外文翻譯--頑固的管理， 資本結(jié)構(gòu)的變化與公司價值

1、<p>　　中文2572字,1395單詞，7900英文字符</p><p>　　出處：Lundstrum L L. Entrenched management, capital structure changes and firm value[J]. Journal of Economics and Finance, 2009, 33(2): 161-175.</p><p>&

2、lt;b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p>　　Entrenched management, capital structure changes and firm value</p><p>　　Material Source: Springer Link Author: Leonard L. Lundstrum</p><p>　　1

3、 Introduction </p><p>　　A number of investigators, including Berger et al. (1997) and Garvey and Hanka(1999) report that managerial entrenchment affects the firm’s choice of leverage.Theory implies that debt

4、 constrains management discretion by either reducing the manager’s bargaining power (Noe and Rebello 1996) or by reducing discretion over spending (Stulz 1990). Zwiebel (1996) argues that entrenched managers use their in

5、fluence to lower debt levels to the point that capital structure maximizes empire building subjec</p><p>　　Jensen and Meckling (1976) find that agency costs are decreasing in managerial share ownership. Yet

6、Stulz (1988) argues that agency costs are not necessarily monotonically decreasing in managerial share ownership as there exists an “entrenchment” range over which the manager’s ability to deter takeovers dominates the “

7、incentive” effect of managerial share ownership. We examine the relation between managerial share ownership and the likelihood, magnitude, and information content of security issue</p><p>　　We examine two im

8、portant extensions of these lines of inquiry. First, while theory implies that managerial share ownership affects the agency costs associated with issuance, security issuance announcement returns have yet to be tied empi

9、rically to managerial share ownership, with the limited exception of Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul (2004) in the case of seasoned equity offerings. Friend and Lang (1988), Nam et al. (2003), and Moh’d et al. (1998) all arg

10、ue that their results indicate that agency </p><p>　　Second, none of the aforementioned papers reports whether the relationship between managerial share ownership and leverage change is monotonic over the ra

11、nge of managerial share ownership. These two gaps in the literature are addressed. </p><p>　　Over an intermediate range of managerial share ownership, firms issue significantly less debt than when managerial

12、 ownership is extreme. When managerial share ownership is large and block holder ownership is small, the firm experiences smaller announcement effects from security issues. The change in leverage is defined here as the a

13、verage debt-to-asset ratio for the 2 years prior to the announcement date less the average debt-to-assets ratio for the 2 year ends subsequent to the announcement dat</p><p>　　Holderness (2003) articulates t

14、he differential incentives arising from share ownership of outside block holders versus managers. Our findings with respect to outside block holders mitigating agency costs of security issuance are consistent with that o

15、f Chen and Yur-Austin (2007) who report that outside block holders help mitigate managerial extravagance with regard to discretionary spending, but our results are in conflict with the Singh and Davidson (2003) finding t

16、hat outside block ownership o</p><p>　　2 Leverage change model </p><p>　　The manager’s choice variables include the size of the security issuance. Examining just the binomial security issuance c

17、hoice model may not fully reveal the relation between managerial share ownership and security issuance. For example, managerial share ownership may be unrelated to the propensity to issue equity, but still may influence

18、the relative magnitudes of debt and equity issuances. To examine the effect of managerial share ownership on the magnitudes of debt and equity issuance, we ana</p><p>　　The change in leverage is defined here

19、 as the average debt-to-asset ratio for the 2 year ends prior to the announcement date less the average debt-to-assets ratio for the 2 year ends subsequent to the announcement date. The firm’s debt-to-assets ratio is the

20、 book value of debt/(book value of debt + market value of equity). Therefore a decline in leverage results in a positive leverage change. For ease of exposition, a decline in the leverage ratio is referred to hereafter a

21、s “de-leveraging”. The</p><p>　　Surplus leverage is defined as the actual debt-to-asset ratio less the target debt-toasset ratio, and is used to control for deviation from optimal capital structure. This ont

22、rols for changes in leverage that are due to an adjustment towards the target. Tax payments/total book value of assets is included to control for the expected marginal tax benefits of debt. Controls for short- term devia

