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1、<p>  Subjective well-being</p><p>  Introduction</p><p>  Subjective measures of well-being are measures of well-being based on questions such as: “Taking things all together, how would yo

2、u say things are these days – would you say you’re very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy these days?” (Gurin, Veroff, & Feld,1960, p. 411, italics in original).1 Subjects maybe prompted to give a number between

3、1 and 7, where 1 represents “In general, I consider myself not a very happy person” and 7 “In general, I consider myself a very happy person” (Lyubomirsky</p><p>  Subjective measures of well-being have beco

4、me the subject of heated discussion in the academy and beyond. One reason is that they are frequently presented as substitutes for, or complements to, traditional income-based economic welfare measures and to indicators

5、inspired by the capability approach (Kesebir & Diener, 2008). Indeed, to encourage the use of subjective measures for public policy purposes, proponents have advocated National Well-Being Accounts (NWBAs), which trac

6、k population-level sc</p><p>  Subjective measures of well-being are frequently referred to as measures of subjective well-being (Andrews&Robinson, 1991). Thus, for example, Stiglitz and coauthors write:

7、 “Recommendation 1: Measures of subjective well-being provide key information about people’s quality of life. Statistical offices should incorporate questions to capture people’s life evaluations, hedonic experiences and

8、 priorities in their own surveys” (Stiglitz et al., 2009, p. 58, italics in original). The term “subjective </p><p>  Nevertheless, considerable confusion remains when it comes to what subjective well-being

9、is and how it relates to what I will call well-being simpliciter: “what we have ,when our lives are going well for us, when we are living lives that are not necessarily morally good, but good for us” (Tiberius, 2006, p.

10、493, italics in original). It has been pointed out that subjective measures differ from economic and capability-based measures with respect to the underlying account of welfare or well-being </p><p>  This p

11、aper examines the notion of “subjective well-being” as the term is used in literature on subjective measures of well-being. In order to examine what subjective well-being is and how it relates to well-being simpliciter,

12、I begin by exploring the accounts of wellbeing implicit in the literature on subjective measures – as well as the role that subjective well-being plays in those accounts – and proceed to examine what subjective well-bein

13、g is thought to be.</p><p>  My aim is to establish that proponents of subjective measures differ at least superficially on at least two points. First, they disagree about the relationship between subjective

14、 well-being and wellbeing simpliciter: about whether subjective well-being constitutes well-being simpliciter or merely is a component of it. Second, they disagree about the nature of subjective well-being: about whether

15、 it is constituted by a cognitive, hedonic, emotional, or mood state, or some combination, and about w</p><p>  A proper appreciation of the nature of subjective well-being and its relation to well-being sim

16、pliciter is important for a variety of reasons. Among other things, such an appreciation can help both proponents and critics of subjective measures to develop clearer and more effective arguments. Proponents of subjecti

17、ve measures– like those who argue for the development of NWBAs – will want to identify the most plausible interpretation of these measures, so as to permit the development of as strong </p><p>  Subjective w

18、ell-being and well-being simpliciter</p><p>  In this section, I explore the relationship between subjective well-being and well-being simpliciter in the writings on subjective measures. I will argue that pr

19、oponents of subjective measures of well-being disagree about the relationship between subjective well-being and well-being simpliciter: about whether subjective well-being constitutes well-being simpliciter or merely is

20、a component of it.</p><p>  As my starting point, I take the concept of well-being, that is, what I have so far called well-being simpliciter: “what we have when our lives are going well for us, when we are

21、living lives that are not necessarily morally good, but good for us” (Tiberius, 2006, p. 493,italics in original). Let us call this the “core” concept of well-being. There are many other terms that are used in the same s

22、ense, including “a person’s good, benefit, advantage, interest, prudential value, welfare, happiness,</p><p>  In particular, it is frequently assumed that well-being is one consideration or as some people w

23、ould argue, the only consideration that should serve as an end, and not just a means for public policy. Here I will take it for granted that when proponents of subjective measures talk about such measures as representing

24、 well-being, they use the term in the core sense (Angner, 2009a, in press). First, as indicated above, subjective measures are often presented as alternatives to other measures of welf</p><p>  Over the year

25、s, philosophers have tried to shed light on the concept of well-being by developing and defending various accounts, or conceptions of well-being. Here, I follow Parfit (1984, pp.493–502) in dividing such accounts into th

26、ree main classes: mental state accounts, preference-satisfaction or desire-fulfillment accounts, and objective-list accounts.4 According to mental-state accounts, well-being is a “mental state” or a “state of mind.” Beca

27、use these accounts all see welfare “as having t</p><p>  Such accounts do not require that a person who is well off experience any feelings of happiness or satisfaction. What they do require is that her des

28、ires are fulfilled (or that her preferences are satisfied), which does not come down to the same thing. The two kinds of account described so far are frequently referred to as subjective accounts, because they describe a

29、 person’s well-being as (at least partly) a function of his or her feelings, experiences, desires, and so on. According to so-call</p><p>  The tri-partite division permits us to capture a major difference b

