金融專業(yè)外文翻譯------自上而下預(yù)算效益的實(shí)證證據(jù)

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Empirical Evidence of the Benefits of Top-down Budgeting</p><p>　　The empirical studi

2、es of the relationship between institutions and fiscal performance provide support for the assumption that a top-down process is associated with lower deficits and debts. In his pioneering study of budget procedures of 1

3、2 EU-member countries, von Hagen(1992) tests the hypothesis that a top-down process in the preparatory phase of the budget, and a top-down decision-making order in parliamentary approval is more conducive to fiscal disci

4、pline than bottom-up procedures. These tw</p><p>　　Against these studies stands Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) who construct an index of the procedural fragmentation of the budget process, broadly correspond

5、ing to a top-down and a bottom-up preparation process. Although they demonstrate that a lower level of fragmentation (i.e., a more top-down oriented process) is associated with a lower deficit, lower expenditure and lowe

6、r revenue, the relationship is found to be weak.</p><p>　　While supportive of the hypothesis that top-down budgeting is conducive to aggregate fiscal discipline, there are some limitations to these studies,

7、however. First, the studies construct composite indices, consisting of several institutional aspects, and test their relationship with fiscal performance to arrive at these results. It is, therefore, not possible to sepa

8、rate out the contribution of the top-down procedure. Second, as discussed above, it is in practice a matter of interpretation of de</p><p>　　A top-down approach to the preparation of the budget requires proc

9、edures for establishing the aggregate expenditure level and the sectoral allocation of the budget. It also changes the focus and dynamics of the negotiations between the ministry of finance and line ministries.</p>

10、<p>　　A stylized characterization of the budget process is valuable for analyzing factors that are relevant for how government finances evolve over time. The use of such abstractions of reality should not lose sig

11、ht of the fact that budgets are shaped in a highly political environment, where there is often pressure to deviate from what is optimal from a collective point of view. Therefore, when designing the institutional framewo

12、rk it becomes necessary to find a pragmatic balance between a theoretical</p><p>　　A central feature of the budget process is that decisions are the result of negotiations between numerous players—the presid

13、ent, prime minister, the minister of finance, individual line ministers, agency executives, civil servants, and parliamentarians—and that the balance of fiscal authority has an impact on the outcome. Any alteration of th

14、e existing order will be acceptable only if a player’s loss of influence in one area is compensated by increased influence in some other area. Strengthening</p><p>　　The single most important decision for th

15、e government is to determine the size of government. In a top-down process, this issue is formalized by setting a limit on total expenditure at the very early stage of budget preparation. As discussed by Ljungman (2008),

16、 there are arguments for establishing such limits well in advance of the start of the budget process through binding medium-term aggregate expenditure ceilings. Although not derived directly from a top-down concept, a me

17、dium-term approach </p><p>　　From one perspective, the overall expenditure limit can be viewed as a highly ideological decision. The size of the budget is a reflection of a commitment to provide goods, servi

18、ces, and social protection, and provides the amount of resources that are to be consumed, invested, or transferred. Such a fundamental decision has to be made by political assemblies(i.e., the cabinet of ministers and pa

19、rliament).</p><p>　　From another angle, the determination of the expenditure limit is a technical issue, which requires the expertise of professionals in the ministry of finance. A qualified assessment of th

20、e room for expenditure has to be based on a projection of available resources—in terms of expected revenue—and an analysis of the adequate fiscal policy given prevailing economic conditions.</p><p>　　Paralle

21、l to these two perspectives is the risk of insufficient accuracy of macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts. A bias can, in some cases, be explained by inadequate forecasting techniques. Another possibility is the existence o

22、f political pressure to paint a positive development. Such a tendency does not have to come as direct interference with the forecasts, but could be the result of civil servants’ unwillingness to present bad news.</p&g

23、t;<p>　　An implicit assumption in a top-down approach is that the budget process is comprehensive, in the sense that all—or at least a significant part of—expenditure is covered by the government budget. The exist

24、ence of separate budgets through extra budgetary funds or significant use of revenue budgeted and accounted for on a net basis, diminishes the disciplining effect of an aggregate expenditure limit.</p><p>　　

25、The expenditure limit is also affected by the government’s assessment of the need for countercyclical fiscal policy. Recognizing that in certain circumstances it may be necessary to accelerate the return to equilibrium G

