科學(xué)、技術(shù)和創(chuàng)新的政策【外文翻譯】

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Science, Technology and Innovation Policy</p><p>　　Material Source： Innovation Handbook. (Oxford: Oxford U

2、niversity Press). </p><p>　　Pages 599-631</p><p>　　Author： Jan, Mowery, David C. and Nelson, Richard R</p><p>　　….to technology policy</p><p>　　Technology policy refers

3、 to policies that focus on technologies and sectors. The era of technology policy is one where especially science-based technologies such as nuclear power, space technology, computers, drugs and genetic engineering are s

4、een as being at the very core of economic growth. These technologies get into focus for several reasons. On the one hand they stimulate imagination because they make it possible to do surprising things - they combine sci

5、ence with fiction. On the other hand</p><p>　　Technology policy means different things for catching up countries than it does for high-income countries and it might also mean different things for small and b

6、ig countries. In big high-income countries the focus will be on establishing a capacity in producing the most recent science-based technologies, as well as applying these innovations. In smaller countries it might be a q

7、uestion about being able to absorb and use these technologies as they come on the market. Catching-up countries may mak</p><p>　　Common for these strategies is that they tend to define ‘strategic technologie

8、s’ and sometimes the sectors producing them are also defined as strategic sectors. The idea of strategic sectors may be related to Perroux and to Hirschman, both students of Schumpeter. Perroux used concepts such as ‘ind

9、ustrializing industries’ and growth poles while Hirschman introduced unbalanced growth as a possible strategy for less developed countries (Perroux, 1969; Hirschman, 1969).</p><p>　　In the lead countries, go

10、vernment initiatives of the technology policy kind were triggered when national political or economic interests were threatened and the threats could be linked to the command of specific technologies. Sputnik gave extra

11、impetus to a focus on space technology and the cold war motivated the most ambitious technology policy effort ever in the US. In Europe, Servan Schreiber’s book ‘Le Defi Americain’ (Servan Schreiber 1967) gave a picture

12、of a growing dominance of the US mu</p><p>　　The motivation behind the technology policy in Japan – and later on in countries such as Taiwan and Korea - is different. It is driven by a national strategy aimi

13、ng at catching up and in the Japanese case it has roots back to the Meiji revolution when the first ideas of modernization based on imitating the technology of the West were formed.</p><p>　　One fundamental

14、question in technology policy is if it is at all legitimate and effective for the state to intervene for commercial reasons promoting specific sectors or technologies. Or is the only legitimate technology policy one wher

15、e national societal issues are at stake, including establishing national military power? It is a paradox that in the country having the most massive public intervention in terms of technology policy, the US, most of the

16、policy has been motivated by non-commercial </p><p>　　A second issue concerns what technologies should be supported. Is it always the case that high tech- and science-based sectors should be given first prio

17、rity? Again the Japanese government as well as governments in smaller countries has been more apt to think about the modernization of old industries than the US and the big European countries.</p><p>　　A thi

18、rd issue is at what stage the support should be given. Should it be given only to ‘pre-competitive’ stages or should it also be helpful in bringing the new products to the market? In the second case there might be a comb

19、ination of government support of new technology and more or less open protectionism.</p><p>　　A fourth issue is about the limits for public sector competence. Technology policy may be pursued with competence

20、 where government operates as a major user but when it comes to developing new technologies for the market, the role of governments must be more modest. To be more specific, there are several historical examples of how g

21、overnment ambitions to make technological choices that reduce diversity have ended in failure, for example, the ‘minitel’ experience in France, and the High Definition</p><p>　　A fifth issue concerns how pro

22、moting a technology or a sector can best be combined with competition. The period in the eighties of promoting single firms as national champions in the bigger European countries was not a great success while the Japanes

23、e public strategy to promote ‘controlled competition’ among a handful of firms was more successful</p><p>　　The objectives of technology policy are not very different from those of science policy but – at le