30、etween subjective measures of well-being, traditional economic welfare measures, and welfare indicators inspired by the capability approach. It has been noted elsewhere that traditional economic welfare measures are base

31、d on preference-satisfaction accounts of well-being (Angner, 2009a,b, in press; Harsanyi, 1982; Hausman & McPherson, 2006). This is evident, among other things, from the fact that welfare economists traditionally <

32、;/p><p>  Meanwhile, it is fairly obvious that many proponents of subjective measures think of well-being as a mental state. There is abundant evidence, for one thing, that they adhere to the experience require

33、ment. In the literature on subjective measures,well-being is often described as a matter exclusively of individual subjective, hedonic, or affective experience. For example, David G. Myers quotes Madame de la Fayette as

34、saying: “If one thinks that one is happy, that is enough to be happy,” and adds </p><p>  Similarly, Ed Diener writes: “The area of subjective well-being is subjective. [It] resides within the experience of

35、the individual” (Diener, 1984, p. 543). Diener and Eunkook Suh reinforce the point: Subjective well-being research is concerned with individuals’ subjective experiences of their lives. The underlying assumption is that w

36、ell-being can be defined by people’s conscious experiences—in terms of hedonic feelings or cognitive satisfactions. The field is built on the presumption that to u</p><p>  Diener and Suh, like Myers and the

37、 authors to whom he refers, apparently use the term “well-being” interchangeably with “subjective well-being.” The fact that Diener and Suh argue that well-being is not only concerned with the individual’s subjective exp

38、eriences, but defined by them, strongly suggests that they adhere to the experience requirement.</p><p>  Several authors emphasize the subjective character of well-being, as they use the term, by contrastin

39、g subjective measures with “objective” ones, including social and economic indicators. Diener makes this point in the following way: Notably absent from definitions of SWB [subjective well-being] are necessary objective

40、conditions such as health, comfort, virtue, or wealth. Although such conditions are seen as potential influences on SWB, they are not seen as an inherent and necessary part of it </p><p>  This quote confirm

41、s that, in Diener’s work, an individual’s well-being is defined not by the objective circumstances in which she finds herself, but by her subjective experiences, though he allows the former to be causally responsible for

42、 the latter. Daniel Kahneman, who identifies well-being with happiness, adds that happiness “is not to be confused with good fortune, which is an assessment of the circumstances of someone’s life” (Kahneman,1999, p. 5).

43、In Kahneman’s view, it is possible to enjo</p><p>  These writings clearly give pride of place to subjectively experienced mental states. Indeed, the evidence suggests that these authors adopt the experience

44、 requirement and think of well-being as constituted by some subjectively experienced mental state. They are best understood as using the term “subjective well-being” to denote the subjectively experienced mental state, s

45、o that well-being can be said to be constituted by subjective well-being. The notion that well-being is constituted by subjec</p><p>  Others, however, appear to resist the view that well-being is constitute

46、d by subjective well-being alone (cf. Angner, in press). Increasingly frequently, it is suggested that subjectively experienced mental states constitute but one component of well-being. For example, Kahneman writes: Obje

47、ctive happiness is not proposed as a comprehensive concept of human well-being, but only as a significant constituent of it. Maximizing the time spent on the right side of the affect grid is not the most sign</p>

48、<p>  The point is clear enough: well-being has multiple components, of which “objective happiness” is only one (albeit an important one). A similar position is defended by Diener, Jeffrey J. Sapyta,and Suh, who use

49、 the term “subjective well-being” to denote the subjectively experienced component of well-being and who argue that although subjective well-being is not sufficient, it is “essential to well-being” (Diener, Sapyta, &

50、 Suh, 1998, p. 33; cf. Kesebir &Diener, 2008, p. 69). Seligman too can be a</p><p>  In sum, these passages all seem to express the notion that well-being has multiple components and that some subjective

51、ly experienced mental state constitutes one of these components. It is unfortunate that these authors do not say more about the number and nature of the remaining components, but it is quite clear that they need not be s

52、ubjectively experienced mental states.</p><p>  The idea that well-being has multiple components, though it does not fit neatly into Parfit’s taxonomy, has been defended by several modern philosophers. By th

53、e end of his discussion, Parfit himself indicates that it might be possible to form a more plausible account of well-being by taking each of the three kinds of account as describing a necessary (but not individually suff

54、icient) condition for well-being (Parfit, 1984, p. 501; cf. Haybron, 2008, p.18). Parfit’s suggestion appears to have bee</p><p>  In any case, these proponents of subjective measures still give pride of pla

55、ce to subjectively experienced mental states. The authors do not, however, treat well-being as constituted by a subjectively experienced mental state alone. Instead, they treat some subjectively experienced mental state

56、as constituting a mere component– albeit an important one – of well-being. These writers are best understood as using the term “subjective well-being” to denote that subjectively experienced mental state,</p><

