銀行支付卡雙面市場(chǎng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)定價(jià)、應(yīng)用和使用【外文翻譯】

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p>　　The Economics of Two-Sided Payment Card Markets: Pricing, Adoption and Usage</p><p>　　Material Source: JEL Classification: L10, D40, O30 </p>

2、<p>　　Author: James Mc Andrews and Zhu Wang</p><p>　　This paper provides a new theory for two-sided payment card markets by positing better micro foundations. Adopting payment cards by consumers and mer

3、chants requires a fixed cost, but yields lower marginal costs of making payments. Considering this together with the heterogeneity of consumer income and merchant size, our theory derives card adoption and usage pattern

4、consistent with cross-section and time-series evidence. Our analyses also help explain the observed card pricing pattern, particula</p><p>　　Keywords: Payment Cards, Two-sided Market, Interchange Fees.</p

5、><p>　　1. Introduction</p><p>　　As credit and debit cards become increasingly prominent forms of payments, the structure and performance of payment card markets are drawing increasing scrutiny. Man

6、y controversial issues are raised about interchange fees — the fees paid to card issuers when merchants accept their credit or debit cards for purchase. Interchange fees are typically set by card networks and in many ins

7、tances they are considered by competition authorities to be too high.2 Particularly, interchange fees in the US are</p><p>　　The two-sided market theories emphasize the fundamental externality in card paymen

8、t systems. Every card transaction necessarily involves two users: a cardholder and a merchant. Cardholders benefit from their holding a card only if their cards are accepted by a wide range of merchants, and merchants be

9、nefit from the card only if a sufficient number of consumers use it. Therefore, it is reasonable for the card network to price differently to cardholders and merchants in order to effectively balanc</p><p>　

10、　Meanwhile, an important question is whether interchange fees or card fees in general could beset at the “wrong level.” These theories show that, although the socially optimal and privately optimal levels of card fees bo

11、th depend on the same factors (e.g., issuing costs, acquiring costs, cardholders’ and merchants’ demand elastic ties, market structure, and bargaining power of the parties), they are not equal in general. However, given

12、various complications of the models, including imperfect comp</p><p>　　While these two-sided market theories advanced our understanding of the card payment systems, there are weaknesses in their micro founda

13、tions. First, these theories typically assume payment cards charge fixed-dollar fees. However, in reality, it is those cards charging proportional fees that have pricing controversies. Second, they assume a distribution

14、of “convenience benefits” from the use of a payment card for both sides of the market, but do not really explain where those benefits come from.</p><p>　　2. A New Approach</p><p>　　In this paper

15、, we provide a new analysis of two-sided payment card markets by positing better Micro foundations. First, to be consistent with the reality, we assume payment cards charge proportional fees. Second, the payment methods

16、that consumers use do not yield utility directly, but instead imposes a frictional cost on their purchases. Third, in contrast to the existing model, we assume a contestable market for merchants, which greatly simplify t

17、he welfare analysis.</p><p>　　Using the model, we are able to systematically compare the differences between privately and socially optimal card fees: Because the card network makes profit from serving card

18、users, it does not care about cash users in its pricing decision. Meanwhile, lowering card fees to consumers help inflate the value of card transactions so the network prefers high merchant fees. In contrast, the social

19、planner cares about both card users and cash users, and prefers lower merchant fees because this helps </p><p>　　Meanwhile, we found that under the private network, cards are not over adopted and used as sug

20、gested by many existing models. Rather, because the card network charges a high markup, it leads to a lower card adoption and usage compared with the social optimum. Also, we found that cash users are disadvantaged under

21、 the private network. However, this is not because they have to subsidize card users as suggested by many existing theories (In fact, cash users are subsidized by card uses because they </p><p>　　3. The Mode

22、l</p><p>　　Our model studies pricing, adoption and usage of monetary payment devices. We first lay out the environment in which only one payment device, referred to as cash, is in use. Then we will consider

23、the introduction of an alternative device, which we refer to as a payment card.</p><p>　　We model the consumers as having generalized Cobb-Douglas preferences across a range of goods. They take prices as giv

24、en. Each consumer is endowed with income, which is distributed across the population of consumers according to known cumulative distribution function. The merchant side of our model is quite stylized. Each merchant compe

25、tes in a contestable market for a single good that the merchant sells, and prices are set at the zero profit level. </p><p>　　Consumers and merchants are both presented with the option to adopt a new payment