24、ast to begin with – it represented a shift from broader philosophical considerations to a more instrumental focus on national prestige and economic objectives. Technology policies were developed in an era of technology o

25、ptimism. But later on – in the wake of the 1968 student revolt – more critical and broader concerns relating to technology assessment and citizen participation came onto the agenda </p><p>　　The elements of

26、the innovation system in focus remain universities, research institutions, technological institutes and R&D laboratories. But the attention moves from universities toward engineering and from the internal organizatio

27、n of universities toward how they link to industry. Technology policy may go even further and include the commercialization of technologies, but then we approach what we will call innovation policy.</p><p>　

28、　In some countries such as the US, the main technology policy actors in the public sector are sector ministries promoting and sometimes procuring technology for purposes of telecommunications, defense, health, transport,

29、 energy etc. while in others, such as Japan, they are ministries in charge of industry and trade. Ministries of education and research are important since they organize the education and training of scientists and engine

30、ers. Authorities in charge of regulating competition as well </p><p>　　There are many possible instruments to be used in promoting specific technologies and sectors. Most efficient may be combinations of ins

31、truments in fields where public procurement is involved. When the government has the leading user competence, it is in a better position to judge what kind of instruments will work (Edquist et al. 2000). Besides public p

32、rocurement direct economic incentives in terms of subsidies and tax reductions may be offered to firms. Supporting research at universities in t</p><p>　　In areas where the main application of the new techno

33、logies is commercial, the set of instruments used may be a combination of sector or technology specific economic incentives with more or less protectionist trade policy. An example might be the high definition TV policy

34、of the EU in the early 1990s, where the attempt to define a compulsory analogical standard would have been a technical trade barrier to emerging digital standards, combined with specific economic incentives for European

35、produce</p><p>　　While the evaluation of research is important in science policy there are similar general policy tools that are useful when designing and redesigning technology policy. Technology forecastin

36、g is a way of capturing new technological trends. Asking leading expertise among scientists and among the most advanced producers and users about what technologies are rising on the horizon helps to scout the next genera

37、tion of ‘strategic technologies’. In order to limit the capturing of public interest by pr</p><p>　　As pointed out, science and technology policy are ideal types, which serve our broad analytical purposes. I

38、n the real world of advanced capitalist economies, however, the policy focus, instruments and actors involved in science and technology policy-making are not always easily grouped in one or the other of these categories.

39、 As we will examine now, innovation policy takes a step further by bringing in an even broader set of policy issues.</p><p>　　..and to innovation policy</p><p>　　Innovation policy appears in two

40、 different versions. One – the laissez faire-version - puts the emphasis on non-interventionism and signals that the focus should be on ‘framework conditions’ rather than specific sectors or technologies. This often goes

41、 with a vocabulary where any kind of specific measure gets grouped under the negative heading ‘picking the winners’. The extreme version of this type of innovation policy is one where basic research and general education

42、 are seen as the only legiti</p><p>　　The other version may be presented as the ‘systemic’ version and by referring to the concept of ‘innovation system’. This perspective implies that most major policy fiel

43、ds need to be considered in the light of how they contribute to innovation. A fundamental aspect of innovation policy becomes to review and redesign the linkages between the parts of the system. The first approach is bui

44、lt upon the standard assumption made in economics that firms always know what is best for them and that they no</p><p>　　Both of these approaches cover all aspects of the innovation process – including diffu

45、sion, use and marketing of new technologies and in a sense they may be seen as an important form of ‘economic policy’ where the focus is more on innovation than on allocation. Both tend to put stronger emphasis on ‘insti

46、tutions’ and ‘organizations’ than do science and technology policy. In the laissez faire-version, the predominance of the market and of competition becomes the most important prerequisite for in</p><p>　　In

47、the systemic approach the importance of competition is recognized but so is the need for closer co-operation vertically between users and producers and sometimes even horizontally among competitors when it comes to devel

48、op generic technologies. In the system’s approach it is recognized that the institutional set up differs across national economies and that this has implications for what types of technologies and sectors thrive in the n