57、p>  The discussion in this section has shown that proponents of subjective measures of well-being appear to disagree about the relationship between subjective well-being and well-being simpliciter. Some think of well-

58、being as constituted by some subjectively experienced mental state; they are best understood as using the term “subjective well-being” to denote the subjectively experienced mental state, so that well-being can be said t

59、o be constituted by subjective well-being. Others think of some sub</p><p><b>  主觀幸福感</b></p><p><b>  1.引言</b></p><p>  幸福的主觀測(cè)量是基于一些問(wèn)題的幸福感的測(cè)量,如:“在一起,你覺得這些天過(guò)得

60、怎么樣呢—— 你會(huì)說(shuō)你這些日子很高興,挺快樂的,或者不太高興嗎?格瑞,威戎夫&費(fèi)爾德,960年,第411,斜體原件)。被試可能會(huì)給予數(shù)字1到7之間的提示,其中1代表 “總的來(lái)說(shuō),我認(rèn)為我不是一個(gè)很快樂的人”和7代表“總的來(lái)說(shuō),我認(rèn)為自己一個(gè)非常幸福的人”(柳博米爾斯基及萊佩爾,1999年,第151頁(yè))。在過(guò)去,他們會(huì)被問(wèn)及對(duì)這樣的描述是否滿意,如:“性格開朗,大部分時(shí)間是同性戀心境。有時(shí)為一些事煩惱,但通??梢砸恍Χ^(guò),” “跌宕起伏,

61、時(shí)而為事情感到高興,時(shí)而為長(zhǎng)期的均衡感到惆悵,” 和 “生活通常似乎都是這么沒有意義以至于沒什么值得一個(gè)人去繼續(xù)向前的。沒什么重要的事情,已經(jīng)有這么多的傷害,笑聲全成了無(wú)意義的嘲弄”(華生,1930年,第81頁(yè))。這些問(wèn)題的答案是用來(lái)創(chuàng)建個(gè)體幸福(個(gè)人的幸福)和社會(huì)幸福(團(tuán)體的幸福)的諸多方法。</p><p>  主觀幸福感的測(cè)量已成為了在學(xué)術(shù)界及以后熱烈討論的對(duì)象。其中一個(gè)原因是,他們經(jīng)常被作為對(duì)傳統(tǒng)的以收入

62、為基礎(chǔ)的經(jīng)濟(jì)福利措施,和對(duì)通過(guò)能力的方法得到啟發(fā)的指標(biāo)的替代品,或補(bǔ)充(凱士比與迪納,2008)。事實(shí)上,為了鼓勵(lì)使用主觀措施來(lái)達(dá)到公共政策的目的,支持者都提倡國(guó)家幸福報(bào)告,它是通過(guò)追蹤一段時(shí)間的人口水平分?jǐn)?shù)的主觀措施(迪納與塞利格曼,2004;迪納,2006;卡內(nèi)曼,克魯格,施卡德,施瓦茨,斯特尼,2004)。雖然現(xiàn)在很難預(yù)測(cè)在何種程度上的主觀措施將承擔(dān)傳統(tǒng)上由其他措施所發(fā)揮的作用,但是主觀措施似乎正在提高它的地位。例如,最近法國(guó)總統(tǒng)

63、薩科齊的委員會(huì)也贊同將它們用在經(jīng)濟(jì)績(jī)效和社會(huì)進(jìn)步的測(cè)量上。該委員會(huì)是由諾貝爾紀(jì)念獎(jiǎng)獲得者約瑟夫斯蒂格利茨和阿馬蒂亞森領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的,已經(jīng)承擔(dān)負(fù)責(zé)了探索國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的替代品的任務(wù),是用來(lái)作為經(jīng)濟(jì)績(jī)效和社會(huì)進(jìn)步的措施的(斯蒂格利茨,森與羅菲圖西,2009)。</p><p>  幸福的主觀測(cè)量通常也指主觀幸福感的測(cè)量(安德魯斯&羅賓遜,1991)。因此,例如,斯蒂格利茨和同事寫道:“建議1:主觀幸福感的測(cè)量能提供有關(guān)人們對(duì)生

64、活質(zhì)量的關(guān)鍵信息。統(tǒng)計(jì)局應(yīng)將記錄人們的生活評(píng)價(jià),享樂經(jīng)驗(yàn)和優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)的問(wèn)題納入到他們自己的調(diào)查中”(斯蒂格利茨等,2009年,第58頁(yè),原斜體)。所謂“主觀幸福感”(迪納,1984)—是指幸福的主觀測(cè)量的目的是代表—有自己的百科全書的條目(例如,迪納,2001)和手冊(cè)制品(例如,迪納,盧卡斯,&歐石,2005)。到現(xiàn)在,既定的文學(xué)使用幸福的主觀測(cè)量來(lái)闡明主觀幸福感的影響因素和相關(guān)。雖然對(duì)這些措施的信度和效度的問(wèn)題依然存在,但是科學(xué)和效度以

