影響力, 權利還是榮耀的嫉妒. 嫉妒的競爭有時是得到推崇的. 因為人們相信它擦出了創(chuàng)新的火花, 成為生產的動力. 嫉妒有時是不能被安撫的一種渴望.

46、 它與怨恨的關系常常是被抑制的, 它本身對社會的公害也往往被忽略. 嫉妒的人會深深陷入其欲望與抱負, 參與對其產生的傷害和痛苦的結構中, 以至于把個人的處境與失敗都歸咎于自己. 這時他們的怨恨變轉向自己了: 他們對自己產生不滿, 對這個或那個缺點自責, 卻沒有認識到他們是一種普遍現象的一部分. </p><p>　　尼采至少在一件事上是對的: 對于不同意他的絕對自由與自創(chuàng)的個人的夢想的那些人, 他的描述還

47、是準確和清晰的. 我們在客觀上和實際上都是互相依賴的. 我們自視道德高尚地把相互比較看作很惡劣的行為. 但其實在我們生活的這個世界上, 一直就有著對權利的階級的比較的測試和爭辯. 即使自力自律的愛默生信仰者們也要同化他們所說的對其他人的一暼. </p><p>　　不論是通過何種形式表現出來, 怨恨的根源始于權力的不平衡的不滿和對物質, 權益和特權的不公平分配的不滿. 由于分布的范圍和公正的標準度, 公平度有

48、所不同, 怨恨, 嫉妒和憤慨的體現和理由也有所不同. 誰擁有對正義的界定和分配的權利? 是軍事實力、政治或經濟優(yōu)勢, 金融的掌控、知識的權威、魅力和號召力, 還是口才? 無論這個因素是什么, 無論我們認為它是什么, 我們尋求這個因素因為這體現了我們本身的價值, 還因為我們認為這符合我們的利益. 有關控制權的斗爭體現在政治的活躍中、社會生活的細節(jié)中, 甚至是學術的期刊中. 強大的一派的行動常遇到對應的挑戰(zhàn). 但在兩種力量的對抗一直不平衡的

49、情況下, 當弱的一方無法訴諸任何幫助尋求補償時, 他們越來越強烈的怨恨會轉變成摧毀型的破壞力量. 在其極端的形式下, 共同存亡的思想便造成隨意公開的自我毀滅和滅亡. </p><p>　　對于我們這些不管怎樣依舊把自己看成進步的啟蒙運動 (啟蒙運動: 普遍教育, 公正的執(zhí)法與公平的分配) 的一員的人來說, “寧死不屈"這個座右銘是讓人無法理喻的. 盡管我們這些不能確定啟蒙運動到底是否只是個空的理想和

50、幻想的人對永無休止地怨恨報復深感不安, 即使這些反叛都離我們很遠, 發(fā)生在一些我們不能想象的人身上, 它依舊威脅著我們對世界的了解和我們最終對自身的了解. </p><p>　　憤慨和嫉妒產生于空頭的許諾和對合理預期的否認. 像所有的態(tài)度一樣, 怨恨有的建立在真正了解上, 而有的則是誤解; 有的反應過于激烈有的則不足; 有的可以被熟練或笨拙地表現出來; 他們可能或已經無法擁有適當的治療方案. </p&g

51、t;<p>　　怨恨的戲劇性進一步提出了難題. 代表其它人而怨恨是否得當, 特別是當被壓迫的人不認為自己受到了傷害的時候? 當然家長往往代表孩子發(fā)表不滿, 但是孩子本身并沒有意識到自己受了委屈. 政治改革者往往代表一個被壓迫階級表示不滿, 他們認為被壓迫階級是受到哄騙而接受了現狀. 當然, 這種設身處地的不滿通常都帶著怨恨或憤怒. 但在分類上的含糊不清導致這個緊迫問題沒有被解決: 什么情況下我們有權代表應該去怨恨而又沒有的

52、這些人? 什么時候應喚醒這些不滿和憤慨, 把它們組織起來作為政治工具以服務改革? 即使是最積極的改革派政治革命人士、工會組織, 都認為只有后代可能從他們希望喚醒的不公正中得益. 這些問題的背后有公民對公民啟蒙的義務的范圍和限制. 這便是另一個話題了. </p><p>　　到目前為止, 我只說到了怨恨的黑暗面. 現在談談其正面意義. 像所有的態(tài)度和姿態(tài)一樣, 怨恨也有兩面性. 像所有的態(tài)度一樣, 它即可以是建

53、設性也可以是破壞性的, 但不可否認兩者有時幾乎無法區(qū)分. </p><p>　　關于怨恨的辯護適用于其不公平與公平的形式, 甚至適用于那些誤解產生的怨恨. 這個辯護主要有兩點. 首先, 無論其是否準確、公正, 抑郁的怨恨確實比摧毀房子與城市的力量的威力還大. 在我們試圖壓制怨恨之前, 我們應該問問: 有什么是其它可能的選擇? 有時積怨的確比狂怒更好些. 但你可能會問, 如果壓制僅僅是拖延而最終導致怨恨爆發(fā)呢?

54、 試想李查德三世的例子. 誠然如此. 然而, 在話語或有象征性的手勢中表現出的怨恨, 在藝術和習俗中表現出的蔑視, 是一回事. 怨恨在暴力行動的直接體現, 又是另一回事. 但象征性的怨恨的表達的作用不僅僅是作為心理安全閥, 以排放怒氣. 恰恰相反, 它作為一項重要指標, 反映了事情中出的差錯, 指出事情必須被認識和糾正. </p><p>　　對于怨恨辯護的第二步是個比喻. 任何一個疾病的癥狀, 發(fā)燒、發(fā)冷、

55、頭暈, 都是讓人不安的. 但打壓或超越它們是不明智的, 試圖擺脫感覺它們的能力忽視它們也是不明智的. 因為這些跡象顯示有些事情是錯誤的. 由于疾病的主要根源往往與其表現的癥狀有差距, 這就要求了過硬的技術診斷工作. </p><p>　　怨恨也是如此. 怨恨是一種發(fā)燒、一種有暈眩癥狀的錯亂的疾病. 怨恨沒有被給予正確的位置去明確自己的病情基本來源. 怨恨的表現可以極其雄辯, 但伴有嫉妒、仇恨、憤怒的怨恨, 其

56、表現出的強烈感情倒不一定有說服力. 這些感情的結合通常產生恐懼, 從而產生更多更新的嚴厲的鎮(zhèn)壓. </p><p>　　另一個不那么戲劇性, 但更悲慘的戲劇場面便是當那些應該不滿的人感到羞恥, 甚至有時被迫對他們的狀況感到羞恥. 確實, 占主導地位的權力為了保持其控制時, 會以絕對的惡意舉動企圖使不滿的人懷疑他們自己憤怒的權利. 這種對受傷者的加劇傷害, 有時會成功的壓制怨恨, 使他們幾乎毫無自衛(wèi)能力.

57、</p><p>　　當然, 辯證的怨恨不一定走向自覺的惡意. 無端的權力的失衡, 在導致失信與失望時, 可能是意外或偶然的. 不幸的是, 即使被怨恨的對象-這些毫無領導才能的壓迫階級-都善意地想努力解決這些怨恨的根本時, 他們有時卻只是加固權利的不平衡, 進一步導致怨恨. </p><p>　　怨恨在良好的情況下, 能創(chuàng)造性地去發(fā)明以及被動地去破壞. 相互報復的循環(huán)的升級可能會喚醒對