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1、目錄外文文獻(xiàn)....................................................................................................11.Introduction...................................................................................................
2、.........................12.Gamesgamethey.........................................................................................................23.Theiesofsocialpreferences..............................................
3、.................................................34.Whydogameexperimentswhichgames...................................................................35.Conclusions.........................................................
4、...................................................................4中文翻譯....................................................................................................41.摘要...........................................
5、.............................................................................................42.博弈和博弈論......................................................................................................................
6、..53.社會(huì)偏好理論........................................................................................................................64.為什么用博弈做實(shí)驗(yàn)?用什么博弈?......................................................................
7、..........65.結(jié)論......................................................................................................................................6外文文獻(xiàn)外文文獻(xiàn)MeasuringSocialNmsPreferencesusingExperimentalGames:AGuidefSoc
8、ialScientistsColinF.CamererErnstFehr1.IntroductionThepurposeofthischapteristodescribeamenuofexperimentalgamesthatareusefulfmeasuringaspectsofsocialnmssocialpreferences.Economistsusetheterm“preferences”torefertothechoices
9、peoplemakeparticularlytotradeoffsbetweendifferentcollections(“bundles”)ofthingstheyvalue—foodmoneytimeprestigesofth.“Socialpreferences”refertohowpeoplerankdifferentallocationsofmaterialpayoffstothemselvesothers.Selfinter
10、estedindividualscareonlyabouttheirownmaterialpayoffs.Thepasttwodecadesofexperimentalresearchhaveshownhoweverthatasubstantialfractionofpeopleindevelopedcountries(typicallycollegestudents)alsocareaboutthepayoffsofothers.In
11、somesituationsmanypeoplearewillingtospendresourcestoreducethepayoffofothers.Inothersituationsthesamepeoplespendresourcestoincreasethepayoffofothers.Aswewillseethewillingnesstoreduceincreasethepayoffofrelevantreferenceact
12、sexistseventhoughpeoplereapneitherpresentnfuturematerialrewardsfromreducingincreasingpayoffsofothers.Thisindicatesthatinadditiontocpateprofitsthegapbetweenwhatyouwouldmaximallypayfsomethingwhatyouactuallypay(“consumersur
13、plus”)asenseofjusticecapturedterrity.Gametheyconsistsoftwodifferententerprises:(1)Usinggamesasalanguagetaxonomytoparsethesocialwld(2)derivingprecisepredictionsabouthowplayerswillplayinagamebyassumingthatplayersmaximizeex
14、pected“utility”(personalvaluation)ofconsequencesplanaheadfmbeliefsaboutotherplayerslikelyactions.Thesecondenterprisedominatesgametheytextbooksjournals.Analyticaltheyofthisstisextremelymathematicalinaccessibletomanysocial
15、scientistsoutsideofeconomicstheeticalbiology.Ftunatelygamescanbeusedasataxonomywithminimalmathematicsbecauseunderstingprototypicalgames—likethosediscussedinthischapter—requiresnothingbeyondsimplelogic.Themostcentralconce
16、ptingametheyisNashequilibrium.Asetofstrategies(onefeachplayer)fmanequilibriumifeachplayerischoosingthestrategywhichisabestresponse(i.e.givesthehighestexpectedutility)totheotherplayers’strategies.Attentionisfocussedonequi
17、libriumbecauseplayerswhoareconstantlyswitchingtobetterstrategiesgivenwhatothershavedonewillgenerallyendupatanequilibrium.Increasinglygametheistsareinterestedinthedynamicsofequilibrationaswellinthefmofevolutionofpopulatio
18、nsofplayerstrategies(Weibull1995)learningbyindividualsfromexperience(e.g.FudenbergLevine1998CamererHo1999).3.TheiesofsocialpreferencesWithineconomicstheleadingexplanationfthepatternsofresultsdescribedaboveisthatagentshav
19、esocialpreferences(“socialutility”)whichtakeintoaccountthepayoffsperhapsintentionsofothers.Roughlyspeakingsocialpreferencetheiesassumethatpeoplehavestablepreferencesfhowmoneyisallocated(whichmaydependonwhotheotherplayeri
20、showtheallocationcameabout)muchastheyareassumedineconomicstohavepreferencesffoodthepresentversusthefuturehowclosetheirhouseistowksofth.10Culturalanthropologistsevolutionarypsychologistshavesoughttoexplaintheiginofthesepr
21、eferences.Oneideaisthatintheenvironmentofevolutionaryadaptation(EEA)ancestralpastpeoplemostlyengagedinrepeatedgameswithpeopletheyknew.Evolutioncreatedspecializedcognitiveheuristicsfplayingrepeatedgamesefficiently.Itiswel
22、lknowningametheythatbehaviwhichisoptimalfaselfinterestedactinaoneperiodgamewithastrangersuchasdefectingfreeridingacceptingallultimatumoffersisnotalwaysoptimalinrepeatedgameswithpartners.Inarepeatedultimatumgamefexampleit
23、paystorejectofferstobuildupareputationfbeinghardtopusharoundwhichleadstomegenerousoffersinthefuture.Intheunnaturalhabitatviewsubjectscannot“turnoff”thehabitualbehavishapedbyrepeatedgamelifeintheEEAwhentheyplaysinglegames
24、withstrangersinthelab.Animptantmodificationofthisviewisthatevolutiondidnotequipallpeoplewithidenticalhardwiredinstinctsfplayinggamesbutinsteadcreatedthecapacityflearningsocialnms.Thelatterviewcanexplainwhydifferentcultur
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