65、及在實(shí)證研究的實(shí)質(zhì)性關(guān)系更多。</p><p>  盡管如此,當(dāng)涉及到什么是主觀幸福感以及它與我稱其為絕對(duì)幸福的有何聯(lián)系時(shí)仍然相當(dāng)?shù)睦Щ蟆!拔覀儞碛惺裁?,我們的生活什么時(shí)候會(huì)變得好,什么時(shí)候我們的生活不是一定道義上的好,但是有利于我們”(提比略,2006,第493,原斜體)。據(jù)指出,主觀措施不同于有關(guān)于潛在的福利或幸福報(bào)告的經(jīng)濟(jì)和以能力為基礎(chǔ)的措施(阿德勒和波斯納,2008;安格納,2008,2009)。也有人指

66、出,主觀測(cè)量的支持者彼此不同(布魯尼,2008年,第117- 120;厄斯,2006年,第494-495)。然而,當(dāng)涉及到主觀幸福感的本質(zhì)及其與絕對(duì)幸福的關(guān)系時(shí),現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)未能找到多樣性程度和主觀測(cè)量的支持者之間的不同意見。其結(jié)果會(huì)是一種同質(zhì)性的假象和對(duì)富有成效的溝通的障礙以及學(xué)科間和跨學(xué)科之間的合作。</p><p>  本文探討了“主觀幸福感”的概念,將其作為使用在文學(xué)上的幸福主觀測(cè)量的術(shù)語(yǔ)。為了研究什么是主觀

67、幸福感,以及它如何關(guān)乎絕對(duì)幸福,我開始通過(guò)探索隱含在文學(xué)里的有關(guān)主觀測(cè)量的幸福報(bào)告,以及主觀幸福感在這些報(bào)告中所起的作用 ,并著手研究主觀幸福感被認(rèn)為是什么。</p><p>  我的目標(biāo)是建立主觀措施的支持者的差異至少在表面上至少有兩點(diǎn)。首先,他們對(duì)主觀幸福感和絕對(duì)幸福之間的關(guān)系持不同意見:主觀幸福感是否構(gòu)成絕對(duì)幸?;騼H僅是它的一個(gè)組成部分。第二,他們?cè)谥饔^幸福感本質(zhì)上的意見不同:它是否是由認(rèn)知,享樂,情緒或情

68、緒狀態(tài),或它們的組合構(gòu)成,以及有關(guān)該國(guó)是否能完全被稱作“幸?!?,“滿足”或別的其他。為了努力協(xié)調(diào)這些分歧,我提出了一個(gè)根據(jù)主觀測(cè)量預(yù)先假定偏好享樂主義的解釋:根據(jù)幸福是一個(gè)理想的精神狀態(tài)問(wèn)題的報(bào)告。這個(gè)解釋還沒有(據(jù)我所知)被主觀測(cè)量的支持者明確表示贊同。然而,它成功地協(xié)調(diào)著許多關(guān)于主觀測(cè)量的寫作,而且它具有歸因于主觀測(cè)量支持者的額外優(yōu)勢(shì),一個(gè)幸福報(bào)告具有明確的價(jià)值論基礎(chǔ),是相對(duì)合理的。</p><p>  給主

69、觀幸福感的本質(zhì)及其與絕對(duì)幸福之間的關(guān)系一個(gè)適當(dāng)?shù)脑u(píng)價(jià)對(duì)于許多原因來(lái)說(shuō)是重要的。除其他事情,這樣的一個(gè)評(píng)價(jià)可以同時(shí)幫助主觀測(cè)量的支持者和批判者去進(jìn)行更清晰,更有效的辯論。主觀測(cè)量的支持者,就像那些為國(guó)家幸福報(bào)告的發(fā)展?fàn)幷摰娜艘粯?,想要確認(rèn)這些測(cè)量的最合理的解釋,以允許盡可能強(qiáng)有利于他們的發(fā)展的情況。批判者,就如同為傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)或以能力為基礎(chǔ)的經(jīng)濟(jì)的優(yōu)越性辯論的人一樣, 想要清空關(guān)于主觀測(cè)量的最合理的解釋,以避免受到他們是在攻擊一個(gè)稻草人的指控

70、。在最后,我的希望是一個(gè)對(duì)主觀測(cè)量的基礎(chǔ)的更明確的評(píng)價(jià)可以幫助消除學(xué)術(shù)交流,合作和進(jìn)步的障礙。</p><p>  2.主觀幸福感和絕對(duì)幸福</p><p>  在這個(gè)部分,我將就著作中的主觀測(cè)量來(lái)探討主觀幸福感和絕對(duì)幸福之間的關(guān)系。我會(huì)爭(zhēng)辯說(shuō),主觀幸福感的測(cè)量的支持者在主觀幸福感和絕對(duì)幸福之間的關(guān)系上持不同意見:主觀幸福感是否構(gòu)成絕對(duì)幸福或僅僅是它的一個(gè)組成部分。</p>