49、ational context. To design a suitable innovation policy r</p><p>　　Innovation policy does not imply any a priori preference for high versus low technology. The systems approach introduces a vertical perspect

50、ive on the industrial system seeing it as a network and as value chains where certain stages might be more suitable for firms in a specific country.</p><p>　　The theoretical foundation of the two different v

51、ersions of innovation policy is respectively an application of standard neo-classical economics on innovation and, respectively, a long-term outcome of research on innovation and economic evolution (Metcalfe, 1995; Metca

52、lfe and Georghiou, 1998). The innovation system approach may be seen as bringing together the most important stylized facts of innovation. It makes use of empirical material and analytical models developed in innovation

53、research, a</p><p>　　The major reason for innovation policy becoming more broadly used as a concept was the slow down in economic growth around 1970 and the persistence of sluggish growth as compared to the

54、first post-war decades. The reasons for the slow down in the growth in ‘total factor productivity’ were, and still are, not well understood but there was a feeling that it had to do with the lacking capability to exploit

55、 technological opportunities. At the same time, the restrictions imposed on general economic p</p><p>　　This implies that the major objectives of innovation policy are economic growth and international compe

56、titiveness. In the European Union discourse these objectives are combined with ‘social cohesion’ and equality. Innovation might also be seen as a way to solve important problems relating to pollution, energy, urbanism an

57、d poverty. But the main focus is on the creation of economic wealth.</p><p>　　Among the instruments to be used are the regulation of intellectual property rights and access to venture capital. One fundamenta

58、l distinction in innovation policy goes between initiatives aiming at promoting innovation within the institutional context and, respectively, policies aiming at changing the institutional context in order to promote inn

59、ovation. The first category overlaps with instruments used in science and technology policy. The second may include reforms of universities, education,</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p>　　科學(xué)

60、、技術(shù)和創(chuàng)新的政策</p><p>　　資料來源：《創(chuàng)新手冊(cè)》，牛津：牛津大學(xué)出版社，2005(599-631)．</p><p>　　作者：簡·莫薇爾, 大衛(wèi)C. 和尼爾森·理查德R.</p><p><b>　　技術(shù)政策</b></p><p>　　技術(shù)政策是指注重技術(shù)和部門的政策。當(dāng)科學(xué)技術(shù),如

61、核能、空間技術(shù)、電腦、藥物和基因工程被人們認(rèn)為在經(jīng)濟(jì)增長扮演重要核心角色時(shí)，說明技術(shù)政策時(shí)代已來臨。這些技術(shù)成為焦點(diǎn)的原因主要有以下幾點(diǎn)：一方面,因?yàn)樗鼈兡茏屓藗兘Y(jié)合科學(xué)與虛構(gòu)，使想象力不受束縛，可以做令人吃驚的事情。另一方面新的技術(shù)政策開辟了新的商業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)，能使人們高效率的創(chuàng)新和迅速占領(lǐng)市場。 </p><p>　　技術(shù)政策在不同的國家，具有不同的意義。在高收入國家將最新的科學(xué)技術(shù)重點(diǎn)應(yīng)用在建立生產(chǎn)能力創(chuàng)新上

62、。在低收入國家，利用技術(shù)政策，進(jìn)一步吸收和利用新技術(shù)，使產(chǎn)品得以在市場上生存。高增長國家或許只有當(dāng)確定一個(gè)行業(yè)具有發(fā)展前途時(shí)，才會(huì)運(yùn)用新的技術(shù)。</p><p>　　在我們常見的戰(zhàn)略中,人們傾向于運(yùn)用“戰(zhàn)略技術(shù)”,有時(shí)他們將生產(chǎn)行業(yè)定義為戰(zhàn)略部門。戰(zhàn)略領(lǐng)域的想法可能與Perroux和Hirschman熊彼特的學(xué)生一樣,使用Perroux概念,例如“工業(yè)化產(chǎn)業(yè)”和“區(qū)域增長極”,然而Hirschman認(rèn)為：戰(zhàn)略技術(shù)

