法學(xué)外文翻譯2篇

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯之一</b></p><p>　　BEYOND JUDICIAL DISCRETION : TOWARD A RIGHTS-BASED THEORY OF CIVIL DISCOVERY AND PROTECTIVE ORDERS</p><p>　　作者：Jordana Cooper</p><p>　　

2、國籍：The United States</p><p>　　出處：Rutgers Law Journal, Vol. 36, Issue 3 (Spring 2005), pp. 775-[ii]</p><p><b>　　原文正文：</b></p><p>　　Civil discovery, as every first-year la

3、w student knows, is governed by the forum's rules of civil procedure. We have by now grown so accustomed to the rules regime that we rarely look beyond it to determine whether something more persists in the backgroun

4、d, supporting its structure and perhaps constraining, at certain outer limits, the exercise of judicial discretion that has become so commonplace. Although rarely the subject of modem civil discovery discourse, there are

5、 limits on the scope of r</p><p>　　In this Article, two such important limitations are considered: (1) the limits of discretion when trade secret discovery is at issue and the resisting litigant seeks entry

6、of a protective order to prohibit unnecessary dissemination of its trade secret information - this is a limitation on the government's power under the Fifth Amendment, which prohibits the taking of private property f

7、or public use without just compensation; and (2) the limits of discretion when relevancy of the private informat</p><p>　　As we shall see, Supreme Court jurisprudence in these areas is sparse, and little is

8、current. The most important Supreme Court foray into the area of protective orders in civil discovery was the 1984 decision Seattle Times Co.v. Rhinehart , which rejected the notion that the public had a constitutional r

9、ight of access to unfiled pretrial discovery materials and affirmed the state court's issuance of a protective order entered upon a rules-based showing of "good cause." Seattle Times has been so</p>

10、<p>　　I. THE SUPREME COURT'S RULES-BASED JURISPRUDENCE: SEATTLE TIMES</p><p>　　Seattle Times arose in a context where a protective order had already been granted, and it was the grant of that prote

11、ctive order that was challenged as a matter of constitutional significance. In Seattle Times, the Supreme Court was in a position to, and did, confirm that where the trial court had found that an application for a prote

12、ctive order met the "good cause" standard of the rules of civil procedure, it could properly exercise its discretion to protect. The Court did not confront the s</p><p>　　In reaching its holding,

13、the Supreme Court made some additional observations that are important to bear in mind for this discussion because they identify several interests that support limitations on dissemination of discovery materials:</p&g

14、t;<p>　　1. "Pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial." </p><p>　　2. "Much of the information that surfaces during pretrial discovery may be un

15、related, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action."</p><p>　　3. "Liberal discovery is provided for the sole purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settleme

16、nt, of litigated disputes .... It is clear from experience that pretrial discovery by depositions and interrogatories has a significant potential for abuse." </p><p>　　4. "Discovery also may seriou

17、sly implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties." The Court continued in a footnote: "Although the Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that may be impl

18、icated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and language of the Rule. </p><p>　　5. The government has a "substantial interest" in preventing abuse of "its processes" and to avo

19、id the opportunity for litigants to obtain information that "not only is irrelevant but if publicly released could be damaging to reputation and privacy." </p><p>　　超越司法裁量權(quán)：走向民事訴訟證據(jù)開示制度和保護(hù)令的權(quán)利基礎(chǔ)理論

20、</p><p><b>　　作者：庫珀·喬丹娜</b></p><p><b>　　國籍：美國</b></p><p>　　出處：拉特格斯法律期刊，第36卷，第3期（2005年春季），第775 - [Ⅱ]</p><p><b>　　頁</b></p>

21、<p><b>　　中文譯文：</b></p><p>　　正如每個一年級法律系的學(xué)生所知，民事訴訟證據(jù)開示是民事訴訟的法庭規(guī)則的一部分?，F(xiàn)在，我們對這個規(guī)則制度是如此地習(xí)以為常，以致于我們不能超越它來決定在這個背景下是否有更多的東西要堅(jiān)持，以此來支撐它的結(jié)構(gòu)和可能在一定的外部界限中來限制行使相當(dāng)司空見慣的司法裁量權(quán)。雖然關(guān)于現(xiàn)代民事訴訟證據(jù)開示的項(xiàng)目很少被披露，但是也有對以規(guī)則