23、tions from target leverage are also included. Long-term debt divided by total assets and stock return vol</p><p>　　Following Lucas and McDonald (1990), the change in the leading indicators in the month of is

24、suance announcement is included to control for the state of the economy. Masulis and Korwar (1986) find that firms reduce leverage after a stock runup, a high runup suggests optimal timing for equity issuances. Three alt

25、ernative functional forms are admitted for managerial share ownership. </p><p>　　3 Conclusion </p><p>　　We analyze the relationship between managerial share ownership and the firm’s change in le

26、verage around a security issuance for a hand-collected sample of 999 straight bond and stock issuances during calendar years 1989–1993. The sample consists exclusively of straight bond and equity issuances of AMEX, NYSE

27、and NASD firms from the Corporate Finance Directory, published by Investment Dealer's Digest. The sample excludes financials and utilities. In addition, shelf registered, secondary offerings</p><p>　　A c

28、omplete set of announcement dates, balance sheet data, managerial and block share ownership data, and CRSP daily return data for the (?240, ?40) interval preceding the announcement date is available for a sample of 111 f

29、irms. The choice of security issuance, the change in firm leverage around the issuance and the issuance announcement return are examined. The change in firm leverage is measured on a market value basis and is the change

30、in the debt-to-assets ratio from the average level of the</p><p>　　We contribute by examining the evidence and filling two gaps in the literature. First, we empirically tie security issuance announcement ret

31、urns to managerial share ownership while controlling for outside block share ownership. We find that when managerial share ownership is high the market reacts more negatively to an issuance announcement. However, when ma

32、nagerial share ownership is high, announcement returns are about 256 basis points higher if outsider block share ownership is also high. Sec</p><p>　　Our evidence indicates that ownership structure impacts t

33、he extent to which a firm reduces leverage around security issuances. In addition, we find that block share ownership attenuates the agency costs of security issuance associated with high managerial share ownership. <

34、/p><p><b>　　譯文 </b></p><p>　　頑固的管理， 資本結(jié)構(gòu)的變化與公司價值</p><p>　　資料來源: 施普林格全文數(shù)據(jù)庫 作者: Leonard L. Lundstrum</p><p><b>　　1 介紹 </b></p>&l

35、t;p>　　許多研究人員, 包括貝格爾(1997) 、加維和漢卡(1999) 等的報告說，管理防御影響公司選擇的杠桿效率。 這項理論說明債務(wù)迫使管理者謹慎， 要么使管理者降低的議價能力(諾爾和雷貝洛 1996)，要么使得減少過多的開銷(斯圖爾茲 1990)。茨威貝爾(1996) 認為為了表明資本結(jié)構(gòu)足夠穩(wěn)固， 頑固的管理者們利用他們的影響力來降低債務(wù)水平。如果管理者做了欠安全的證券發(fā)布選擇，公司的代理成本到時候?qū)馐軗p

36、失。</p><p>　　簡森和麥克林(1976) 發(fā)現(xiàn)代理成本會降低管理者的股票所有權(quán)。然而斯圖爾茲(1988) 認為代理成本的管理者股權(quán)不一定是單調(diào)遞減的，他們認為存在著這么一個“防御” 的范圍，管理者團隊有能力阻止某些收購大部分股權(quán)的“刺激” 所帶來的影響。我們調(diào)查管理者股權(quán)與可能性、規(guī)模以及信息量這些安全問題之間的關(guān)系。</p><p>　　在商討債務(wù)協(xié)議時，債權(quán)人似乎回應(yīng)了由行政

37、總裁持有的股份比例。貝格利和費爾特姆(1999) 發(fā)現(xiàn)，債務(wù)合同契約數(shù)目是由該公司行政總裁持有的股份比例的增加實現(xiàn)的。這一證據(jù)表明，股權(quán)管理對于了解該機構(gòu)與證券發(fā)行有關(guān)的問題可能是十分重要的。債權(quán)人要求提高管理公司的持股比例的證據(jù)表明，有關(guān)機構(gòu)債權(quán)人的擔(dān)憂加劇時，管理股權(quán)高。股份所有權(quán)似乎不僅影響債權(quán)人的要求，而且還影響到杠桿的選擇。弗蘭德和朗(1988)，莫赫德等(1998) 和納姆等(2003) 得出的結(jié)論都是充分利用了股權(quán)下降。&

