金融學(xué)專業(yè)外文翻譯--格萊珉銀行的歷程

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>　　外文題目：The Story of the Grameen Bank </p><p>　　出 處：Brooks world Poverty institute </p><p>

2、;　　作 者：David Hulme </p><p><b>　　原 文：</b></p><p>　　The Story of the Grameen Bank</p><p>　　David Hulme </p><p>　　Abs

3、tract This paper looks at the establishment and evolution of the iconic Grameen Bank of Bangladesh. It traces the development of the Bank from its origins, providing microcredit to poor, rural women in Bangladesh, thro

4、ugh a period of national expansion and institutionalisation, to the replication around the world of the Grameen model. In the late 1990s the Bank faced repayment problems and a developing financial crisis, and strategies

5、 were put in place to stabilise and reshape the Bank. Thi</p><p>　　Keywords microfinance, micro-enterprise, credit financing</p><p>　　Introduction</p><p>　　The Grameen Bank of Bang

6、ladesh holds an iconic position in the world of microfinance. It is credited with proving that ‘the poor are bankable’; the Grameen ‘model’ has been copied in more than 40 countries; it is the most widely cited developme

7、nt success story in the world; and its charismatic Founder-Director, Professor Muhammad Yunus, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006. By the end of February 2008 it had 7.4 million clients and outstanding loans of $5

8、45 million. By any measure it is an </p><p>　　The group-based lending model, targeted at poor, rural women, that is synonymous with the Grameen Bank contrasts markedly with the two other iconic microfinance

9、institutions, Bank Rakyat Indonesia and BancoSol of Bolivia. The original Grameen Bank model comes out of what Robinson calls a ‘poverty lending’ approach, rather than the ‘financial systems’ approach that she, the Cons

10、ultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), and many US microfinance specialists prefer. However, unnoticed by many obse</p><p>　　Early days </p><p>　　As Professor Yunus reports in his autobiogra

11、phy (Yunus, 1999), and as Fuglesang and </p><p>　　Chandler (1986) record, the origins of the Grameen Bank lie in the dilemma that the </p><p>　　young Yunus found himself facing in the mid-1970s.

12、 Having completed his PhD in the USA, he had returned to Bangladesh to lecture in economics at Chittagong University. However, he found himself wondering what relevance the economic theory he taught had to the immediate

13、needs of the thousands of hungry and deprived people he saw in rural Bangladesh. The country was slowly recovering from a vicious war of independence that had destroyed its infrastructure and its productivity and murdere

14、d much of </p><p>　　Yunus could try to help people by giving them charity, but he wondered whether some of his economic theory could be applied in the field. His training postulated that if people got access

15、 to credit they could increase their profitability, or diversify their economic activities, in ways that would allow them to raise their incomes. So, if he could lend some poor people his money they could improve their l

16、ives and pay him back. Then, he could lend the money to other poor people and thus assist man</p><p>　　It was an interesting theory, but his initial experiments seemed to show it was invalid. </p><

17、;p>　　Quite a few of the men and women he lent to did not repay their small loans (sums of </p><p>　　US$10 or 20). He thought that this was because they had either used the money unwisely (for consumption

18、or poorly planned microenterprises) or were not trustworthy. As a result, he began to experiment with ways of (i) approving and supervising loans, to ensure they would be used for productive investments, and (ii) selecti

19、ng trustworthy clients and managing them, so that they would repay their loans.</p><p>　　Eventually he came up with a model that worked. This had a number of features: </p><p>　　? Lending to poo

20、r, rural women (as they were less likely than men to use loans badly and were more reliable for repayment). </p><p>　　? Organising women into cells of five, that took collective responsibility for each other

21、’s loans (creating social collateral and a peer screening process). </p><p>　　? Establishing Kendro (centres) where six cells (i.e. 30 women) met, at a set time each week, to apply for loans and make repayme

22、nts. </p><p>　　? Charging a higher rate of interest than government schemes and NGO loans programmes. </p><p>　　? Requiring clients to make compulsory microsavings each week (to create financial

23、 discipline and generate financial collateral for groups), and to make promises about their social conduct. </p><p>　　? Simple, standardised products that required regular, small repayments. </p><