22、為基礎(chǔ)的司法自由裁量權(quán)的范圍限制，而且這些限制來自于我們的憲法。</p><p>　　在2000年修正案中，兩個非常重要的限制被考慮到：（1）當(dāng)商業(yè)秘密的開示處在訴訟中和抵制當(dāng)事人尋求保護(hù)令來禁止其商業(yè)秘密的信息不必要傳播時的自由裁量權(quán)的限制-- 這是在憲法第五修正案下對政府權(quán)力的限制，它禁止為了公共利益需要而用不公平的補(bǔ)償來掠奪私人財(cái)產(chǎn)；（2）當(dāng)缺乏私人信息的相關(guān)性的發(fā)現(xiàn)與拒絕和在案件中證據(jù)開示要求達(dá)到超越案件

23、本身的廣度時的自由裁量權(quán)的限制-- 這是在憲法第四修正案下對政府權(quán)力的限制，它禁止不合理的搜查和掠奪。</p><p>　　正如我們看到的，最高法院的判例在這些領(lǐng)域是很少的，且?guī)缀鯖]有最近的。最高法院進(jìn)軍最重要的民事訴訟證據(jù)開示制度領(lǐng)域的標(biāo)志是對1984年西雅圖時報(bào)公司訴萊因哈特的判決。 它抵制這一觀點(diǎn)，即公眾擁有獲得未歸檔審前開示的材料這一憲法權(quán)利，并肯定了州法院對保護(hù)令的發(fā)布，而保護(hù)令是建立在以規(guī)則為基礎(chǔ)的“

24、正當(dāng)理由”的發(fā)現(xiàn)之上。 西雅圖時報(bào)有時會回避保護(hù)令， 偶爾也會忽視它， 而且常常被下級聯(lián)邦法院的判決所需的嚴(yán)格“正當(dāng)理由”發(fā)現(xiàn)弄得不堪重負(fù)。 因?yàn)樗U述的是規(guī)則 而不是作為積極法律資源的憲法，西雅圖時報(bào)甚至無法約束州法院。即使法官認(rèn)真遵守規(guī)則，大多數(shù)保護(hù)令也會被誤解--正是如此，在那樣的情況下賦予真正被展現(xiàn)和決定的發(fā)布令--以便強(qiáng)調(diào)法官自由裁量權(quán)，也就是說，主審法官應(yīng)該具備這樣的能力，即他或她在權(quán)衡特定因素后認(rèn)為發(fā)布保護(hù)令是合適的。 盡

25、管在現(xiàn)有的判例法中某些共識正在形成，這對法官來說，在民事訴訟證據(jù)開示爭議的某些方面發(fā)布一個精心設(shè)計(jì)的保護(hù)令 的確是“義不容辭”的，但是這種認(rèn)識遠(yuǎn)未統(tǒng)一。同時它也沒有將這種認(rèn)識傳遞給最高法院。因此，這個修正案認(rèn)為在證據(jù)開示爭議的某些方面，對民事訴訟證據(jù)開示的限制是一個憲</p><p>　　最高法院以規(guī)則為基礎(chǔ)的法理：西雅圖時報(bào)案</p><p>　　西雅圖時報(bào)案出現(xiàn)在一個保護(hù)令被想當(dāng)然的背

26、景下，是保護(hù)令被質(zhì)疑為憲法意義上的一個問題時的產(chǎn)物。 在西雅圖時報(bào)案中，最高法院是并且確實(shí)是在這的情況下，確認(rèn)審判法庭在認(rèn)定為保護(hù)令的申請符合民事訴訟規(guī)則的“正當(dāng)理由”標(biāo)準(zhǔn)時，它可以正確地行使其自由裁量權(quán)。 法院沒有遇到像初審法院拒絕一方當(dāng)事人申請保護(hù)令的情形，因此它并沒有解決保護(hù)令作為一個既是規(guī)則法理又是先驗(yàn)原則的問題時駁回申請可能被阻止的情形。在西雅圖時報(bào)工作的原告萊因哈特和其他代表自己和他的宗教團(tuán)體--水瓶基金會提起訴訟，主張西雅