26、 device that offers a lower variable cost of use, but a higher fixed cost relative to the pre-existing alternative. They each make their optimal adoption decision taking the other’s choice as given. The model yields a tw

27、o-sided market under our structure of the heterogeneity of consumer income and merchant size, the fixed adoption costs, and, finally, under the assumption of price coherence by merchants that accept </p><p>

28、　　3. Conclusions</p><p>　　This paper provides a new two-sided market theory to study the pricing, adoption and usage of payment devices. Using this framework, we are able to study the evolution of payment ca

29、rd markets both in the short run and in the long-run, and also shed new light on related competition policy issues.</p><p>　　Our analyses show that as payment card markets evolve the interchange fees increas

30、e over time. This is because a monopoly card network, besides internalizing the two-sided market externality, has the incentive to inflate the value of card transactions. Lowering card fees to consumers but raising them

31、to merchants help inflate the card transaction value, so the card network prefers high interchange fees. As card service costs decline over time, the card network is able to further raise interchang</p><p>　

32、　There are many avenues for further research. Wang (2007) examines four-party systems in mature card markets without adoption externalities. Further extensions to this environment would be useful. Models of the vertical

33、restraints imposed by card networks would also be of interest in this model and its extensions. Finally, modeling consumer credit constraints and the provision of credit via the payment device is another important direct

34、ion for future research.</p><p>　　銀行支付卡雙面市場(chǎng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)：定價(jià)、應(yīng)用和使用</p><p>　　資料來(lái)源： JEL Classification: L10, D40, O30 </p><p>　　作者：James Mc Andrews and Zhu Wang</p><p>　　本文提供了關(guān)于微觀

35、經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)基礎(chǔ)和銀行支付卡雙面市場(chǎng)不相抵觸的一種更好的新理論。在消費(fèi)者和商家使用信用卡時(shí)，銀行在制作信用卡時(shí)需要支付一定的固定成本，得到較低的邊際效益?？紤]到消費(fèi)者的收入差距和商人的規(guī)模大小，我們對(duì)信用卡的理論要采納和使用截面和時(shí)序模式的相關(guān)證據(jù)來(lái)推導(dǎo)。我們的分析也有助于解釋還沒有投入使用的處于觀測(cè)階段的信用卡的定價(jià)模式（特別是新興的商業(yè)交流費(fèi)用）。這是因?yàn)閷?duì)于個(gè)人業(yè)務(wù)的銀行卡系統(tǒng)來(lái)說(shuō)，除去互利的表現(xiàn)外，還需要增加銀行卡的交易價(jià)值。我們的分

36、析表明：私下確定價(jià)格來(lái)使用信用卡會(huì)偏離社會(huì)最優(yōu)選擇，對(duì)交易費(fèi)實(shí)行上限制度也有可能增加消費(fèi)者的利益。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞：信用卡、雙面市場(chǎng)、交易費(fèi)</p><p>　　信用卡和借記卡在如今的社會(huì)上作為越來(lái)越重要的付款形式，在付款方式市場(chǎng)引起了越來(lái)越多的關(guān)注和審視。許多有爭(zhēng)議的問(wèn)題在于銀行卡的交易費(fèi)（交易費(fèi)的費(fèi)用是指當(dāng)商人接受他們的信用卡或借記卡進(jìn)行采購(gòu)時(shí)支付給銀行卡發(fā)行者的費(fèi)用）。銀

37、行卡的交換費(fèi)通常是由銀行卡的網(wǎng)絡(luò)環(huán)境或者在許多情況下,他們被認(rèn)為是由更多的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)部門決定的。交易費(fèi)，尤其在美國(guó)，是銀行卡收費(fèi)業(yè)務(wù)中最高比重之一。近年來(lái)，盡管銀行卡產(chǎn)業(yè)的成本下降，但是他們還是一直在增加銀行卡交易的交易費(fèi)。交易費(fèi)的提出首先是從Baxter (1983)展開的,他在文章中提出反對(duì)壟斷主義的觀念，并探討了在付款卡系統(tǒng)中潛在的反競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性在交易費(fèi)的確定中的影響。然而，之后就一直沒有系統(tǒng)的理論分析Baxter的觀點(diǎn)，直到最近關(guān)于支付卡中