24、p>　　? Recruiting and training bright, young graduates to administer services (to minimise corruption).</p><p>　　There were many other carefully designed elements of this ‘Grameen model’ (see Fuglesang and

25、 Chandler (1986) for details). It certainly appeared to work, and Yunus </p><p>　　was able to persuade the state-run Bangladesh Krishi Bank (BKB) to finance and house the experiment. Donor agencies, such as

26、the Ford Foundation, became involved.</p><p>　　Expansion and institutionalisation </p><p>　　The early success of the Grameen model was matched by Professor Yunus’s personal energy and enthusiasm

27、. But, to expand the Bank he needed more finance and a robust</p><p>　　organisational structure. The finance was not too much of a problem. In the early 1980s there were many foreign aid agencies in Banglade

28、sh facing a big problem: most of the grants they made to government agencies were only weakly accounted for and they appeared to achieve little development impact. </p><p>　　Achieving an effective organisati

29、onal structure was, perhaps, more challenging. If he stayed with BKB, then as the Grameen Bank expanded it would be likely to take on the characteristics of the country’s nationalised commercial banks: nepotistic staff r

30、ecruitment and promotion, financial corruption, the politicisation of the loan portfolio, and an offhand attitude towards clients. The alternatives – registering as a Bank or as a cooperative – were not attractive. So, w

31、ith great insight and caref</p><p>　　Over the 1980s and early 1990s the Grameen Bank steadily expanded, with large inflows of donor funding. By 1991it had more than one million clients and a growing range of

32、 products – housing loans, agricultural loans and others. Alongside this, both the profiles of the Bank and of Yunus became increasingly international. International transfer replication </p><p>　　As the 198

33、0s progressed, an increasing amount of Grameen Bank senior management time was devoted to exporting the Grameen Bank model. I first became acquainted with the Grameen model in 1987, while researching rural finance in Sri

34、 Lanka. At the time it seemed that almost every NGO and donor project I visited had staff who had recently returned from a visit to the Grameen Bank. Most of these staff were very impressed with what they had seen and ta

35、lked of ‘replicating’ the model. The Asian Develop</p><p>　　The idea of replicating the Grameen Bank around the world crystallised when the US-</p><p>　　based group RESULTS and its Director, an

36、experienced lobbyist, came up with the idea of a Microcredit Summit. Since 1990, the UN had convened a set of global summits that had set goals for poverty reduction, education, gender equality and other issues. The 1997

37、 Microcredit Summit was not a UN event – it was organised by RESULTS – but it presented as a global summit, with claims of ‘microcredit is a human right’ and speeches from heads of state. It set a goal of mobilising US$2

38、1.6 billion, so tha</p><p>　　Can the Grameen Bank go bust? </p><p>　　As the Grameen model was ‘exported’ overseas during the 1990s, the Bank continued to grow in Bangladesh. Client numbers grew

39、steadily, but the portfolio grew more quickly as clients took bigger ordinary loans and new types of loans (especially housing). Those of us working in Bangladesh increasingly heard that repayment rates were falling, but

40、 that branch managers were massaging their performance figures by issuing new loans to defaulters. These were immediately used to pay off the outstanding l</p><p>　　From Grameen I to Grameen II </p>&

41、lt;p>　　The problems faced by Grameen Bank in the late 1990s led to its senior staff piloting a number of experiments with new products and new ways of managing service provision. By early 2001 these had been consolida

42、ted and Professor Yunus announced the launch of ‘Grameen II’ – the replacement of the Bank’s earlier products by a new range on different terms. The components of Grameen II were designed so that (i) they should meet cli

43、ent demand, and (ii) they should be profitable for the Bank. Between M</p><p>　　The main elements of Grameen II are: </p><p>　　? A major focus on savings from members and the public. This includ

44、es voluntary savings, term deposits and the Grameen Pension Scheme (GPS) – a long-term savings programme. </p><p>　　? The provision of flexible ‘basic loans’ to members (rather than the standardised Grameen

45、I 12-month loans). These are for variable amounts, can be repaid over three to 36 months, have negotiable repayment schedules and interest rates are determined by loan type (size, length, grace period, etc). </p>

46、<p>　　? The abandonment of joint liability (and the idea of social collateral). </p><p>　　? A poverty-focused ‘struggling members’ programme, that provides small, subsidised loans to beggars and encoura

