外文翻譯---通過并購創(chuàng)造價(jià)值

1、<p>　　Creating value through acquisitions</p><p>　　Stuart E. Jackson, (2007),"Creating value through acquisitions", Journal of Business Strategy, Vol. 28 Iss: 6 pp. 40 – 41</p><p&g

2、t;　　A caution to readers who like nothing better than a headline-grabbing, out-of-the-blue acquisition: I’m not one of you.</p><p>　　In fact, as a rule, I am an advocate of organic growth, of growing out fro

3、m the core of the business in ways that build on established strengths. That strategy is at the heart of a discipline that I call ‘‘strategic market positioning,’’ or SMP, which is about defending and growing your compan

4、y’s weighted share of the strategic market segments that define competitive advantage within your industry. This may be defined by geography, customer demographic, channel focus, and so on – the critical di</p>&l

5、t;p>　　.Stated simply, you are far more likely to increase the value of your company if you can find a way to expand your existing business and achieve increased benefits of scale or scope within your existing strategi

6、c segments. </p><p>　　One huge problem with most of those headline-grabbing deals: it is hard to create value for shareholders given the price of acquisitions today. Every successful corporation is feeling t

7、he same growth imperatives, so almost all of them are looking for growing, profitable companies to add to their portfolios of businesses.</p><p>　　Meanwhile, would-be acquirers face stiff competition from fi

8、nancial buyers. equity firms looking for good companies to buy. These financial buyers were not in the game 20 years ago, or even a decade ago. It can take only one or two such buyers with an inflated sense of their own

9、management capabilities to drive the cost of a potential acquisition past what you should be willing to pay for it. </p><p>　　The combination of these factors means that valuations of good companies, and eve

10、n some not-so-good companies, have been steadily creeping upward since the market recovery began in 2001. The upshot? You may have to pay ten times cash flow or 20 times net earnings, or even more, to acquire a good prop

11、erty. This means that, even if you ignore the time value of money, you need many years of profits at the current level to get your money back. </p><p>　　So that is the bad news. The good news is that there a

12、re definitely situations in which, from an SMP perspective, acquisitions make good sense. The point is to use the discipline of SMP to figure out whether it is worth paying the acquisition premium that today’s competitiv

13、e M&A environment requires. You need to ask: What strategic segment are we entering through this acquisition and who is the competition in that segment? Will the new business strengthen our SMP in segments where we a

14、lready com</p><p>　　One of my favorite examples of an SMP-savvy buyer is Northrop Grumman, which since the late 1990s has used a number of targeted acquisitions to strengthen its SMP and, by extension, its p

15、rofitability and value.</p><p>　　Northrop by the early 1990s was a50-year-old major defense contractor looking hard for further growth. In1994, it paid $2.1 billion for Grumman Corporation, a premier electro

16、nic systems firm and the prime contractor for the lunar excursion module used in the Project Apollo moon landings. The acquisition gave the company (now called Northrop Grumman) a strong technological position in airborn

17、e surveillance and electronics warfare systems. Nevertheless, results in the late 1990s were disappointing</p><p>　　The central problem for Northrop Grumman was that it had failed to achieve scale through th

18、e Grumman acquisition and other recent purchases. Great technology alone was not sufficient. Being the fourth-largest military supplier, without a particularly strong niche in any of its strategic market segments, appear

19、ed to be a recipe for further decline.</p><p>　　So the company took conscious steps to improve its SMP. In May 1999, it announced that it would buy Ryan Aeronautical from Allegheny Teledyne for $140 million,

20、 with the express goal of expanding its reach into key niche markets, including the emerging industry of ‘‘unmanned aerial vehicles,’’ or UAVs. </p><p>　　Even within the tight-knit defense-contracting commun

21、ity, there were those who asked, ‘‘Ryan who?’’ The San Diego-based Ryan had only300 employees and annual sales of about $100million – under 2 percent of the acquiring company’s size. Critics of the deal suggested that No

22、rthrop Grumman had overpaid for Ryan by a factor of two or three. But let us apply the four-question ‘‘SMP test’’ outlined above and scrutinize the deal from the parent company’s point of view.</p><p>　　What

23、 strategic segment are we entering through this acquisition, and who is the competition in that segment? Northrop Grumman felt that the UAV strategic segment was attractive for several reasons. First, there was mounting

24、pressure from the public to reduce military casualties, increasing demand for unmanned technologies. Second, there was an increased need for surveillance to leverage a dwindling number of combat platforms. And finally, n

25、ew technologies were increasing bandwidth available for </p><p>　　Will the new business strengthen our SMP in segments where we already compete? Here, the answer was probably ‘‘no.’’ Ryan was unlikely to hav