71、<p>  如同我一開始的觀點(diǎn)一樣,我認(rèn)為幸福的概念,也就是所謂的迄今我都成為絕對(duì)幸福:“我們擁有什么,我們的生活什么時(shí)候會(huì)變得好,什么時(shí)候我們的生活不是一定道義上的好,但是有利于我們”(提比略,2006年,第493,原斜體)。讓我們稱其為幸福的核心概念吧。還有許多其他的名詞,在同一意義上使用,包括“一個(gè)人的好,利益,優(yōu)點(diǎn),興趣,審慎的價(jià)值,福利,幸福,繁榮,幸福和實(shí)用”(摩爾&酥,1996年,第599)。因?yàn)樾腋J菫榱俗非笞?/p>

72、終的,而不僅僅是幫助性地有利于個(gè)人,幸福也應(yīng)該是我們有理由鼓勵(lì)追求的,是作為目的,而不僅僅是作為一種手段,無(wú)論是在我們自己的生命里以及他人的生命里。正如托馬斯斯坎倫指出:大家普遍認(rèn)為個(gè)體幸福有一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的含義,它起著以下三個(gè)作用。首先,它作為一個(gè)單個(gè)人的理性決策的重要依據(jù),至少對(duì)那些在他或她獨(dú)自關(guān)注時(shí)(也就是說(shuō),在這種道義上的義務(wù)和對(duì)他人的關(guān)切上能夠予以擱置)的決定。第二,它關(guān)注恩人如朋友或父母,有理由推廣。第三,它是以將其個(gè)人的利益考慮

73、到道德觀點(diǎn)里為基礎(chǔ)的(斯坎倫,1998年,第93頁(yè))。</p><p>  特別是,人們經(jīng)常認(rèn)為幸福是一個(gè)因素,或者像有些人會(huì)認(rèn)為,唯一的因素應(yīng)作為結(jié)果,而不僅僅是為公共政策的一個(gè)手段。當(dāng)主觀測(cè)量支持者談到用這種測(cè)量代表幸福感時(shí)我會(huì)認(rèn)為這是理所當(dāng)然的,他們?cè)诤诵母拍钌鲜褂眠@個(gè)術(shù)語(yǔ)(安格納,2009年)。首先,如上所述,如果主觀測(cè)量經(jīng)常被作為福利或幸福的其他測(cè)量的替代方案;事實(shí)上,如果主觀測(cè)量并不旨在代表其他那些準(zhǔn)

74、備用來(lái)表示福利或幸福的測(cè)量的話,那這將毫無(wú)意義。其次,支持者們的幸福感概念起著相同的作用就如同核心概念所起的作用:那些為主觀幸福感測(cè)量的作用辯護(hù)的人們往往強(qiáng)調(diào)他們認(rèn)為幸福感是最終有利于個(gè)人的,也是值得在別人的生活中所提倡的,并且能作為公共政策的一個(gè)主要(有時(shí)甚至是唯一)的最終的目標(biāo)(上面引述的參見迪納與塞利格曼,2004年)。第三,許多支持者明確地列舉了和哲學(xué)家所認(rèn)為的一樣,古典哲學(xué)文學(xué)也意見相當(dāng)一致地表示他們用意思相同的“幸?!焙?或

75、“幸福感”(卡內(nèi)曼,沃克爾,沙林,1997;萊亞德,2000;華生,1930)。</p><p>  多年來(lái),哲學(xué)家們?cè)噲D通過(guò)完善各種報(bào)告或者幸福感的概念來(lái)闡明幸福感的思想。在這里,我跟隨帕菲特(1984,第493-502)將這個(gè)報(bào)告分為三個(gè)主要類別:心理狀態(tài)報(bào)告,偏好滿足或愿望實(shí)現(xiàn)的報(bào)告,客觀名單報(bào)告。根據(jù)精神狀態(tài)報(bào)告,幸福感是一種“精神狀態(tài)”或“心靈的狀態(tài)?!庇捎谶@些報(bào)告都把福利“當(dāng)做不得不出現(xiàn)在我們的經(jīng)驗(yàn)中

76、,”據(jù)說(shuō)他們對(duì)經(jīng)驗(yàn)要求很滿意(格里芬,1986年,第13頁(yè))。斯坎倫寫道:“經(jīng)驗(yàn)論認(rèn)為,生命的質(zhì)量‘就是這個(gè)人所過(guò)得生活’完全是由它的經(jīng)驗(yàn)的質(zhì)量所決定的,”“這里的經(jīng)驗(yàn)質(zhì)量”是指“它會(huì)想過(guò)怎樣的生活”(斯坎倫,1998年,第97,99)。從這個(gè)角度來(lái)看,那么,主觀感覺的經(jīng)驗(yàn)對(duì)于一個(gè)人的幸福感來(lái)說(shuō)是必要的也是足夠的。根據(jù)愿望實(shí)現(xiàn)或偏好滿足報(bào)告,相比較而言,如果一個(gè)人的愿望得到滿足和/或她的喜好得到滿足,那么她就是富裕的。斯坎倫這樣指出:欲