38、lt;/p><p>　　我們研究調(diào)查了這條線路的兩個重要拓展。首先，雖然理論暗含著股權(quán)管理的影響與發(fā)行相關(guān)的代理成本，根據(jù)里帕約姆和尼加烏提庫(2004) 有限公司外的現(xiàn)金增資案，安全返回發(fā)行公告尚未被管理經(jīng)驗分享所有權(quán)所束縛。弗蘭德和朗(1988)，納姆等(2003) 以及莫赫德等(1998) 都認為，他們的研究結(jié)果表明，代理問題是資本結(jié)構(gòu)的重要決定因素。雖然這些調(diào)查機構(gòu)沒有審查這些問題的匯價變動的影響，而且這是在

39、大股東持股控制外，但我們還是這么做了。</p><p>　　上述文件的報告之間是股權(quán)管理和利用變化的關(guān)系還是在股權(quán)的管理范圍單調(diào)關(guān)系。 在文獻中，這兩個問題已經(jīng)得到解決。</p><p>　　以上股權(quán)的管理中間范圍，明顯低于公司發(fā)行管理的所有權(quán)時的極端債務(wù)。當(dāng)管理層股權(quán)持有人擁有大量股份，大宗股票持有者相對較少時，該公司以往的經(jīng)驗告訴我們，該公司安全問題公告的影響較小。 杠桿的變化在這里定

40、義為平均債務(wù)與資產(chǎn)比率為 2 年前公告之日起減平均債務(wù)資產(chǎn)比率為2年結(jié)束后宣布的日期。其中資產(chǎn)債務(wù)比率是以市場價值為基礎(chǔ)計算的。</p><p>　　霍爾德內(nèi)斯(2003) 闡述了不同股票份額持有人以及大宗股票持有人所產(chǎn)生的參與所有權(quán)管理的動因。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，就外在大宗股票持有人對減輕證券發(fā)行代理成本與我們的研究結(jié)果是一致的。陳和奧斯汀(2007) 報告說，大宗股票持有人能幫助減少管理方面過多的開支， 但是我們的結(jié)果

41、與辛格和戴維森(2003) 的發(fā)現(xiàn)相沖突: 大宗股票持有人限制了代理成本的減少。 </p><p><b>　　2 利用變化模型 </b></p><p>　　這位經(jīng)理的選擇變量包括發(fā)行規(guī)模的安全性。 檢查證券發(fā)行只是二項式選擇模型可能無法充分揭示管理之間的股權(quán)和證券發(fā)行的關(guān)系。例如，管理股權(quán)可能與發(fā)行股票的傾向無關(guān)，但仍有可能影響債券及股票發(fā)行的相對大小。為了探討關(guān)

42、于債務(wù)和股票發(fā)行管理股權(quán)的大小的影響，我們從發(fā)行前發(fā)行后關(guān)系的變化上分析其與股份所有權(quán)和管理中的杠桿作用。</p><p>　　杠桿的變化定義為自這個結(jié)束公告之日起往前推兩年的平均債務(wù)與資產(chǎn)比率減去自這個結(jié)束公告之日起往后推 2 年的平均債務(wù)資產(chǎn)比率。 該公司的負債對資產(chǎn)比率是債務(wù)的賬面價值/(債務(wù)賬面價值+市場的公平值)。 因此，發(fā)生了下降的積極變化，這是充分利用杠桿的結(jié)果。為了論述方便，此杠桿比率下降被簡稱為

43、“去杠桿化”。使用 2 年的平均數(shù)據(jù)可以允許資本結(jié)構(gòu)重新調(diào)整和發(fā)布任何信號的變動。債券和股票發(fā)行的股份都匯集起來用來來衡量跨所有制結(jié)構(gòu)的安全問題類型及其影響。這個規(guī)范是用來檢驗債券及股票發(fā)行的相對大小是否與股權(quán)管理有關(guān)。包含一個指示變量，以控制安全類型。 </p><p>　　剩余的杠桿定義為實際負債對資產(chǎn)比率減去目標債務(wù)的比例，用于控制和優(yōu)化資本結(jié)構(gòu)的偏差。改變這種控制的原因是利用它調(diào)整財務(wù)目標。納稅/總資產(chǎn)的