26、DP-levels through expansionary or contractionary fiscal policies, arguments for temporary deviations from the long-term budget balance position have to be taken into account when determining the level of total expenditur

27、e. Primarily this involves estimating the effect of the auto</p><p>　　A policy stage where the government discusses and establishes sector allocations—preferably in a medium-term context—provides structure a

28、nd stability to the budget process. Considering the heterogeneity of constitutional arrangements, public sector management traditions and political conditions, it is difficult to generalize procedures that are appropriat

29、ion all circumstances. Some elements of an allocative phase appear to be important, however.</p><p>　　The allocation of the budget to key sectors is essentially an expression of political priorities. The amo

30、unt of resources allocated to various objectives such as education, defense, regional development, infrastructure, unemployment support, or social welfare, is the characterizing difference between political parties or fa

31、ctions within parties. Determining the allocation of the budget to overall sectors is, from this perspective, a stage that should attract significant attention, as it is at th</p><p>　　For a given year, most

32、 expenditure is fixed by legally binding contracts, civil service employment legislation and annual agreements on salary increases, explicit commitments to specific areas or entitlement legislation. Radical changes are r

33、arely possible from one year to another. Budget policy can be redirected, but noticeable results may take longer than one year. When taking into account the inertia of current policies, a significant part of setting sect

34、or allocations becomes a politically u</p><p>　　The contentious issue is, therefore, to determine how to distribute any additional room for expenditure—or if so demanded, where to make expenditure cuts—which

35、 is a significantly more manageable undertaking than making a full reassessment of government policies. In addition, the discretion wielded by the government is often limited by policy commitments made earlier through co

36、alition agreements, party manifestos, political programs, or by statements by the president, prime minister or other repr</p><p>　　This view of the process highlights the importance of having a capacity to m

37、ake accurate expenditure projections. Unless the allocation to sectors is based on a qualified assessment of the cost of continuing current policies and the cost of new initiatives, its usefulness becomes highly question

38、able. Insufficient understanding of the expenditure dynamics of government policies is a widespread obstacle for budget management.</p><p>　　A stringent top-down procedure presupposes that decisions made ear

39、lier in the budget process are respected and adhered to. This implies that the overall ceiling and the sector allocations are politically realistic. A minimum accepted level of funding for the various sectors must be mad

40、e available in the budget, and this allocation must be supported by a sufficient number of members in the decision-making body. Some kind of endorsement of the sectoral allocations, which can be referred to at late</p

41、><p>　　In order for sector ceilings to be effective in the process of preparing the budget, it is vital that they are operational. For this reason, they have to be defined in a dimension that can be easily tran

42、slated to the classification of the budget and the organizational structure of the government administration. Sector ceilings stretching over several ministries necessitate a coordination that may be difficult to achieve

43、 in practice. In order to ensure adherence to the ceilings, it is, furthermor</p><p>　　Source: Ljungman. 2009.Top-down Budgeting--A Instrument to Strengthen Budget Management. IMF Working Paper, 243. pp.10-1

44、6.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p>　　自上而下預(yù)算效益的實(shí)證證據(jù)</p><p>　　有關(guān)機(jī)構(gòu)和財(cái)政績效兩者關(guān)系的實(shí)證研究，為一個(gè)自上而下的決策流程假設(shè)提供支持，自上而下的決策流程同較低的赤字和債務(wù)聯(lián)系在一起。在對(duì)十二個(gè)歐盟成員國的國家預(yù)算程序的開創(chuàng)性研究中，馮·哈根(1992)驗(yàn)證了預(yù)算籌備階段中自上

45、而下決策流程的假設(shè)。在議會(huì)中一個(gè)自上而下的決策程序要比自下而上的決策程序更有利于財(cái)政方案的批準(zhǔn)。決策程序的兩方面都包含在具有預(yù)算過程特征的結(jié)構(gòu)指數(shù)中，該指數(shù)與債務(wù)和赤字水平有重要關(guān)系。德哈恩與斯特姆(1994)擴(kuò)大了研究范圍來控制政府組成和保持政府穩(wěn)定，并驗(yàn)證了包括自上而下的預(yù)算程序在內(nèi)一定的預(yù)算機(jī)制與更穩(wěn)健的財(cái)政政策密切相關(guān)。沃(2003)采取了類似的方法構(gòu)造了一個(gè)指數(shù)，這個(gè)指數(shù)廣泛地應(yīng)用于自上而下預(yù)算準(zhǔn)備程序。當(dāng)把馮·哈根

