[雙語翻譯]養(yǎng)老保險外文翻譯--中國勞動力市場狀況與社會保險（英文）

1、Labor market conditions and social insurance in China☆Johanna RICKNE?Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), P.O. Box 55665, SE-10215 Stockholm, Swedena r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c tArticle history:Receiv

2、ed 5 September 2012Received in revised form 13 July 2013Accepted 15 July 2013Available online 24 July 2013This paper provides micro-level evidence on the relationship between labor market conditionsand social insurance p

3、articipation among Chinese industrial firms. I find that the increasedscarcity of labor over this period was a quantitatively important driver of participation.Moreover, a comparison of the responses in different segment

4、s of the labor market shows thatthe response was relatively stronger in sectors with larger shares of uninsured workers,namely in private firms, those with a larger share of low-educated workers, and those withoutlabor u

5、nions. The results suggest that a tighter labor market in the years ahead can aid policymakers to implement social insurance programs and combat insurance inequality.© 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.JEL clas

6、sification:J64J65D21Keywords:Social insuranceEmployer participationLabor market tightnessPeople's Republic of China1. IntroductionThe dramatic overhaul of China's social insurance system is a major component of t

7、he country's ongoing economic transition.The endowment system for workers in the state-sector has been replaced with several different social insurances. Industrial firmsbased in urban areas are required to make larg

8、e payments to these programs. Adding up the benchmark payment rates, theoverall level is among the highest in the world. It constitutes 30% of the firm's payroll expenses, which can be compared to 10% ofpayroll in th

9、e U.S., 20% in Germany and 23% in Sweden (SSA, various country reports).High payment levels coupled with weak regulatory enforcement and a fragmented administration of the programs havecombined to make evasion of payment

10、s a serious concern (Dorfman et al., 2013; Feng Mao, Zhang, fax: +46 8 665 4599.E-mail address: johanna.rickne@ifn.se.1043-951X/$ – see front matter © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.http://dx.doi.org/10.10

11、16/j.chieco.2013.07.003Contents lists available at ScienceDirectChina Economic ReviewIn addition to the schemes listed in Table 1, firms are also encouraged to participate in voluntary and supplementaryinsurances. One ex

12、ample is the Enterprise Annuity (EA) scheme that is a part of the pension system. In 2008, less than 5% of thefirms that participated in the main urban old-age insurance scheme also insured their workers through the EA (

13、Dorfman et al.,2013).An important milestone in China's social insurance reform was the implementation of a Social Insurance Law in July 2011. Thisdocument unified the main regulations for the five insurances listed i

14、n Table 1 and set the tone for the future development of thesystem. Important provisions included the portability of pension and health care benefits, expanded coverage for foreign workers,and the establishment of a unif

15、ied social security ID system. The law also promoted responsible management of pooled funds anda more efficient system for collecting contributions. A benchmark enforcement mechanism was outlined that prescribes a dailyo

16、verdue payment fine of 0.05% for non-complying firms.The Social Insurance Law gave a set of broad policy parameters but left most of the implementation details for futureclarification via additional regulations at the na

17、tional and local level. The regulatory complexities at the local level are thus likelyto remain substantial. Local regulations often differ in terms of payment rates, caps on payment size and, importantly, additionalprog

18、rams often exist for workers that lack a residence permit (hukou) in the urban area where they work. Already in 2008, thecentral government introduced a law that required employers to provide health, unemployment, work i

19、njury and pensioninsurance for migrant workers and, in most regions, separate and less generous programs have been set up (Zhang, Zhao, Meng, 2012; Meng Nyland,Thomson, Schwartz, 2003). Furthermore, interviews with em

20、ployers have shown that they explicitly perceiveevasion as a cost-cutting measure (Nyland et al., 2011). Based on such evidence, a number of observers have argued that futurereforms of the programs should strive to cut c

21、ontribution rates to reduce “opting out” among firms (for example Feng Mao et al., 2012; World Bank, 2013).3. Determinants of participation: Theory and Chinese evidence3.1. Regulatory compliance and social corporatismSch

22、olarly work on regulatory compliance usually takes compliance costs as a starting point. As noted above, the Chinese socialinsurance programs directly impose high compliance costs through their high levels of required co

23、ntributions. A recent study byNielsen and Smyth (2007) observes that Chinese employers are also less able to shift the insurance costs to their workers in theform of lower wages. On average, they find that only 9.1% of t

24、he costs were shifted in 2002 and 33.8% were shifted in 2003(although this should not be interpreted as a time trend due to the large differences in firm characteristics in the two yearly crosssections of firms).The regu

25、lated contribution rate is only one of many factors that drive the overall cost of compliance. The attitude and effortsamong the enforcing authorities constitute another potential influence. Vodopivec and Tong (2008) arg

26、ue that a weak compliancewith China's unemployment insurance has resulted from a combination of vague regulations, poor enforcement, and smallpenalties. In contrast, Maitra, Smyth, Nielsen, Nyland, and Zhu (2007) arg

27、ue that penalties may be of lesser importance than othercharacteristics of the enforcement mechanism. Using data from Shanghai's audit agency in the early 2000s, 20–30% of the firmsare found to fully meet their payme

28、nt obligation despite facing economically insignificant penalties. Compliance is insteadreasoned to be the result of authorities applying more monitoring intensity in the future to firms found to be in arrears in thecurr

29、ent period (following the argument of Harrington, 1988).Local political concerns are likely to play a key role for enforcement efforts. In the Chinese case and as noted above, a mainreason for this is that evaluations of

30、 local governments' job performances are based on local growth numbers, resulting in a weakformal enforcement of cost-raising regulations. In such situations, non-governmental agents and organizations can assume thef

31、unctions of both monitoring and punishing misbehavior (e.g. Utting, 2005). Drawing on interviews with current and former staffmembers at the Bureau of Labor and Social Security in Shanghai, Nyland, Hartel, Thomson, Stanl

32、ey, and Zhu (2012) argue that thisTable 1Benchmark contribution rates for China's urban social insurance programs.Employer (% of payroll) Employee (% of wage)Basic pension scheme (1997) 20 8Urban employees basic medi

33、cal insurance scheme (1999) 6 2Unemployment insurance (1999) 2 1Employment injury insurance (1996) 1 0Maternity insurance (1994) 1 0Total (%) 30 11Notes: For details on program regulations, including the structure and si