44、賬面價值包含控制預(yù)期邊際債務(wù)的稅收優(yōu)惠，目標杠桿短期偏差控制也包括在內(nèi)。分析長期負債占資產(chǎn)比率和占股票報酬比率的波動是為了控制預(yù)期財務(wù)困境成本。</p><p>　　繼盧卡斯和麥當(dāng)勞(1990) 發(fā)現(xiàn)在月 發(fā)行公告中領(lǐng)先指標的變化可以用來控制經(jīng)濟的狀態(tài)后，馬蘇里斯和科瓦(1986) 發(fā)現(xiàn)，企業(yè)在利用一個杠桿作用后庫存會減少，這是股票發(fā)行的最佳時機。三個替代功能形式被認為是管理股票的所有權(quán)。</p>

45、<p><b>　　3 結(jié)論 </b></p><p>　　為了搜集發(fā)行的999個樣品的債券和股票股票所有權(quán)和該公司的變化，我們分析了歷年認購日期間的安全杠桿。樣品債券和股票全由美國證券交易商協(xié)會認購, 根據(jù)紐約的一家企業(yè)的企業(yè)融資目錄, 確定公布投資經(jīng)銷商。 樣品不包括財務(wù)和公用事業(yè)。 此外, 上架的, 登記的, 增發(fā)新股上市可轉(zhuǎn)換債券, 組合的債務(wù)和股權(quán)、 優(yōu)先股和串行認購也被

46、排除使安全問題與文獻相符。</p><p>　　資產(chǎn)負債表的數(shù)據(jù)，CRSP 日常的回報數(shù)據(jù)是(?240,?40) ，在完整的公布日期之前, 管理大宗股票所有權(quán)數(shù)據(jù)的公司有 111 家。安全杠桿選擇的變化在公司發(fā)行公告回報的檢查中顯得尤為重要。杠桿率是公司的變化測量基礎(chǔ)和市場價值以及資產(chǎn)負債的變化的平均水平。 其比例根據(jù)前兩年發(fā)行融資和隨后的允許的資本結(jié)構(gòu)推算, 通過資本回購等杠桿作用調(diào)整了穩(wěn)定性、三種功能形式之間

47、關(guān)系的變動和員工的杠桿的股票所有權(quán)。 </p><p>　　我們搜尋了關(guān)于此文獻的證據(jù)，找到了兩者之間的差距。綜合指標與資產(chǎn)負債率和長期負債率作回歸分析得出結(jié)論:企業(yè)業(yè)績與資本結(jié)構(gòu)有密切關(guān)系，但并非簡單的線性關(guān)系，而是滿足二項式關(guān)系，當(dāng)負債比率較低時，提高負債率有助于經(jīng)營業(yè)績的提高.當(dāng)負債率達到一定程度后. 提高負債水平將降低企業(yè)經(jīng)營業(yè)績。 首先, 我們進行了實證分析。第一， 我們發(fā)現(xiàn), 當(dāng)管理股票所有權(quán)過高,

48、會對市場的發(fā)行公告產(chǎn)生負面影響。然而,當(dāng)管理股權(quán)高、公告的回報率所有權(quán)也非常高，相對于外部股權(quán)，公告的回報率接近于 256 的基準點上。 第二, 我們發(fā)現(xiàn)去杠桿化的大小與安全管理情況下發(fā)行的股票所有權(quán)呈正相關(guān), 這種關(guān)系局限于“管理者防御” 范圍內(nèi)管理的股權(quán)。 我們發(fā)現(xiàn)頑固的經(jīng)理人不具有更大的傾向股票, 也就是說他們并沒有傾向于擴大自己在公司所占的股份額。他們受到低杠桿的影響，更愿意接受小債務(wù)或者更大股權(quán)的認購。 </p>