環(huán)境信息披露的規(guī)范理論分析【外文翻譯】

1、外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯原文：原文：InfmationDisclosureasEnvironmentalRegulation:ATheeticalAnalysisAbstractGovernmentsaroundthewldarebeginningtoembraceanewfmofenvironmentalregulation–matydisclosureofinfmation.Whileinfmationdisclosureprogr

2、amsappeartohaveanimpactonsubsequentfirmbehavioftenresultinginlowerlevelsofpollutionlittleisknownaboutthecostsbenefitsoftheseprogramswhethernottheyenhancesocialwelfare.Thispaperpresentsasimplebargainingmodelwherematyinfma

3、tiondisclosureisusedtoovercomealackofinfmationonthepartofthepublic.Weacterizetheconditionsunderwhichinfmationdisclosurewillleadtoareductioninemissionsultimatelytheconditionsunderwhichitwillenhancesocialwelfare.Severalext

4、ensionsofthemodelarebrieflyexpledincludingtheeffectoftwosourcesofpollutiononlyoneofwhichissubjecttoinfmationdisclosure1.IntroductionGovernmentsaroundthewldarebeginningtoembraceanewfmofenvironmentalregulation–matydisclosu

5、reofinfmation.PerhapsthebestknownexampleistheToxicReleaseInventy(TRI)programintheU.S.wherebyfirmsarerequiredtodiscloselegallyemittedchemicalreleases.TRIhasbroughtaboutsignificantreductionsinchemicalemissions.Fexampletota

6、lonsiteoffsitereleasesoftoxicemissionsarereptedlydownby45.5%between19881999(EPA2001:TableE6).Otherdisclosureprogramshavefocusedondrinkingwatersafetyriskmanagementplansfchemicalreleases.1Similarprogramshavebeeninstitutedi

7、nothercountriescontextsincludingIndiaIndonesiaPhilippinesColombiaMexicoBrazil(AfsahLaplanteWheeler1996).Themechanismsbywhichinfmationdisclosureprogramsleadtoreductionsinpollutionarevariedstillbeingstudied(seee.g.MaxwellL

8、yonHackettreduction.Consumergroupsothernongovernmentalgroupsthatexertpressureonpollutingfirmstoreducetheiremissionsalsoincurcosts–thecostofcollectiveactionlobbyinglitigationetc.Thesecostssubstitutetosomeextentfthesavings

9、fromreducedgovernmentmonitingenfcement.Finallythereisanotherpotentialcostassociatedwithinfmationdisclosureprograms–theopptunitycostoffegonepollutionreductionbenefitsoutsidetheindustrypollutantsubjecttoinfmationdisclosure

10、.Thatisbyplacingattentionononefmofpollutionamatydisclosureprogrammightdiverttheattentionlimitedresourcesofconsumercommunityenvironmentalgroupsawayfromotherfmsofpollutionthatmightbewsethan–lessexpensivetocontrolthan–thepo

11、llutantsubjecttoinfmationdisclosureregulation.Wseyetitispossiblethatinfmationdisclosureprogramsmayresultinnobenefitinenvironmentalquality–evenawsening–totheextentthatfirmssubstituteonefmofpollutionfanother.Todatevirtuall

12、yalloftheliteratureoninfmationdisclosurehasbeenempirical–eitherdemonstratingtheaggregateeffectofaninfmationdisclosureprogramonemissionsattemptingtoacterizethemechanismsbywhichinfmationdisclosureleadstotheseemissionreduct

13、ions.ExamplesincludeHamilton(1995)KonarCohen(19972000)KhannaQuimioBojilova(1998)MaxwellLyonHackett(2000).Inspiteofthisgrowingliteratureoninfmationdisclosurenoattempthasbeenmadetotheeticallyanalyze.2.Bargainingbetweenpoll

14、utervictim:Theimpactofvictim’signanceofhisdamageTheproblemweareconsideringissimilarto–butnottypicalof–aCoaseanbargainingmodelwithasymmetricinfmation(seeCoase1960HuberWirl1998).Inastardasymmetricinfmationproblemthevictimk

15、nowsthedamagecausedbypollutionbutdoesnotknowthecostofpollutioncontrol.Howeverinthismodelthevictimdoesnotknowthedamage.Shemaymaynotknowthecostofpollutioncontrol.Considertheproblemofasinglepolluterwhosepollutioncausesdamag