26、e much of an impact on Northrop Grumman’s existing segments, including ships and combat fighter aircraft. There was little prospect of sharing manufacturing costs and support functions across the two companies’ product l

27、ines.</p><p>　　If we are entering a new strategic segment, can we leverage our SMP in adjacent segments to ensure that we achieve a strong SMP in the target segment? Here the answer was clearly ‘‘yes.’’ Ryan

28、 already had a strong position in the emerging segment. The parent company possessed technologies (especially Grumman technologies) that could contribute to next-generation UAVs. In addition, Northrop Grumman was a savvy

29、 and well-connected player in the defense industry, with the contacts to help win contra</p><p>　　Bottom line, will the new business make the weighted average SMP for our overall company better or worse? Thi

30、s, clearly, was the crux of the SMP test of the acquisition. To justify the cost of the deal, Northrop Grumman needed not just to maintain Ryan’s leadership in UAVs, but also to grow the business sufficiently to have an

31、impact on the parent company’s overall SMP.</p><p>　　This is exactly what Northrop Grumman has done. Among the company’s 2004 contracts were $1.04 billion for X-47B Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems. That si

32、ngle contract was more than enough to justify the $140 million cost for acquiring Ryan. Other UAV business has followed, and the ‘‘Global Hawk’’ UAV has played a critical role in the Iraq War.</p><p>　　In te

33、rms of shareholder returns, it is difficult to separate out the impact of the Ryan acquisition from the string of other, mostly larger acquisitions that Northrop Grumman has completed since 1999. But the company’s revenu

34、es have increased an average of 26.2 percent annually since 1999, and net income has increased by 20.1 percent annually (to $1.4 billion). The stock price has risen at an average annual rate of 12 percent. Today, Northro

35、p Grumman is the second-biggest US defense contractor (</p><p>　　The acquisition price became irrelevant when considered against the amount of new business generated by the deal. Yes, acquirers may pay a ste

36、ep acquisition premium in today’s marketplace, but as the Northrop Grumman/Ryan deal clearly illustrates, there are properties for which you should pay such a premium, assuming that you have a clear view of the strategic

37、 market position that you are trying to build.</p><p>　　Successful acquirers focus on understanding the strategic value of an asset, measured in terms of either stronger SMP and increased revenues, or higher

38、 profitability for the combined organization – a value that is often very different from a fair price based on multiples of historic earnings, or cash flow.</p><p>　　You can use acquisitions to create value

39、for your shareholders if you know where value hides.</p><p><b>　　通過并購創(chuàng)造價(jià)值</b></p><p>　　斯圖爾特 · E.杰克遜. 通過并購創(chuàng)造價(jià)值[J].商業(yè)策略雜志. （2007 年），28卷第 40-41頁.</p><p>　　提醒那些喜歡吸引人眼球的

40、讓人出乎意料的收購的讀者：我不敢茍同。</p><p>　　事實(shí)上，一般來說，我提倡有機(jī)增長(zhǎng)，即在既有的優(yōu)勢(shì)上從核心業(yè)務(wù)中獲得增長(zhǎng)。這種用以捍衛(wèi)和擴(kuò)大公司的加權(quán)份額的市場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)略以明確您在行業(yè)內(nèi)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)的策略，我稱之為市場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)略定位或 SMP，它是一門學(xué)科的核心內(nèi)容。這種競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)可能由地理、 客戶人口統(tǒng)計(jì)資料、銷售渠道熱度等等 — 也就是您特定業(yè)務(wù)本身的規(guī)模決定。它不是為了增長(zhǎng)而增長(zhǎng)，而是把客戶偏好、生產(chǎn)者經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的基

41、本原理與實(shí)現(xiàn)強(qiáng)大的市場(chǎng)定位和通過選擇性的增長(zhǎng)實(shí)現(xiàn)更高的收益率的目標(biāo)相結(jié)合。</p><p>　　簡(jiǎn)單地說，如果你能找到在你現(xiàn)有的戰(zhàn)略段內(nèi)擴(kuò)大您現(xiàn)有的業(yè)務(wù)以及實(shí)現(xiàn)增加收益的規(guī)?；蚍秶囊环N方法，那么你更有可能使你公司的價(jià)值得到增加。</p><p>　　與大多數(shù)的這些喜歡頭條新聞的交易有一個(gè)巨大的問題：現(xiàn)今發(fā)出的收購價(jià)格很難為股東創(chuàng)造價(jià)值。每個(gè)成功的公司感覺到相同的增長(zhǎng)要?jiǎng)?wù)，所以幾乎所有人都