63、的運(yùn)用在欠發(fā)達(dá)國家中效果并不明顯, (Perroux,1969, Hirschman；1969)。</p><p>　　具有遠(yuǎn)見的政府只有在國家的政治或經(jīng)濟(jì)利益受到威脅和挑戰(zhàn)時(shí)，才會(huì)觸發(fā)技術(shù)類政策并指揮特定技術(shù)。人造地球衛(wèi)星的出現(xiàn)給了更多政府發(fā)展科學(xué)技術(shù)的動(dòng)力,它同時(shí)也讓各國把焦點(diǎn)集中在空間技術(shù)上。冷戰(zhàn)時(shí)期最具雄心的技術(shù)政策發(fā)生在美國。在歐洲,Servan Schreiber的書《該挑戰(zhàn)的美國人》 (Servan

64、 Schreiber 1967)給我們描繪出越來越多的跨國公司在高技術(shù)領(lǐng)域占有主導(dǎo)地位的畫面。此書觀點(diǎn)的提出，帶動(dòng)了歐洲國家,如法國、英國和德國出臺(tái)在特定的領(lǐng)域鼓勵(lì)發(fā)展促進(jìn)民族冠軍的激勵(lì)政策,然而其中法國人和后來歐洲人一味靠禁止出口計(jì)算機(jī)技術(shù)的政策,也為他們帶來不小的損失，阻礙他們自身核能技術(shù)的發(fā)展便是其中一例。</p><p>　　日本的迅速發(fā)展離不開其技術(shù)政策的支持,這與后來追上的地區(qū)或國家,如臺(tái)灣和韓國是不

65、同的。日本的國家戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)只有一個(gè),它的淵源可追溯到明治維新時(shí)期，即第一次基于模仿西方現(xiàn)代化技術(shù)的形成。</p><p>　　一個(gè)最基本的問題是如果一個(gè)國家同時(shí)擁有公民干預(yù)政策和技術(shù)政策并且兩者均是可行的，有時(shí)候通過公民干預(yù)商業(yè)來促進(jìn)特定部門或技術(shù)的發(fā)展?；蛘呤峭ㄟ^唯一合法技術(shù)政策來處理一個(gè)國家的社會(huì)事件,包括建立攸關(guān)國家軍事力量，這兩者會(huì)產(chǎn)生矛盾嗎？在美國正因有了這兩種政策，促使大部分政策對(duì)話已經(jīng)激發(fā)了論點(diǎn)和非商

66、業(yè)性話題，這已經(jīng)屬于一反常態(tài)范疇。而日本是明確最多的商業(yè)驅(qū)動(dòng)技術(shù)政策國家,國家為此在這里干預(yù)曾非常有限,至少在足球的公共資金金額參與方面便有所體現(xiàn)。</p><p>　　第二個(gè)問題涉及到什么技術(shù)應(yīng)當(dāng)支持。以科學(xué)為基礎(chǔ)的產(chǎn)業(yè)高科技應(yīng)當(dāng)給予最先考慮嗎?在較小的國家日本政府比起美國和歐洲國家。更傾向于考慮傳統(tǒng)工業(yè)的現(xiàn)代化。</p><p>　　第三個(gè)問題是在什么階段應(yīng)當(dāng)給予支持。只給予“競爭領(lǐng)域

67、”或者更有助于將新產(chǎn)品推向市場階段的支持嗎?在第二種情形或多或少有有可能包含政府支持新技術(shù)的公開貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義。</p><p>　　第四個(gè)問題是關(guān)于公共部門的能力。只有當(dāng)技術(shù)政策的用戶是政府時(shí)，才能發(fā)揮它的能力, 但是當(dāng)它為開發(fā)新技術(shù)所用時(shí),政府在市場中的境地就顯得更為尷尬了。有幾個(gè)歷史性的例子說明政府選擇用技術(shù)政策來促使本國產(chǎn)品與外國產(chǎn)品減小差異，然而到了市場中，政府的技術(shù)政策便顯得蒼白無力，最終以失敗而告終。