38、的正規(guī)模型(e.g., Schmalensee 2002, Rochet and Tirole 2003, Wright 2003, 2004)的產(chǎn)生。這些模型提供了一種比較最嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)?shù)姆椒▉?lái)分析支付卡的定價(jià)和價(jià)值。他們所使用的框架強(qiáng)調(diào)了在這個(gè)工業(yè)和其它包括互聯(lián)網(wǎng)、媒體、視頻游戲和軟件等網(wǎng)絡(luò)產(chǎn)業(yè)已經(jīng)被稱為“雙面”市場(chǎng)的一般規(guī)律。</p><p>　　雙面市場(chǎng)的基本理論強(qiáng)調(diào)銀行卡付款體系的外部性。每張銀行卡的交易必然包

39、括兩個(gè)用戶：持卡人和商人。持卡者受益于其持有的卡片應(yīng)當(dāng)擁有廣泛的商人群體，而商人受益于這些銀行卡在于只要有足夠數(shù)量的消費(fèi)者去使用它。因此，為了有效地平衡雙方市場(chǎng)的需求，對(duì)銀行卡系統(tǒng)的持卡人和商人分別定價(jià)是合理的。</p><p>　　與此同時(shí)，一個(gè)重要的問(wèn)題是：是否交易費(fèi)或銀行卡手續(xù)費(fèi)在一般情況下會(huì)存在“錯(cuò)誤的狀態(tài)”。這些理論表明：雖然社會(huì)最優(yōu)選擇和個(gè)人信用卡費(fèi)用的最佳水平都依賴于相同的因素（例如：發(fā)行成本，獲得

40、成本，持卡者和客商的需求、市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)彈性，團(tuán)體的議價(jià)能力），但它們一般并不相等。然而，考慮到各種復(fù)雜的模型，包括商人的不完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，這些情況通常沒有辦法被告知這張銀行卡片所需要的費(fèi)用到底是太高還是太低，相比其他的支付卡而言是否是社會(huì)最優(yōu)水平。</p><p>　　雖然這些雙邊市場(chǎng)理論讓我們對(duì)銀行卡支付系統(tǒng)有更先進(jìn)的認(rèn)識(shí)，但在微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)基礎(chǔ)理論上也存在薄弱的環(huán)節(jié)。首先，這些理論通常認(rèn)為信用卡的卡費(fèi)是固定的費(fèi)用。然而，在現(xiàn)

41、實(shí)中，對(duì)這些支付卡定價(jià)的收費(fèi)比例還是存在爭(zhēng)議的。其次，在雙方的市場(chǎng)上，他們假定使用一種“便利好處”的銀行付款卡，但是卻不解釋這些好處在到底從哪里來(lái)的，到底有哪些好處。這些好處通常被稱為非經(jīng)濟(jì)條件，并且是消費(fèi)者對(duì)商品需求的一個(gè)固定不變的選擇。這個(gè)假設(shè)也許適合其他雙邊市場(chǎng)的情況，因?yàn)橄M(fèi)者的支付購(gòu)買需求是他們潛在的購(gòu)買貨物或服務(wù)的需求。換句話說(shuō)，消費(fèi)者的購(gòu)買力要取決于他們的付款方式，金錢上的利益一直是消費(fèi)者選擇不同的付款方式最重要的考慮因素

42、。類似的爭(zhēng)論會(huì)給商人來(lái)帶一定的好處。第三，這些理論通常認(rèn)為商人從事一種特殊形式的不完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)(e.g，Hotelling)。雖然這便于考慮商人接受銀行支付卡的商業(yè)動(dòng)機(jī)，但它以復(fù)雜化了的全局的角度出發(fā)，使社會(huì)福利分析起來(lái)更加困難。事實(shí)上，從未指明的商人或者消費(fèi)者使用一種付款裝置所得到的收益與不完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和議價(jià)能力的影響差異的角度上，以現(xiàn)有的理論來(lái)分析支付卡的收益福利還是相當(dāng)艱巨的。</p><p>　　在這篇論文中，我

43、們將使用一個(gè)與微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)基礎(chǔ)不相抵觸的更好的模型來(lái)分析銀行支付卡的雙邊市場(chǎng)。</p><p>　　首先，根據(jù)現(xiàn)實(shí)的情況，我們認(rèn)為信用卡的費(fèi)用是有比例的費(fèi)用。</p><p>　　第二，消費(fèi)者使用的付款方式在購(gòu)買商品時(shí)會(huì)產(chǎn)生摩擦成本。</p><p>　　第三，與現(xiàn)有的模式進(jìn)行對(duì)照，我們?yōu)樯倘思僭O(shè)一個(gè)有爭(zhēng)議性市場(chǎng)來(lái)大大簡(jiǎn)化分析福利制度。</p><p