77、望理論拒絕經(jīng)驗(yàn)要求,卻允許不只通過(guò)人意識(shí)狀態(tài)里的變化,也通過(guò)在一個(gè)能夠滿足個(gè)人喜好的世界的其他地方的變化讓一個(gè)人的生命變得好與壞。(斯坎倫,1993年,第186頁(yè))。</p><p>  這些報(bào)告不要求一個(gè)富裕的人體驗(yàn)過(guò)任何幸?;驖M足的感覺。他們確實(shí)需要的是她的愿望得到滿足(或她的喜好得到滿足),它沒有歸結(jié)為同樣的事情。這兩類報(bào)告迄今為止經(jīng)常被稱為主觀報(bào)告,因?yàn)樗麄冃稳菀粋€(gè)人的幸福感(至少部分)是他或她的感情、經(jīng)

78、驗(yàn)、欲望等等的功能。根據(jù)所謂的客觀報(bào)告,與此相比,一個(gè)人的幸福并不取決于這種主觀因素。在這種報(bào)告里,“有些事情對(duì)于一個(gè)人是好還是壞,至少單獨(dú)地在一些他們是否得到滿足或它們是否會(huì)引起愉快的經(jīng)驗(yàn)的案例中”(察佩爾&酥,1998年,第553)。鑒別那些有利于人們的事物清單,而不管他們想要的是什么是非常困難的,但是這樣的事情臨時(shí)名單包括“道德上的善,理性活動(dòng),一個(gè)人能力的發(fā)展,生孩子并成為一個(gè)好家長(zhǎng),知識(shí),和真實(shí)之美意識(shí)”(帕菲特,1984年,

79、第499頁(yè))。顯然,各類報(bào)告有許多種版本。</p><p>  三方分工使我們能夠找到主觀幸福感測(cè)量,傳統(tǒng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)福利測(cè)量以及受到能力方法啟發(fā)的福利指標(biāo)三者之間的主要區(qū)別。人們注意到在其他地方,傳統(tǒng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)福利測(cè)量是以幸福感的偏好滿足報(bào)告為基礎(chǔ)的(安格納,2009;海薩尼,1982年;奧斯曼和麥克弗森,2006年)。除其他外,從傳統(tǒng)上,福利經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家通過(guò)顯示它們是有實(shí)用功能(那就是,他們是偏好滿足的指標(biāo))的來(lái)為他們的測(cè)

80、量辯護(hù)這個(gè)事實(shí)來(lái)看,這是顯而易見的。也有人指出,受能力方法啟發(fā)的測(cè)量是建立在幸福報(bào)告的客觀名單上的(努斯鮑姆,2008年;森,1987年)。除其他外,從某些事情尤其是有大的能力集的事情,不管這些事情是否會(huì)使人更快樂也不管這個(gè)人是否能取悅他們就被認(rèn)為是有利于個(gè)人的這個(gè)假設(shè)來(lái)看,這是明確的。</p><p>  同時(shí),許多主觀測(cè)量的支持者都認(rèn)為幸福感是一種心理狀態(tài),這是相當(dāng)明顯的。一方面,有大量證據(jù)表明他們遵守經(jīng)驗(yàn)要

81、求。在有關(guān)主觀測(cè)量的文獻(xiàn)資料中,幸福感經(jīng)常被描述為一個(gè)完全是個(gè)人主觀,享樂,或情感經(jīng)驗(yàn)的問(wèn)題。例如,大衛(wèi)邁爾斯引述克拉法葉夫人的話說(shuō):“如果一個(gè)人認(rèn)為他是快樂的,這一點(diǎn)就足以快樂”,并補(bǔ)充說(shuō),“和拉法葉夫人一樣,社會(huì)科學(xué)家也把幸福感看作是一種心理狀態(tài)。幸福感,有時(shí)被稱為‘主觀幸?!瘡?qiáng)調(diào)這一點(diǎn),它是一個(gè)普遍意義上的生活是美好的”(邁爾斯,1992年,第23,27)。邁爾斯明確地認(rèn)為幸福感是完全主觀的東西,要指出的是,尤其是使用“主觀幸福感

82、”這個(gè)術(shù)語(yǔ)等同于“幸福。” 心理狀態(tài)的明確提出強(qiáng)烈地表明,人的頭腦中所想的東西就是心理狀態(tài)報(bào)告的某一類型。</p><p>  同樣,埃德迪納寫道:“主觀幸福感方面是主觀的,它屬于個(gè)人經(jīng)驗(yàn)”(迪納,1984年,543頁(yè))。迪納和亞科卡.薩強(qiáng)調(diào)了這一點(diǎn):主觀幸福感的研究與個(gè)人生活的主觀經(jīng)驗(yàn)有關(guān)。潛在的假設(shè)是幸??梢酝ㄟ^(guò)人的意識(shí)經(jīng)驗(yàn)來(lái)定義,是就享樂感受或認(rèn)知滿意度而言的。該領(lǐng)域是建立在了解個(gè)人幸福經(jīng)驗(yàn)質(zhì)量的假設(shè)上的,