68、例如, 在上個(gè)世紀(jì)90年代早期。無論是“迷你電話”在法國的經(jīng)歷,還是高清晰度電視在歐盟的經(jīng)歷，均印證了這一點(diǎn)。</p><p>　　第五個(gè)問題是促進(jìn)技術(shù)、部門相結(jié)合的競爭。在上世紀(jì)八十年代期間單一公司促進(jìn)國家領(lǐng)先，而在當(dāng)前大歐洲國家卻很難成功,但日本民眾通過技術(shù)策略競爭的控制少數(shù)公司，卻取得更大的成功。</p><p>　　從政策角度來說，技術(shù)政策的目標(biāo)與科學(xué)技術(shù)的目標(biāo)存在較大不同 ,這代

69、表了從用哲學(xué)關(guān)注國內(nèi)信譽(yù)和經(jīng)濟(jì)向儀器聚焦的轉(zhuǎn)變。技術(shù)政策的時(shí)代發(fā)展技術(shù)是樂觀的。但后來——沉浸在1968年的學(xué)生反抗——更重要和更廣闊的有關(guān)技術(shù)評(píng)估和公民參與都一起走到議程中(經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展組織1970)。</p><p>　　創(chuàng)新體系的元素集中在高等院校、科研機(jī)構(gòu)、科研機(jī)構(gòu)和研發(fā)實(shí)驗(yàn)室。但重視運(yùn)用則來自大學(xué)工程系。技術(shù)政策可以進(jìn)一步的使技術(shù)商業(yè)化,但后來則被稱為創(chuàng)新的政策。</p><p&g

70、t;　　在一些國家,如美國、主要技術(shù)政策以促進(jìn)公共行業(yè)部門和采購部門技術(shù)為宗旨。在其他國家則以電信、國防、健康、交通、能源為主,如日本,他們則用技術(shù)政策來促進(jìn)工業(yè)和貿(mào)易。由于技術(shù)政策的存在，多個(gè)國家很看重教育和研究,他們組織教育及培訓(xùn)的科學(xué)家和工程師并調(diào)節(jié)競爭的主管部門和其他主管機(jī)關(guān)，從而對(duì)技術(shù)政策和技術(shù)的發(fā)展產(chǎn)生重大影響。公共機(jī)構(gòu),可以使技術(shù)政策，通過組織技術(shù)評(píng)估和其他的方式涉及到公民。</p><p>　　目

71、前，有多種儀器用于促進(jìn)特定的技術(shù)和部門。最有效的是公共采購領(lǐng)域的組合儀器，但這些都是徒勞的。當(dāng)政府運(yùn)用領(lǐng)導(dǎo)能力,它讓用戶處于更好的位置來判斷什么樣的儀器工作(Edquist et al. 2000)。除了公共采購直接經(jīng)濟(jì)方面的稅收減免補(bǔ)貼和條款，其余是不可獻(xiàn)給公司的。在大學(xué)，科學(xué)領(lǐng)域的研發(fā)配套是新技術(shù)得以在公共領(lǐng)域扎根的重要原因。某個(gè)領(lǐng)域，既得利益的公共用戶與部分缺乏透明度行業(yè)的出現(xiàn)，促使這些危險(xiǎn)種類的政策是技術(shù)與“工業(yè)配合物”相結(jié)合，

72、此外一個(gè)更微妙的問題是一種收斂性和協(xié)議技術(shù)方向上的發(fā)展軌跡,正朝向于更有前途的行業(yè) (Lundvall,1985)。</p><p>　　主要地區(qū)應(yīng)用新技術(shù)的前景是集商業(yè)與儀器測量為一體，這可能是一個(gè)部門或技術(shù)相結(jié)合的具體經(jīng)濟(jì)動(dòng)力，其中或多或少貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義政策。如20世紀(jì)90年代初,歐盟對(duì)高清晰度電視的政策 ,歐洲生產(chǎn)商嘗試定義一個(gè)新的技術(shù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來構(gòu)建技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘。更有希望可以成為不同公司組織和知識(shí)機(jī)構(gòu)支持的項(xiàng)目