47、ges them to join Grameen Bank centres. </p><p>　　The future of the Grameen Bank </p><p>　　The Grameen Bank looks as though it has a secure future as an MFI in Bangladesh and should remain a majo

48、r player in the microfinance market, alongside other big players, such as ASA and BRAC. Internationally, it is still perceived as a micro lending institution, focused on extremely poor women, despite the fact that it has

49、 adopted a market-based, ‘financial systems’ approach since 2001.</p><p>　　Within Bangladesh, Grameen now plays an important role as a substantial MFI that meets client needs and helps to promote competition

50、 within the financial markets. Its viability is essential for this internal role, but also very important for its external role. Had the Grameen Bank collapsed, then optimism about the feasibility of poverty reduction an

51、d international development would have been dented. It helps the citizens of the rich world to understand that poor people are active agents in the </p><p><b>　　譯 文：</b></p><p><

52、;b>　　格萊珉銀行的歷程</b></p><p><b>　　摘要</b></p><p>　　本文主要探究孟加拉格萊珉鄉(xiāng)村銀行的建立及其演化。從銀行發(fā)展的足跡起源，為孟加拉的農(nóng)村婦女提供小額信貸，通過(guò)國(guó)家的擴(kuò)張和制度化，格萊珉模式在世界范圍得到了復(fù)制。在20世紀(jì)90年代末，銀行面臨發(fā)展中金融危機(jī)的償還問(wèn)題，策略在于穩(wěn)定和重塑銀行。這導(dǎo)致了2001

53、年格萊珉銀行模式二的推出，正是基于以上問(wèn)題的分析。最后本文著眼于鄉(xiāng)村銀行中那些為幫助窮人而在小額信貸中發(fā)揮了重要作用的參與者。</p><p><b>　　介紹</b></p><p>　　孟加拉格萊珉銀行開展的小額信貸在世界上有著重要的地位。它被證明的窮人是可以兌現(xiàn)的，格萊珉的模型在40多個(gè)國(guó)家被復(fù)制，它是世界上被廣泛被引用的最成功的故事，其創(chuàng)始人穆罕默德尤努斯，是

54、2006年諾貝爾和平獎(jiǎng)的獲得者。截止2008年2月底，它有740萬(wàn)客戶和未償還貸款5.45億美元。不管從何種標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來(lái)看，這是一個(gè)對(duì)許多貧困人口的生活和小額信貸的發(fā)展產(chǎn)生很大國(guó)際影響的發(fā)展思路。</p><p>　　與其他兩個(gè)標(biāo)志性的小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)相比，格萊珉銀行以貧困地區(qū)的農(nóng)村婦女為對(duì)象，小組貸款的模式，和當(dāng)?shù)仄渌膬蓚€(gè)小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)具有明顯的區(qū)別性。原來(lái)的鄉(xiāng)村銀行模式被稱為“扶貧貸款”的方式，而不是采用協(xié)商小組協(xié)助窮

55、人的方法，許多美國(guó)專家更傾向于小額信貸。但是在2001和2002年鄉(xiāng)村銀行在其服務(wù)方面取得了戲劇性的改變。它的新模式（格萊珉模式二）更接近于一個(gè)金融的方法。雖然尤努斯教授繼續(xù)將為貧困婦女提供小額信貸放在首位的理念具有明顯性，通過(guò)每年的小額信貸會(huì)議，他指示銀行貸款給費(fèi)貧困客戶，積極動(dòng)員資金的流動(dòng)，非常符合銀行提供的產(chǎn)品的整體盈利性。格萊珉模式二與其說(shuō)是反應(yīng)了一個(gè)在鄉(xiāng)村戰(zhàn)略革命的改革，倒不如說(shuō)是挑戰(zhàn)以市場(chǎng)為基礎(chǔ)的金融系統(tǒng)的方法，并且去證明它