42、正在尋找業(yè)務(wù)不斷增長(zhǎng)、 利潤(rùn)豐厚的公司將它們添加到自己的投資組合公司。</p><p>　　與此同時(shí)，潛在的收購者面對(duì)著金融買家的激烈競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。股本公司都在尋找好的公司購買。這些金融買家不是像十年前或二十年前一樣在游戲。只要有一兩個(gè)這樣抬高價(jià)格意識(shí)的買家在你面前炫耀一家公司潛在收購的成本，你將會(huì)很愿意為此買單。</p><p>　　這些因素綜合起來意味著估值的好公司和甚至一些不太好的，但在20

43、01年市場(chǎng)復(fù)蘇以來一直穩(wěn)步向上發(fā)展的公司。結(jié)果如何？您可能要付出十倍的現(xiàn)金流或20倍的凈收益，或者更多的錢來完成兼并一家好的公司。這意味著即使你忽略金錢的時(shí)間價(jià)值，在目前的利潤(rùn)水平上你也需要許多年才能收回你的投資成本。</p><p>　　這就是壞消息。而好消息是，從 SMP 的角度看，目前肯定是有解決方法讓收購能夠帶來效益的。成功的關(guān)鍵就是使用SMP的原理找出在現(xiàn)今的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)收購兼并環(huán)境中是否值得付出收購溢價(jià)。這時(shí)

44、你就需要問自己：我們要通過此次收購進(jìn)入哪個(gè)戰(zhàn)略領(lǐng)域，該領(lǐng)域的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者是誰？新業(yè)務(wù)將加強(qiáng)我們?cè)谝延袘?zhàn)略領(lǐng)域中的戰(zhàn)略地位嗎？如果我們正進(jìn)入一個(gè)新的戰(zhàn)略段，我們可以利用我們?cè)谙噜弲^(qū)域的戰(zhàn)略地位來確保我們達(dá)到在目標(biāo)段中強(qiáng)有力的戰(zhàn)略地位嗎？至少要弄清楚新的業(yè)務(wù)將會(huì)使公司整體的戰(zhàn)略地位得到提升還是下降？</p><p>　　一個(gè)我最喜歡的的懂得SMP的精明買家是諾斯羅普格魯曼公司，自上世紀(jì) 90 年代末以來已使用多有針對(duì)性的收

45、購，以加強(qiáng)其戰(zhàn)略地位，并不斷地?cái)U(kuò)展，增強(qiáng)其盈利能力和公司價(jià)值。</p><p>　　九十年代初期諾思羅普是一家有著50年歷史并且努力地尋找進(jìn)一步發(fā)展機(jī)會(huì)的國(guó)防承包商。在1994年，諾思羅普支付給格魯曼公司21億美元，格魯曼是一家電子系統(tǒng)公司并且是阿波羅登月項(xiàng)目中登月艙的主要承包商。這次收購提升了公司 （現(xiàn)稱諾斯羅普格魯曼） 在機(jī)載監(jiān)視和電子對(duì)抗系統(tǒng)中強(qiáng)有力的技術(shù)地位。不過，在上世紀(jì) 90 年代末的結(jié)果卻令人失望。

46、諾斯羅普格魯曼公司在重要項(xiàng)目的利潤(rùn)率仍然貧血，收入從1996年的86 億美元下降到1999年的76億美元。</p><p>　　諾斯羅普格魯曼公司的關(guān)鍵問題是它未能通過收購格魯曼公司和其他最近的購買計(jì)劃實(shí)現(xiàn)規(guī)模化。僅靠偉大技術(shù)是不夠的。作為第四大的軍事供應(yīng)商，其所有戰(zhàn)略市場(chǎng)部分都沒有特別強(qiáng)大利無疑會(huì)造成公司的進(jìn)一步衰退。</p><p>　　因此公司應(yīng)該采取由意識(shí)的步奏以改善自身的戰(zhàn)略地位

47、。1999 年 5 月宣布它將用130億美元從阿勒格尼萊購買瑞安航空，明確表明目標(biāo)是將其活動(dòng)范圍擴(kuò)大到利基市場(chǎng)，包括無人駕駛飛機(jī)和無人機(jī)的新興行業(yè)。</p><p>　　即使在緊密防御承包社區(qū)內(nèi)也有一些人會(huì)問：“Ryan是誰？”位于圣地亞哥的 Ryan僅有300名員工，年銷售額約100億美元 ，其規(guī)模不到收購公司大小的 2%。這筆交易的批評(píng)家們認(rèn)為諾斯羅普格魯曼公司多付了瑞恩兩、三倍的錢。但讓我們應(yīng)用SMP原理的