73、。過去的經(jīng)驗(yàn)表明,無論是從內(nèi)容和時(shí)間，還是至于什么特定類型的技術(shù)解決方案，都應(yīng)該對(duì)準(zhǔn)負(fù)面影響，進(jìn)行限制競爭。</p><p>　　而評(píng)價(jià)的研究是非常重要的，也有類似的技術(shù)政策工具,他們可以重新技術(shù)政策。技術(shù)預(yù)測是一種捕捉發(fā)展趨勢的新技術(shù)。在科學(xué)界和誘導(dǎo)性專業(yè)中最先進(jìn)的生產(chǎn)者和使用者可以使用技術(shù)預(yù)測，從而有助于統(tǒng)治下一代“戰(zhàn)略技術(shù)”。并限制公眾和私人公司獲取獨(dú)立政策評(píng)估的利益。毫不奇怪,這樣的研究最后往往報(bào)道效果非

74、常好,有很多的相同之處,也會(huì)優(yōu)先考慮。在這種情況下,像在其他許多環(huán)境中合作伙伴之間太多的協(xié)議可能被鎖定,它應(yīng)被視為是否給“外人”作為評(píng)判強(qiáng)大的角色。正如公共政策對(duì)以技術(shù)為基礎(chǔ)的公司促進(jìn)“崗位輪換”和“職能兼顧”。</p><p>　　值得一提的是,科學(xué)和技術(shù)政策是理想類型,為研究分析目的，并存在于現(xiàn)實(shí)世界先進(jìn)的資本主義經(jīng)濟(jì)中。然而,這一政策重點(diǎn)是，當(dāng)我們將檢查相關(guān)政策時(shí),參與科技決策并不總能輕易分辨其中的一個(gè)或另

75、一個(gè)類別，現(xiàn)在需要進(jìn)一步引進(jìn)更寬的成套政策。</p><p><b>　　創(chuàng)新政策</b></p><p>　　創(chuàng)新政策出現(xiàn)在兩個(gè)不同的版本中?！侵铝τ谄骄怠獙⒅攸c(diǎn)放在不干涉主義和信號(hào),“應(yīng)該致力于條件”,而不是具體框架部門和技術(shù)。這往往伴隨著詞匯在任何具體類型中得到的負(fù)面航向，它聚集在選擇“優(yōu)勝者”方面。二是極端版本的這種類型的創(chuàng)新政策，當(dāng)一個(gè)基礎(chǔ)研究和通識(shí)教

76、育被視為唯一合法的公共活動(dòng)和知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)領(lǐng)域的唯一合法政府相關(guān)法規(guī)時(shí)，在更為溫和的版本中，公共措施正在培養(yǎng)企業(yè)家的積極態(tài)度,促進(jìn)科學(xué)技術(shù)的群體被關(guān)注。</p><p>　　“其他版本可提交系統(tǒng)版本,并參照創(chuàng)新體系的概念”。這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)暗示最重要政策字段可以被認(rèn)為是針對(duì)他們?nèi)绾蝿?chuàng)新。設(shè)計(jì)系統(tǒng)中各部分之間，一個(gè)基本的方面將成為創(chuàng)新政策的回顧和連結(jié)。第一種方法是在經(jīng)濟(jì)公司總是知道對(duì)自己最好的情況是什么（他們沒有正常的市場失