46、的研究擴(kuò)展到包括東亞九個(gè)國家在內(nèi)，沃證實(shí)了這些制度安排和財(cái)政成果之間的牢固關(guān)系。格雷(2003)關(guān)注中東歐國家的編制預(yù)算草案和自上而下的議會(huì)決策程序的批準(zhǔn)過程。他得出結(jié)論認(rèn)為，更嚴(yán)格的預(yù)算機(jī)制將對(duì)這些國家的赤字和債務(wù)產(chǎn)生積極影響。易勞特(2004)也在研究中東歐國家，包括預(yù)算籌備的決策標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和議會(huì)審批程序，因此證實(shí)了較早前的結(jié)果。</p><p>　　針對(duì)這些研究，佩羅蒂和卡特·保羅斯(2002)他們構(gòu)建

47、了預(yù)算過程中的程序性分化指數(shù)，該指數(shù)大致相當(dāng)于一個(gè)自上而下和自下而上的準(zhǔn)備過程。盡管它們表現(xiàn)出較低水平的程序（即一個(gè)更自上而下化的過程）是與低赤字、 低開支和低收入相關(guān)，但這種關(guān)系受到了削弱。</p><p>　　雖然自上而下的預(yù)算過程假設(shè)是有利于財(cái)政法案獲得支持，但是對(duì)這些研究仍有一些局限。首先，研究構(gòu)建綜合指數(shù)，這個(gè)指數(shù)包含一些體制方面的問題,并測試它們與財(cái)政狀況的關(guān)系所形成的結(jié)果, 因此不可能區(qū)分自上而下流

48、程作出的貢獻(xiàn)。其次，正如以上所討論的，它實(shí)際上是對(duì)一個(gè)所謂的預(yù)算過程問題的解釋，這種預(yù)算過程目前主要是自上而下或自下而上的進(jìn)程。不同的研究會(huì)得出不同的結(jié)論。第三，這些研究要依賴于正式的機(jī)構(gòu)，但在現(xiàn)實(shí)中的預(yù)算過程很可能受大量的非正式條件的制約。艾哈特等人(2006)采取了一種不同的方法，得出測試時(shí)決定的結(jié)果對(duì)預(yù)算過程的結(jié)果有影響。在一系列可控制的試驗(yàn)中，他們表明預(yù)算結(jié)果的大小確實(shí)受到自下而上或自上而下的決策過程的影響，但對(duì)于自上而下的程序

49、能生成較小預(yù)算而言卻沒有統(tǒng)一的趨勢。嚴(yán)格地說，預(yù)算程序的目的是為了避免過多的赤字和確保一個(gè)可持續(xù)的財(cái)政狀況，而不是減少開支水平。因此，結(jié)果是既不支持也不反對(duì)自上而下的預(yù)算。然而，這項(xiàng)研究的第二個(gè)結(jié)果是復(fù)雜的是昂貴的，而且規(guī)模支出數(shù)量的增加（即更多的預(yù)算項(xiàng)目）和更少的信息需要更多輪投票來達(dá)到一種均衡。綜上所述，由于預(yù)算由一定量的撥款組成，信息收集的過程存在一</p><p>　　對(duì)于預(yù)算準(zhǔn)備而言，一種自上而下的方法

50、要求建立總開支水平和部門預(yù)算的分配程序。這也改變了財(cái)政部和相關(guān)部委之間談判的焦點(diǎn)和動(dòng)力。</p><p>　　一個(gè)預(yù)算過程的程序化定性分析因素是分析隨著時(shí)間的推移如何體現(xiàn)政府財(cái)政狀況相關(guān)因素的價(jià)值。這種對(duì)現(xiàn)實(shí)抽象化的使用不應(yīng)忽視，實(shí)際上預(yù)算是在一個(gè)高度的政治環(huán)境中得以制定，在這種環(huán)境中經(jīng)常有壓力使其背離從集體角度看是最優(yōu)的東西。因此，在設(shè)計(jì)體制框架時(shí)，找到一個(gè)嚴(yán)格理論模型和妥協(xié)所需框架之間的平衡是必需的。<