48、四個(gè)問題來測(cè)試上文所述并且用母公司的觀點(diǎn)審議這一交易看看。</p><p>　　我們通過此次收購要進(jìn)入什么戰(zhàn)略區(qū)域以及該領(lǐng)域的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者是誰？諾斯羅普格魯曼公司出于幾個(gè)原因考慮認(rèn)為無人機(jī)戰(zhàn)略部分非常有吸引力。首先，來自市民的越來越大的壓力要求減少軍事人員傷亡，這增加了對(duì)無人駕駛技術(shù)的需求。其次，有增加監(jiān)督設(shè)施的需要來平衡日益減少的作戰(zhàn)平臺(tái)。最后，新技術(shù)帶來的寬帶的增加使得遠(yuǎn)程控制和視頻監(jiān)控更加方便。在無人機(jī)戰(zhàn)略領(lǐng)域中

49、只有少數(shù)的幾家公司，而瑞恩是其中的領(lǐng)頭羊。</p><p>　　新業(yè)務(wù)會(huì)加強(qiáng)我們?cè)谝延懈?jìng)爭(zhēng)領(lǐng)域中的戰(zhàn)略地位嗎？在這里，答案可能是否定的。 瑞恩公司對(duì)諾斯羅普格魯曼公司的現(xiàn)有戰(zhàn)略部分不太可能有太大影響，其中包括船舶和戰(zhàn)斗航母。所以減少制造成本以及對(duì)生產(chǎn)線的功能支持是的可能性極小。</p><p>　　如果我們正進(jìn)入一個(gè)新的戰(zhàn)略段，我們可以利用我們?cè)谙噜弲^(qū)域的戰(zhàn)略地位來確保我們達(dá)到在目標(biāo)段中強(qiáng)

50、有力的戰(zhàn)略地位嗎？這里的答案顯然是肯定的。瑞恩在新興段已經(jīng)有了一個(gè)強(qiáng)大的地位。母公司擁有的技術(shù)(特別是羅普·格魯曼公司的技術(shù)),有助于下一代無人機(jī)的誕生。此外,在國(guó)防行業(yè)諾斯羅普·格魯曼是一家精明的、聲名在外的公司,這有助于贏得好產(chǎn)品的合同。</p><p>　　底線是要弄清楚新的業(yè)務(wù)將會(huì)使公司整體的戰(zhàn)略地位得到提升還是下降？這一點(diǎn),很明顯,是SMP測(cè)試關(guān)于收購的的癥結(jié)所在。為了證明交易成本的

51、合理,諾斯羅普·格魯曼公司需要的不只是維持瑞恩在無人機(jī)領(lǐng)域的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位,還要讓這項(xiàng)業(yè)務(wù)的發(fā)展足以影響到母公司的總體的戰(zhàn)略地位。</p><p>　　這正是諾斯羅普·格魯曼公司做的事情。在該公司2004年的合同是10.4億美元的x - 47 b無人作戰(zhàn)航空系統(tǒng)聯(lián)合。這單獨(dú)合約足以證明付出1.4億美元的代價(jià)獲得瑞安是正確的選擇。其他無人機(jī)業(yè)務(wù)已經(jīng)緊隨其后, 在伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中“全球鷹”無人機(jī)已經(jīng)發(fā)揮了重

52、要作用。</p><p>　　至于股東回報(bào)，很難從諾斯羅普格魯曼公司自1999年以來的其他較大的已完成的收購中分離出收購瑞恩帶來的影響。但自 1999 年以來每年公司的收入平均增加了 26.2%，其中凈收入每年增長(zhǎng)了 20.1% （達(dá)到 1.4 億美元）。股票價(jià)格年平均增長(zhǎng)率上升到了12%。如今，諾斯羅普格魯曼公司是 （在洛克希德馬丁) 后面的第二大美國(guó)國(guó)防承包商。同時(shí)，一次小小的瑞恩收購開始生成超過其十倍購置價(jià)

53、格的年?duì)I業(yè)收入— — 多么明智的戰(zhàn)略地位之勝。 </p><p>　　當(dāng)時(shí)考慮的新業(yè)務(wù)產(chǎn)生的交易量時(shí)購置價(jià)格便變得無關(guān)緊要了。是的，在當(dāng)今的市場(chǎng)，收購者可能需要支付一筆不合理的收購溢價(jià)，但作為諾斯羅普格魯曼公司、瑞恩交易清楚地說明了，假設(shè)你有試圖建立的明確的市場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)略位置，那么就你應(yīng)該支付這筆費(fèi)用的屬性。</p><p>　　成功收購者強(qiáng)調(diào)理解一項(xiàng)資產(chǎn)的戰(zhàn)略價(jià)值，無論是從強(qiáng)有力的戰(zhàn)略地位、增