83、在他或她自己生活的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)背景下直接研究一個(gè)人如何感受生活是適當(dāng)?shù)模ǖ霞{和薩,1997年,第191)。</p><p>  迪納和薩,像邁爾斯和作者們提到的人一樣,明確把“幸?!焙汀爸饔^幸福感這兩個(gè)術(shù)語(yǔ)互換使用。??”事實(shí)是迪納和薩認(rèn)為幸福不僅與個(gè)人主觀經(jīng)驗(yàn)有關(guān),也是由它們來(lái)定義的,有力地表明他們遵守經(jīng)驗(yàn)要求。</p><p>  由于他們使用這個(gè)術(shù)語(yǔ),一些作者通過(guò)比較主觀測(cè)量與客觀測(cè)量,包括

84、社會(huì)和經(jīng)濟(jì)指標(biāo)強(qiáng)調(diào)主觀幸福感的特征。迪納以下列方式說(shuō)明這點(diǎn):主觀幸福感的定義特別是由于如健康,舒適,美德,或財(cái)富這些必要的客觀條件的缺乏。雖然這些條件是被看作是主觀幸福感的潛在影響因素的,但它們不會(huì)被視為主觀幸福感的固有的和必要的一部分(迪納,1984年,543頁(yè))。</p><p>  在迪納的論文中,這句話證實(shí)一個(gè)人的幸福不是由在她了解自己的客觀情況定義的,而是由她的主觀經(jīng)驗(yàn)來(lái)定義的,雖然他讓前者為后者負(fù)責(zé)。

85、丹尼爾卡內(nèi)曼,他通過(guò)幸福來(lái)確認(rèn)幸福感,補(bǔ)充說(shuō),幸福“是不能與好運(yùn)氣(它是對(duì)一個(gè)人生活環(huán)境的評(píng)估)相混淆的”(卡內(nèi)曼,1999年,第5頁(yè))。在卡內(nèi)曼看來(lái),享受好運(yùn)氣(大概有收入、健康等等,沒有不愉快)是有可能的。安格斯.坎貝爾(1976年),引述迪納的話(1984年,543頁(yè)),在這點(diǎn)上展開??藏悹栒J(rèn)為:“國(guó)民生產(chǎn)總值,它無(wú)疑是重要的,但顯然不是反對(duì)這個(gè)國(guó)家的幸福定量是可以評(píng)估的最終試金石”(坎貝爾,1976年,第117頁(yè))。他繼續(xù)說(shuō):如

86、果我們主要關(guān)注描述人口生活經(jīng)驗(yàn)質(zhì)量,那么我們需要的測(cè)量就要是不同于那些常被用來(lái)描述人們生活的客觀環(huán)境的測(cè)量。我們必須發(fā)展測(cè)量方法,能夠直接測(cè)出經(jīng)驗(yàn)本身。這些主觀測(cè)量方法是肯定不會(huì)有指標(biāo)的精確度的,指標(biāo)是用來(lái)表示美元值、時(shí)間單位、或平方數(shù)的數(shù)目的,但他們將擁有直接處理我們想知道的是什么和個(gè)人幸福感的意義這些問(wèn)題的巨大優(yōu)勢(shì)(坎貝爾,1976年,第118頁(yè),原斜體)??藏悹栒J(rèn)為,生活質(zhì)量是一種個(gè)人的幸福感的功能。如果我們要研究生命質(zhì)量,<

87、;/p><p>  這些著作明確地贊揚(yáng)了主觀的富有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的心理狀態(tài)。事實(shí)上,有證據(jù)表明,這些作者采納經(jīng)驗(yàn)要求,并且認(rèn)為幸福感是由一些主觀的有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的心理狀態(tài)構(gòu)成的。他們最好被理解為使用術(shù)語(yǔ)“主觀??幸福感”來(lái)表示主觀的有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的心理狀態(tài),這樣幸??梢哉f(shuō)是由主觀幸福感構(gòu)成的。順便說(shuō)一下,那種認(rèn)為幸福是由主觀幸福感構(gòu)成的看法解釋了“幸福的主觀測(cè)量”和 “主觀幸福感的測(cè)量”的鑒別。</p><p>  然

88、而,其他人拒絕幸福是僅僅是由主觀幸福感構(gòu)成的觀點(diǎn)(參見安格納)。越來(lái)越頻繁地認(rèn)為主觀性的有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的心理狀態(tài)由幸福的一個(gè)部分組成。例如,卡內(nèi)曼寫道:客觀幸福不建議作為人類幸福的綜合性概念,但只是作為它的一個(gè)重要組成部分。最大限度地提高對(duì)影響坐標(biāo)方格右邊花的時(shí)間并不是生命中最重要的價(jià)值,以及采用這個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)作為生活指導(dǎo)可能是不道德的而且可能會(huì)弄巧成拙。然而,坐標(biāo)方格的右邊是一個(gè)較為理想的地方這一命題不是特別的有爭(zhēng)議性??陀^幸福是許多幸福概念的一個(gè)