56、。現(xiàn)在讓我們開始。</p><p><b>　　初期</b></p><p>　　格萊珉銀行的起源在于困境，正如尤努斯教授在他的自傳里寫的，年輕的尤努斯在20世紀(jì)70年代所面對(duì)的困難。在美國(guó)完成博士學(xué)位后，他返回孟加拉的一所大學(xué)教授經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)。然而，他在孟加拉的農(nóng)村地區(qū)，看到了數(shù)以千計(jì)的貧困和饑餓的人們的迫切需要，他想知道經(jīng)濟(jì)理論的相關(guān)性是什么。這個(gè)國(guó)家正處在一場(chǎng)摧毀了其

57、基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，生產(chǎn)力，一大批知識(shí)分子的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的緩慢恢復(fù)階段，整個(gè)國(guó)家依賴于糧食的援助，不管是城市還是農(nóng)村人們都遭受著巨大的苦難。</p><p>　　尤努斯可以通過(guò)慈善援助來(lái)幫助這些貧困的人群，但同時(shí)，他也在思考他的經(jīng)濟(jì)理論是否也能運(yùn)用到這些領(lǐng)域里。他假設(shè)，如果人們得到了貸款的機(jī)會(huì)，則可以增加他們的盈利能力或者使得經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)多樣化，通過(guò)這樣的方式他們的收入將會(huì)增加。所以，如果他能夠出借一些錢給窮人，使得他們可以改善生活，

58、接著再歸還給他，然后他再出借錢幫助其他的人這樣比單純把錢給窮人要好的多。</p><p>　　這是一個(gè)有趣的理論，但它最初的實(shí)驗(yàn)表明它似乎是無(wú)效的。他出借錢的很多男性和女性都沒(méi)有歸還這些小額款項(xiàng)。他認(rèn)為這主要是由于他們沒(méi)有可靠和理智地運(yùn)用這些錢。因此，他嘗試用審批和監(jiān)督貸款的方式確保他們將款項(xiàng)用于生產(chǎn)性投資，并且選擇值得信賴的客戶管理他們，使得他們可以償還貸款。</p><p>　　最后尤

59、努斯想出了一個(gè)有效的模型，它的主要特征有</p><p>　　1、貸款給農(nóng)村地區(qū)的貧困婦女（相比男性，她們很少會(huì)不合理地使用貸款，并且歸還貸款更加可靠）</p><p>　　2、把婦女們按五人分成一個(gè)小組，小組成員里的每一個(gè)對(duì)其他人的貸款負(fù)有同樣的責(zé)任（建立社會(huì)擔(dān)保和同等的篩選過(guò)程）</p><p>　　3、建立一個(gè)中心，每個(gè)星期的設(shè)定時(shí)間，使得六個(gè)小組的婦女來(lái)申請(qǐng)

60、和歸還貸款。</p><p>　　4、設(shè)定一個(gè)比政府和非政府利息率較高的方案</p><p>　　5、要求客戶每個(gè)星期做出還款（創(chuàng)建財(cái)政紀(jì)律并以小組為抵押），并對(duì)他們的社會(huì)行為做出允諾。</p><p>　　6、僅需定期小額還款的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化產(chǎn)品</p><p>　　7、招聘和培訓(xùn)年輕聰明的畢業(yè)生進(jìn)行管理服務(wù)(最大程度地減少腐敗)</p>

61、;<p><b>　　擴(kuò)張和制度化</b></p><p>　　早期格萊珉模式的成功在于尤努斯教授的個(gè)人的努力和熱情。但在擴(kuò)大銀行上，他需要更多的資金和強(qiáng)大的組織結(jié)構(gòu)，資金是沒(méi)有太大的問(wèn)題。在20世紀(jì)80年代初，在孟加拉的很多外國(guó)機(jī)構(gòu)都面臨一個(gè)巨大的問(wèn)題：他們提出的補(bǔ)助金政府機(jī)構(gòu)只做出了微弱的解釋，且收效甚微。一個(gè)年輕，有前途的社會(huì)企業(yè)家，因協(xié)助窮人而獲得聲譽(yù)，來(lái)監(jiān)督他們的項(xiàng)目