77、敗),并建立標(biāo)準(zhǔn)假設(shè)，采取相應(yīng)行動(dòng)。第二個(gè)觀點(diǎn)在綜合考慮能力不平等分配給公司和良好實(shí)踐發(fā)展下而言的,汲取和使用的新技術(shù)沒有立即擴(kuò)散在公司。 這種“失敗”可能會(huì)超越新古典主義的“市場失靈”。所以機(jī)構(gòu)協(xié)調(diào),鏈接,或者地址及各種系統(tǒng)的需求等。</p><p>　　兩種方法的各個(gè)方面,包括創(chuàng)新過程中擴(kuò)散、使用和銷售新技術(shù),而且在某種意義上他們可能被視為是一種重要的形式，有的“經(jīng)濟(jì)政策”以創(chuàng)新為焦點(diǎn)，做事都傾向于 “機(jī)構(gòu)組

78、織”。在利益平均優(yōu)勢方面,成為市場競爭的最重要前提創(chuàng)新——原則上說一個(gè)單一的制度設(shè)計(jì)建議對(duì)各國創(chuàng)新更有效。</p><p>　　在系統(tǒng)的方法上，競爭的重要性是被公認(rèn)的，不過是垂直需要用戶之間和生產(chǎn)者競爭者加強(qiáng)合作,就開發(fā)普通技術(shù)而言，從系統(tǒng)的方法認(rèn)識(shí)到,不同制度建立在國家經(jīng)濟(jì)中,某些國家的技術(shù)和行業(yè)就會(huì)得到相應(yīng)的發(fā)展。設(shè)計(jì)一個(gè)適合的，有特別見解的創(chuàng)新政策制度在全國系統(tǒng)中是非常有必要的。創(chuàng)新政策不含有任何偏好高、看

79、低技術(shù)的準(zhǔn)則。在一個(gè)特定的國家，介紹了一種系統(tǒng)方法的垂直的角度來看待這個(gè)工業(yè)體系把它看作是一個(gè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)和價(jià)值鏈在某些階段可能更適合公司。</p><p>　　創(chuàng)新政策標(biāo)準(zhǔn)問題的理論基礎(chǔ)有兩部不同版本，分別為以“勇于創(chuàng)新”的新古典經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和長期研究經(jīng)濟(jì)進(jìn)步和發(fā)展結(jié)果的理論(Metcalfe, 1995; Metcalfe and Georghiou, 1998)。創(chuàng)新的系統(tǒng)方法可能被視為最重要的聚集在一起的典型事實(shí)創(chuàng)新。

80、在創(chuàng)新研究和在制度與演化經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中。它利用了模型分析和實(shí)證材料。</p><p>　　相關(guān)政策的日益廣泛利用，使經(jīng)濟(jì)增長放緩，戰(zhàn)后第一個(gè)幾十年，如1970年緩慢增長達(dá)到了一個(gè)臨界點(diǎn)。原因是 “全要素生產(chǎn)率”增長放緩,而且它的技術(shù)開發(fā)能力缺乏機(jī)會(huì)。與此同時(shí),限制總體經(jīng)濟(jì)政策,對(duì)通貨膨脹的恐懼使它錯(cuò)誤的去理解，推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長需從需求方加以考慮。</p><p>　　這意味著相關(guān)政策的主要目標(biāo)是經(jīng)濟(jì)

81、增長和國際競爭力。用歐盟國家的話說這些目標(biāo)結(jié)合社會(huì)內(nèi)聚與社會(huì)平等。創(chuàng)新也可能被視為解決有關(guān)的重大問題如污染、能源、都市生活和貧窮的辦法。但最主要的焦點(diǎn)還是在經(jīng)濟(jì)財(cái)富的創(chuàng)造。</p><p>　　知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)和規(guī)定投資資金通路的測量儀器使用。一個(gè)最基本的創(chuàng)新政策措施是在促進(jìn)創(chuàng)新制度在政策和框架上的運(yùn)用。第一類重疊使用的測量儀器,在科學(xué)和技術(shù)政策上。第二個(gè)可能包括大學(xué)、教育改革、勞動(dòng)力市場、資本市場、調(diào)節(jié)行業(yè)和競爭的