51、/p><p>　　預(yù)算過程的一個(gè)核心特點(diǎn)是眾多政府成員之間談判妥協(xié)的結(jié)果，這些成員包括總統(tǒng)、總理、財(cái)政部長、個(gè)人信息部長、機(jī)構(gòu)代理人員、公務(wù)員以及議員?，F(xiàn)存秩序的任何改革，當(dāng)且僅當(dāng)政府要員在某個(gè)有影響的領(lǐng)域中增加損失而在其他領(lǐng)域中的影響得以補(bǔ)償?shù)那闆r下，才可以接受。加強(qiáng)預(yù)算過程的自上而下的特征不得不考慮到角色和職責(zé)的重新分配，這在一個(gè)很大程度上是為了解決一系列的財(cái)政權(quán)力分散和集權(quán)的弊端。從財(cái)政部（或在國會(huì)、 財(cái)務(wù)或預(yù)

52、算委員會(huì)）的角度來看，對(duì)預(yù)算的詳細(xì)信息的舍棄以換取更大總體參數(shù)的權(quán)力。從部委或部門委員會(huì)來看，在總支出和部門分配的方面自上而下流程引入強(qiáng)硬程度和限制因素，從而減少了部門利益范圍的擴(kuò)大。如果通過增加各部門的靈活性或者如果在各部委意見相結(jié)合的的意義上進(jìn)行改革是可信的，這才可以接受。</p><p>　　對(duì)于政府而言最重要決定是確定政府的規(guī)模。在自上而下的進(jìn)程中，這一問題是通過在預(yù)算編制的最初階段設(shè)置總開支的限額加以具

53、體化。正如勒俊所討論的那樣，在預(yù)算過程初始階段，通過具有約束力的中期總支出預(yù)算來較好地建立這些限制是有爭論的，盡管這種觀念沒有直接來源于自上而下的預(yù)算程序，但一個(gè)中期的財(cái)政預(yù)算及其編制方法對(duì)于確?？傊С鱿揞~達(dá)到預(yù)期目標(biāo)是十分重要的。</p><p>　　從這個(gè)角度看，設(shè)定總開支限額可以被視為一個(gè)極具思想性的決定。預(yù)算的規(guī)模是提供商品、服務(wù)和社會(huì)保護(hù)承諾的反映，并提供大量的消費(fèi)、投資或融資的資源。這種根本性的決定必

54、須由政治集團(tuán)（內(nèi)閣部長和議會(huì)）作出。</p><p>　　從另一個(gè)角度看，該支出限額的界定是一個(gè)技術(shù)問題，這需要財(cái)政部專業(yè)人才的專業(yè)知識(shí)。對(duì)于這一領(lǐng)域內(nèi)的支出考核，必須根據(jù)有利資源（一定時(shí)期內(nèi)可預(yù)見收入）的預(yù)測和當(dāng)時(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)條件下充分的財(cái)政政策分析。</p><p>　　平行于這兩種觀點(diǎn)是宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)和財(cái)政預(yù)測不夠準(zhǔn)確的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。在某些情況下，預(yù)測技術(shù)可以用來解釋這種偏置。另一種可能性是政治壓力所描繪

55、出積極發(fā)展的存在。這種趨勢不必直接影響預(yù)測，但這可能是政府官員不愿意呈現(xiàn)壞消息的結(jié)果。</p><p>　　一個(gè)自上而下的方法所隱含的假設(shè)是全面的預(yù)算過程，也就是說在一定意義上所有或至少大部分開支政府預(yù)算都會(huì)涉及的。對(duì)于單獨(dú)預(yù)算基金或預(yù)算外收入和凈額的使用，削弱了總支出限額的規(guī)范作用。 </p><p>　　總開支限額也受到政府對(duì)反周期的財(cái)政政策的評(píng)估的影響。必須意識(shí)到在某些情況下，擴(kuò)

56、張性或緊縮性的財(cái)政政策能使其加速回歸到國民生產(chǎn)總值的平衡水平。當(dāng)確定總開支水平的時(shí)候，從長期預(yù)算平衡角度，必須考慮到暫時(shí)性偏差參數(shù)。這主要涉及估算對(duì)預(yù)算總支出方面的自動(dòng)穩(wěn)定器的作用。在經(jīng)濟(jì)特別嚴(yán)重衰退時(shí)，總開支限額也可能是財(cái)政政策的自動(dòng)穩(wěn)定器的必要補(bǔ)充。</p><p>　　政府討論和建立分段性任務(wù)（尤其在中期階段）的政策階段為預(yù)算過程提供了結(jié)構(gòu)?？紤]到憲法的規(guī)定及公共部門的管理傳統(tǒng)和政治條件的異質(zhì)性，很難一概而