62、，這正是他們所希望的。在未來(lái)的十年，尤努斯可以依靠財(cái)團(tuán)的捐贈(zèng)的資金來(lái)支持鄉(xiāng)村銀行的發(fā)展。</p><p>　　如何實(shí)現(xiàn)有效的組織結(jié)構(gòu)，相比而言，更加具有挑戰(zhàn)性。如果他像泰國(guó)盤古銀行那樣運(yùn)營(yíng)下去，格萊珉銀行的擴(kuò)建就會(huì)帶來(lái)像其他國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行那樣的問(wèn)題：任人唯親的員工招聘和晉升，金融腐敗，政治化的貸款組合，對(duì)客戶隨便的態(tài)度。因此，在1983年尤努斯通過(guò)深刻而細(xì)致的談判活動(dòng)通過(guò)了格萊珉銀行條例。該條例確立了一個(gè)由銀行、少

63、數(shù)國(guó)家官員和銀行客戶的大集團(tuán)組成的尤努斯半官方監(jiān)督委員會(huì)。這給了尤努斯公司一個(gè)由個(gè)人控制的組織，并且可以根據(jù)銀行地發(fā)展來(lái)靈活地修改其服務(wù)和人員編制。</p><p>　　在20世紀(jì)80和90年代初，鄉(xiāng)村銀行穩(wěn)步擴(kuò)大，有大批捐助資金不斷涌入。到1991年，它有100多萬(wàn)客戶和不斷增長(zhǎng)的系列產(chǎn)品——住房貸款和農(nóng)業(yè)貸款等。除了這一點(diǎn)，不論是鄉(xiāng)村銀行還是尤努斯模式都變得越來(lái)越國(guó)際化。</p><p&g

64、t;<b>　　國(guó)際轉(zhuǎn)移復(fù)制</b></p><p>　　隨著20世紀(jì)80年代的進(jìn)展，格萊珉銀行的高級(jí)管理人員將時(shí)間越來(lái)越多地運(yùn)用于格萊珉模式在世界范圍的推廣。格萊珉銀行在世界各地得到了推廣，它不僅對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家有針對(duì)性，對(duì)美國(guó)和加拿大也有影響。到了20世紀(jì)90年代中期，尤努斯花越來(lái)越多地時(shí)間在國(guó)外，訪問(wèn)捐助者，參加學(xué)術(shù)性的會(huì)議，解決政策等方面的問(wèn)題，并且和公眾面對(duì)面地交流。他大力倡導(dǎo)對(duì)微型企

65、業(yè)的信貸是解決貧困問(wèn)題的有力途徑，因?yàn)樵S多專家指出減少貧困的方法就是使窮人找到謀生的手段。</p><p>　　格萊珉銀行在全世界范圍內(nèi)復(fù)制的結(jié)晶就是美國(guó)集團(tuán)的董事們?cè)O(shè)想出了格萊珉銀行小額信貸的會(huì)議想法。自1990年以來(lái)，聯(lián)合國(guó)召開了全球首腦減貧首腦會(huì)議，旨在解決全球的教育、性別平等其他一些全球性問(wèn)題。1997年的小額信貸首腦會(huì)議不僅僅是聯(lián)合國(guó)的一個(gè)事件——它是一個(gè)有組織的結(jié)果，表面在全球首腦會(huì)議上證明了支持小額

66、信貸是重視人權(quán)的表現(xiàn)。格萊珉銀行設(shè)立了一個(gè)在2005年由216億美元的資金，1.5億客戶獲得貸款的目標(biāo)。一些小額信貸運(yùn)動(dòng)奮力爭(zhēng)取小額信貸更廣泛的服務(wù)范圍，但這種形式是不適合競(jìng)選風(fēng)格的運(yùn)動(dòng)。因此格萊珉銀行是成功的，應(yīng)該在世界范圍內(nèi)進(jìn)行推廣。</p><p>　　格萊珉銀行會(huì)破產(chǎn)嗎？</p><p>　　由于格萊珉銀行在20世紀(jì)90年代出口到了國(guó)外，但其在孟加拉繼續(xù)保持了增長(zhǎng)?？蛻魯?shù)量穩(wěn)步增長(zhǎng)

67、，由于客戶取得了大量的普通貸款及新類型的住房貸款，投資組合也迅速增長(zhǎng)。在孟加拉國(guó)的工作人員越來(lái)越多地聽到還款率的下降，但分行的經(jīng)理為了改變業(yè)績(jī)，發(fā)行新的貸款給違約者。這些貸款是用來(lái)償還未償還的貸款呢，還是回避這個(gè)問(wèn)題，將貸款用于其它地方呢？這樣的做法也使該行遭受了批評(píng)：這樣做是讓那些女人們直接利用貸款還是將貸款交給她們的丈夫呢？這樣，尤努斯的想法值得商榷，每一個(gè)鄉(xiāng)村銀行的貸款用于微型企業(yè)，是否是成功的呢？</p><