44、>　　利用該模型系統(tǒng)，我們可以比較個(gè)人的和社會(huì)最優(yōu)支付卡之間費(fèi)用的差異。因?yàn)橹Ц犊ǖ木W(wǎng)絡(luò)性使它從它的使用者那里獲得利潤(rùn)，它不在乎現(xiàn)金用戶在定價(jià)上面的決定。與此同時(shí)，消費(fèi)者支付更少的銀行卡費(fèi)用，會(huì)助長(zhǎng)其交易費(fèi)。其網(wǎng)絡(luò)性會(huì)使得商人需要支付更高的交易費(fèi)。相比之下，社會(huì)規(guī)劃對(duì)用卡用戶和現(xiàn)金用戶兩者都很關(guān)心，更喜歡比較低的商人費(fèi)用的支出是因?yàn)檫@有助于降低零售價(jià)格來(lái)提高消費(fèi)者對(duì)于采購(gòu)的欲望。因此,這些是私人的網(wǎng)絡(luò)性與社會(huì)規(guī)劃在 “雙面市場(chǎng)效應(yīng)

45、”和“通貨膨脹的效果”根本區(qū)別。</p><p>　　與此同時(shí)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，在一個(gè)專用網(wǎng)絡(luò)下，支付卡并沒有超支采用，而且在現(xiàn)有的模型中反而被更多的使用。相反，因?yàn)榫W(wǎng)絡(luò)上銀行支付卡收費(fèi)的漲價(jià)，導(dǎo)致在社會(huì)最優(yōu)狀態(tài)下銀行支付卡的低采納。同時(shí)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)那些用錢的用戶在專用網(wǎng)絡(luò)下處于不利地位。然而，這并不是因?yàn)樗麄冊(cè)谥Ц犊ìF(xiàn)有的理論上提出更多的建議，而是因?yàn)樵趯Ｓ镁W(wǎng)絡(luò)服務(wù)下，更少的商店提供刷卡和現(xiàn)金兩種支付體系，以至于現(xiàn)金支

46、付的用戶得到更少的刷卡補(bǔ)助。</p><p>　　我們的模型將要研究定價(jià)、應(yīng)用和貨幣支付設(shè)備的使用。我們首先定下的環(huán)境中，只有一種付款裝置，被稱為現(xiàn)金，并且是在使用著。那我們將會(huì)引進(jìn)一種設(shè)備，我們所說(shuō)的付款卡。</p><p>　　我們假設(shè)消費(fèi)者通過(guò)一些商品具有廣義柯布-道格拉斯偏好。每個(gè)客戶都被賦予了收入，消費(fèi)者的人口分布是根據(jù)已知的累積的分布函數(shù)。商人模型的另一個(gè)方面是相當(dāng)程式化。在市

47、場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)比賽中, 商人出售是單一的商品, 價(jià)格設(shè)置在零利潤(rùn)水平。</p><p>　　消費(fèi)者和商家兩者都提出了選擇采取一種新的可變成本較低但是使用效率較高的相對(duì)固定成本已經(jīng)存在的貨幣支付設(shè)備。他們各自采用對(duì)方給予的最優(yōu)選擇決策。該模型使得在消費(fèi)者的非均質(zhì)性收入和廠商規(guī)模的大小、固定成本的采用的雙面市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)下，最后，在價(jià)格連貫的假設(shè)中，接受商家的支付設(shè)備。.</p><p>　　本文提供了一種

48、新的理論模式研究雙面市場(chǎng)的定價(jià)、應(yīng)用和使用付款方式。使用這個(gè)框架，我們無(wú)論在長(zhǎng)期或者短期都能夠?qū)W習(xí)到演變的支付卡市場(chǎng)的變化，以及新的政策執(zhí)行時(shí)的提供了相關(guān)依據(jù)。</p><p>　　我們的分析表明：隨著付款卡市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展，會(huì)產(chǎn)生越來(lái)越多的交易費(fèi)。這是因?yàn)橐粋€(gè)壟斷具有網(wǎng)絡(luò)性的支付卡，除了各種外部性的雙面市場(chǎng)的存在，如果要取得利益，就要抬高銀行卡的交易的價(jià)值。到消費(fèi)者身上的信用卡費(fèi)用降低，而到商人身上的費(fèi)用增長(zhǎng)，然則會(huì)