89、基本元素(卡內(nèi)曼,2000年,第691)。</p><p>  這一點(diǎn)是很清楚的:幸福有多個(gè)組成部分,其中“客觀幸福”只有一個(gè)(雖然是重要的)。一個(gè)類似的立場(chǎng)是由迪納,杰弗里和薩捍衛(wèi)的,他們用“主觀幸福感”來(lái)表示幸福的主觀性經(jīng)驗(yàn)的組成部分,還有他們認(rèn)為雖然主觀幸福感是不充足的,但它是“對(duì)幸福是必要的”(迪納,薩比特,&薩,1998年,第33頁(yè);比照尅賽博與迪納,2008年,第69頁(yè))。塞利格曼也可以歸功于這一觀點(diǎn)

90、:我交替用快樂和幸福既接受積極的感覺(如搖頭丸和舒適性)也接受根本沒有情感成分的積極活動(dòng)(如吸收和接觸)。重要的是要識(shí)別“幸?!焙汀靶腋8小保腋8杏袝r(shí)指感覺,但有時(shí)指在其中什么都沒有感覺到的活動(dòng)(塞利格曼,2002年,第261頁(yè))。</p><p>  總之,這些段落似乎都表達(dá)了這種觀念——幸福有多個(gè)組成部分和有些主觀性有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的心理狀態(tài)是這些組成部分之一。不幸的是,這些作者沒有談到更多關(guān)于剩余組成部分的數(shù)目和性

91、質(zhì),但很清楚的是他們不一定是主觀性有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的心理狀態(tài)。</p><p>  雖然它不適合帕菲特的分類法,但是那種認(rèn)為幸福有多個(gè)組成部分的想法一直由幾個(gè)現(xiàn)代哲學(xué)家所捍衛(wèi)著。到他的討論結(jié)束時(shí),帕菲特本人表示,通過(guò)把三種類型報(bào)告中的每一種作為描述幸福的一個(gè)必要(但不單獨(dú)充分)條件來(lái)形成一個(gè)更加合理的幸福報(bào)告是有可能的(帕菲特,1984年,第501頁(yè);比照哈勃,2008年,第18頁(yè))。帕菲特的建議似乎是借鑒西蒙凱勒的(20

92、04年),他就是寫福利像體能一樣是多方面的。他認(rèn)為,你可以絕對(duì)地過(guò)得比我更好(或更舒適)而不是在所有相關(guān)方面都得分較高;然而,在一些情況下,我們不能說(shuō)無(wú)論是我們中的哪一個(gè)是過(guò)得更好的(更舒適的),因?yàn)闆]有這種問(wèn)題的事實(shí)。凱勒認(rèn)為,幸福一個(gè)組成部分是一個(gè)人的目標(biāo)的成就,不論這些目標(biāo)是什么(凱勒,2004年,第36頁(yè))。根據(jù)我閱讀的文獻(xiàn),像卡內(nèi)曼這些作者可以被理解為在關(guān)于幸福多維度的問(wèn)題上與凱勒的意見一致,雖然他可能不會(huì)提出相同的組成部分。

93、但是請(qǐng)注意,這兩個(gè)建議并不矛盾。</p><p>  在任何情況下,主觀測(cè)量的這些支持者仍贊同主觀性有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的心理狀態(tài)。但是,筆者不認(rèn)為幸福是只由主觀性有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的心理狀態(tài)所構(gòu)成的。相反,他們把主觀性有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的心理狀態(tài)看作是構(gòu)成幸福的唯一(縱使是重要的一個(gè))部分。這些作家最好被理解為使用 “主觀??幸福感”這個(gè)術(shù)語(yǔ)來(lái)表示主觀上有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的心理狀態(tài),這樣主觀幸福感就可以被認(rèn)為不是構(gòu)成幸福,而是幸福的一個(gè)組成部分。</p&

94、gt;<p>  在本節(jié)的討論已經(jīng)表明,幸福的主觀測(cè)量的支持者似乎對(duì)主觀幸福感和絕對(duì)幸福之間的關(guān)系持不同意見。有些人認(rèn)為幸福是由一些主觀上經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富的心理狀態(tài)構(gòu)成的;它們是最好理解為使用 “主觀??幸福感”這個(gè)術(shù)語(yǔ)來(lái)表示主觀上經(jīng)驗(yàn)性的心理狀態(tài),這樣幸福就可以說(shuō)是由主觀幸福感構(gòu)成的。也有人認(rèn)為一些主觀上經(jīng)驗(yàn)性的心理狀態(tài)是構(gòu)成幸福的唯一(縱使是重要的一個(gè))部分;它們是最好理解為用 “主觀??幸福感”這個(gè)術(shù)語(yǔ)來(lái)表示主觀上經(jīng)驗(yàn)性的心

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