68、p>　　實(shí)地調(diào)查發(fā)現(xiàn)，鄉(xiāng)村銀行的客戶可以將他們的貸款用作許多不同的用途：商業(yè)，食品消費(fèi)，健康，教育，甚至嫁妝。格萊珉銀行的貸款沒(méi)有為微型企業(yè)去進(jìn)行一個(gè)單獨(dú)的特殊投資，相反它們到了低收入的貧困家庭的復(fù)雜的金融投資組合中去了。長(zhǎng)期在孟加拉進(jìn)行小額信貸研究的人員看到了當(dāng)?shù)厮l(fā)生的情況。格萊珉銀行的客戶的每周還款，不是來(lái)自于單一的微型企業(yè)，而是來(lái)自于休閑就業(yè)，自營(yíng)就業(yè)，匯款以及從其他來(lái)源的貸款品種中的收入。但是，從格萊珉銀行留下來(lái)的客戶中

69、，他們?cè)诔惺芰似胀ǖ馁J款以外，還取得了住房貸款，因此他們的債務(wù)無(wú)法從他們的收入中進(jìn)行支付。為了防止他們違約，格萊珉銀行的分行經(jīng)理發(fā)出了新的貸款來(lái)償還他們以前的貸款。在達(dá)卡的一個(gè)會(huì)議上流傳的謠言，會(huì)上尤努斯教授問(wèn)他的高級(jí)管理人員真實(shí)的還款率和財(cái)政規(guī)模。1998年的嚴(yán)重水災(zāi)，以及最近推出的農(nóng)業(yè)貸款，加劇了還款問(wèn)題。</p><p>　　事情演變成了一個(gè)問(wèn)題，在2000年丹尼爾珀?duì)栁C(jī)時(shí)，一個(gè)紐約時(shí)報(bào)的記者發(fā)表了一篇文

70、章說(shuō)，格萊珉銀行幾乎是已經(jīng)破產(chǎn)了。對(duì)于銀行的信徒來(lái)說(shuō)這無(wú)疑是世界末日。對(duì)于非資助的支持者，這表明金融系統(tǒng)方法顯示了他們想法的正確性。</p><p>　　但是一個(gè)金融危機(jī)不足以打擊到格萊珉銀行，我相信有一個(gè)三管齊下的策略來(lái)穩(wěn)定和重塑它。這個(gè)策略的第一步就是銀行職員以當(dāng)?shù)氐乃?，精心?zhǔn)備參與到整個(gè)投資組合中去。他們通過(guò)通過(guò)還款利率來(lái)篩選未償還貸款，在必要時(shí)重新安排貸款，核銷那些無(wú)法從借款人和借款人中心收回的貸款。這

71、意味著銀行不得不承認(rèn)重大損失，這使得銀行的資產(chǎn)被吞并。但是策略的第二步有助于減少這種情況。尤努斯教授通過(guò)動(dòng)員捐助者的捐贈(zèng)和政府補(bǔ)助來(lái)抵消這些不良貸款的損失。該戰(zhàn)略的第三步是重新設(shè)計(jì)銀行的產(chǎn)品，使他們的產(chǎn)品變得更有利可圖，可以和國(guó)家里的很多其他的小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)的產(chǎn)品進(jìn)行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，這導(dǎo)致了格萊珉模式二的推出。</p><p>　　從格萊珉模式模式一到格萊珉模式二</p><p>　　在20世紀(jì)90年

72、代末，格萊珉銀行面臨的難題使得該行的高級(jí)管理層進(jìn)行了一系列新產(chǎn)品和管理服務(wù)新途徑的實(shí)驗(yàn)試行。到2001年初，這些舉措得到了鞏固，尤努斯教授宣布推出格萊珉銀行模式2。此模式在滿足客戶需求的基礎(chǔ)上，能夠帶來(lái)更多的盈利。從2001年3月到2002年4月，所有的格萊珉銀行的1200個(gè)分行，從格萊珉模式1轉(zhuǎn)移到格萊珉模式2的產(chǎn)品和系統(tǒng)上。</p><p>　　格萊珉模式二的主要內(nèi)容：</p><p>