57、論該種程序適用于所有情況。但是資源配置階段的一些要素似乎是重要的。</p><p>　　預(yù)算分配的關(guān)鍵是政治優(yōu)先權(quán)的表達(dá)。不同數(shù)量的預(yù)算資源調(diào)撥到各種各樣的領(lǐng)域諸如教育，國防，區(qū)域發(fā)展，基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，失業(yè)救濟(jì)或社會(huì)福利，是執(zhí)政黨或黨內(nèi)派別之間的不同特征。從這個(gè)角度看，因?yàn)樵谶@段時(shí)間內(nèi)財(cái)政政策需要制定，所以確定預(yù)算分配的整體行業(yè)是一個(gè)重要的階段應(yīng)引起重視。然而，新一輪的預(yù)算編制不給人以無限的時(shí)間去重新評(píng)估政府的政策。&

58、lt;/p><p>　　在特定的年里，大部分的開支由具有法律約束力的合約、公務(wù)員就業(yè)立法和每年工資的漲幅協(xié)議、對(duì)特定領(lǐng)域或權(quán)利立法所確定。根本性變化幾乎不可能年年發(fā)生。預(yù)算政策可以被重新定向，但明顯的成效可能需要較長時(shí)間才得以顯現(xiàn)。當(dāng)考慮到目前的政策的連貫性，設(shè)置部門?？畹闹匾M成部分成為正確估計(jì)已經(jīng)實(shí)施的政府開支的政治上相安無事的過程。</p><p>　　因此，爭論的焦點(diǎn)是決定如何區(qū)分總開

59、支預(yù)算中增加的部分（或者說如果這樣要求，政府預(yù)算需在哪些領(lǐng)域削減開支），這比制定一個(gè)完全的政府政策更具有操作性。此外，自由裁量權(quán)通常是由早些時(shí)候通過聯(lián)合協(xié)議，政黨宣言，政治綱領(lǐng)，或由總統(tǒng)，總理或政府其他代表的發(fā)言作出的政策承諾。因此需要在資源分配階段，實(shí)現(xiàn)一定程度上政策承諾，并將其轉(zhuǎn)化為一個(gè)連貫的支出計(jì)劃。</p><p>　　這過程的觀點(diǎn)強(qiáng)調(diào)了有能力準(zhǔn)確作出支出預(yù)測的重要性。除非各部門的分配是基于對(duì)當(dāng)前的持續(xù)性

60、政策和新措施的成本費(fèi)用考核是合格的，否則它的用處變得非常值得懷疑。對(duì)政府政策的不透徹的理解是一個(gè)動(dòng)態(tài)的支出預(yù)算管理的普遍障礙。</p><p>　　一個(gè)嚴(yán)格的自上而下的決策過程的先決條件是在預(yù)算過程中更早得到尊重和遵守。這意味著整體部門的撥款是政治性現(xiàn)實(shí)。各部門最低可接受籌資水平必須在現(xiàn)有的預(yù)算內(nèi)，而且這必須得到分配中的決策機(jī)構(gòu)足夠數(shù)量的支持。一些部門分配可以被稱為在預(yù)算過程的后期階段，通過預(yù)算是必要的，盡管這個(gè)

61、決定的確切模式是按國家的具體國情確定。除非在特殊的情況下，施政綱領(lǐng)是完全只由一個(gè)或少數(shù)人決定的行政條款，在資源分配階段將涉及整個(gè)內(nèi)閣。</p><p>　　為了使部門能有效執(zhí)行預(yù)算，預(yù)算制定過程是非常重要的,以至于他們能正常運(yùn)作。由于這個(gè)原因,它們必須被定義為在一個(gè)范圍內(nèi)可以很容易地分類的政府組織的預(yù)算結(jié)構(gòu)。部門超過主要目標(biāo)部分可能難以在實(shí)踐中達(dá)到協(xié)調(diào)。為了確保遵守了主要目標(biāo),這在預(yù)算的編制過程中是重要的而且需要