73、;　　1、主要著重于成員和公眾的儲(chǔ)蓄，這包括自愿儲(chǔ)蓄、定期儲(chǔ)蓄和格萊珉退休金計(jì)劃——一個(gè)長(zhǎng)期的儲(chǔ)蓄計(jì)劃。</p><p>　　2、對(duì)成員采用靈活的基本貸款，這些金額是可變的，可在3至36個(gè)月內(nèi)償還，轉(zhuǎn)讓的還款期和利率由貸款類型決定。</p><p>　　3、摒棄了過(guò)去的連帶責(zé)任</p><p>　　4、一個(gè)以扶貧為目標(biāo)的計(jì)劃，為乞丐提供小額的補(bǔ)貼貸款，并且鼓勵(lì)他們加

74、入鄉(xiāng)村銀行。</p><p>　　該模式運(yùn)行的結(jié)果令人震驚，格萊珉銀行不僅得到了穩(wěn)定，并且重新調(diào)整了它的服務(wù)策略。格萊珉銀行用了25年達(dá)到了250萬(wàn)德客戶基礎(chǔ)，但從2001年起，招收到下一個(gè)250萬(wàn)客戶只用了三年。從2002年到2005年，它的銀行存款翻了兩倍，并增加了一倍的優(yōu)秀組合貸款。它的貸款組合比它的儲(chǔ)蓄組合要小。它為不良貸款建立了基金，從2002年的6000萬(wàn)塔卡上升到2005年的4.42億塔卡。這種增長(zhǎng)

75、意味著物理擴(kuò)張是必要的，開立了500個(gè)分支機(jī)構(gòu)，因此在2005年底，格萊珉銀行擁有了超過(guò)1700個(gè)分支機(jī)構(gòu)。</p><p>　　格萊珉銀行宣稱以減貧為使命，但以我個(gè)人的觀察相信，它的服務(wù)對(duì)象是比20世紀(jì)8090年代更加貧困的人群。這部分是因?yàn)榭蛻舳俗龅暮芎?，而另一部分原因是產(chǎn)品的重新設(shè)計(jì)和利潤(rùn)的擴(kuò)展。它的許多客戶也會(huì)被歸類于孟加拉的官方貧困線以下的貧困或中等窮人。這些成員的平均貸款只有6元，平均節(jié)省了1美元。許

76、多貧困的人群可能間接受惠于該模式二。</p><p><b>　　格萊珉銀行的將來(lái)</b></p><p>　　格萊珉銀行看起來(lái)是孟加拉的小額信貸機(jī)構(gòu)的一種安全的未來(lái)模式，并且應(yīng)該繼續(xù)在小額信貸市場(chǎng)上發(fā)揮主要作用。在國(guó)際上，它仍然被視為一個(gè)微型的貸款機(jī)構(gòu)，專注于貧困婦女，盡管在2001年以來(lái)它采取了以整個(gè)市場(chǎng)的金融系統(tǒng)為基礎(chǔ)的做法。</p><p&

77、gt;　　在孟加拉國(guó)，格萊珉銀行作為一個(gè)多邊金融機(jī)構(gòu)在滿足客戶需求和促進(jìn)金融市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)方面起到了重要的作用。格萊珉銀行內(nèi)部的可行性是至關(guān)重要的，同時(shí)對(duì)它的外部作用也是非常重要。如果格萊珉銀行倒閉，則對(duì)減少貧困的樂(lè)觀預(yù)期和國(guó)際發(fā)展會(huì)被削弱。國(guó)際信息與銀行相關(guān)——對(duì)于貧困婦女的微型企業(yè)信貸使她們擺脫了貧困——現(xiàn)在來(lái)看則是不準(zhǔn)確的——窮人通過(guò)個(gè)人代理機(jī)構(gòu)，用辛苦工作來(lái)戰(zhàn)勝面對(duì)的問(wèn)題——這種模式非常適合公眾和政客豐富的國(guó)家嗎？它有助于富裕國(guó)家的人