27、圖時報(bào)誹謗他們。 在證據(jù)開示程序中，西雅圖時報(bào)尋求關(guān)于萊因哈特和基金會的捐助者的身份，以及一份載有成員名單的財(cái)務(wù)信息。 最終，審判法庭發(fā)出了一個涵蓋證據(jù)開示程序中產(chǎn)生的所有信息，即“各原告的財(cái)政事務(wù)”和其他一些信息的保護(hù)令。 這些信息就像在隨后的隱私討論中強(qiáng)調(diào)的那樣，包括組織原告的信息。該命令禁止西雅圖時報(bào)除了在必要時為案件做準(zhǔn)備和嘗試外以任何方式出版、傳播或使用這些信息。 最高法院維持了這一保護(hù)令，它反對基于聲稱是“傳播，提前審判”這

28、些第一修正案權(quán)利而通過證據(jù)開示過程獲得的信息；并且最高法院認(rèn)為審判法庭行使自由裁</p><p>　　在形成它的維持決定過程中，最高法院提出了一些對銘記這次討論很重要的補(bǔ)充意見，因?yàn)樗麄冋J(rèn)同一些支持對傳播證據(jù)開示材料的限制方面的利益：</p><p>　　庭前證詞和質(zhì)詢不是民事審判的公開要件。</p><p>　　對是否做出保護(hù)令潛在的理由而言，大部分在審前證據(jù)開示

29、過程中呈現(xiàn)的信息可能是與案件無關(guān)的，或者只有一絲聯(lián)系。</p><p>　　寬松的證據(jù)開示程序?yàn)閰f(xié)助解決問題和訴訟糾紛的準(zhǔn)備和審判提供了唯一目的......從經(jīng)驗(yàn)中明確表示，通過宣誓和質(zhì)詢而進(jìn)行的審前證據(jù)開示程序有顯著的濫用可能性。</p><p>　　證據(jù)開示程序還可能嚴(yán)重牽涉到訴訟當(dāng)事人和第三方的隱私權(quán)益。 法院繼續(xù)在腳注中闡述到：“雖然規(guī)則中沒有具體提到隱私，或者其他可能牽涉到的權(quán)利

30、或利益，但是這些問題都隱含在廣泛的規(guī)則目的和規(guī)則語言中。</p><p>　　政府在防止濫用“保護(hù)令程序”和避免當(dāng)事人獲取信息的機(jī)會上擁有一個“重大利益”，而這些信息“不僅是無關(guān)緊要的，而且如果公開發(fā)表可能會損害當(dāng)事人的聲譽(yù)和隱私?！?lt;/p><p><b>　　外文翻譯之二</b></p><p>　　THE SOUND AND THE FU

31、RY OR THE SOUND OF SILENCE ?: EVALUATING THE PRE-AMENDMENT PREDICTIONS AND POST-AMENDMENT EFFECTS OF THE DISCOVERY SCOPE-NARROWING LANGUAGE IN THE 2000 AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26(b)(1)</p>&l

32、t;p>　　作者：Frost, Christopher C. </p><p>　　國籍：The United States</p><p>　　出處：Georgia Law Review, Vol. 37, Issue 3 (Spring 2003), pp. 1039-1088</p><p><b

33、>　　原文正文：</b></p><p>　　I. INTRODUCTION</p><p>　　Compare these two assertions: (1) The new scope-narrowing provision in Rule 26(b)(1) is a "radical, pro-defendant novelty," and

34、will create "untold havoc on the discovery practice as we know it. Get ready for an avalanche of motions." (2) "The vast majority of current discovery would not be affected at all by this change." Cou

35、ld these comments be referring to the same rule? Surely the text of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure would not spawn such balkanized responses among commentators, scholars</p><p>　　These controversial chang

36、es, embodied in the 2000 Amendment Package to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, were drafted and submitted by the Advisory Committee, approved by the United States Supreme Court, and transmitted to Congress on May 2,

37、 2000. Though the package contained other rule changes, most</p><p>　　notable was the change to the rule governing discovery, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. The pre-amendment standard, one that had been

38、 in place since at least 1970, permitted discovery of "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." Placing at least textually</p><p>　　cogni

39、zable restrictions on the scope of discovery, the 2000 version allows discovery of any non-privileged matter "that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party." However, "For good cause, the court may

40、 order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action." This latter "good cause" provision,</p><p>　　while preserving the long-standing "subject matter"

41、; standard as an expander tool in the hip pockets of District Court judges, seems to militate away from redundancy and toward a palpable distinction between the two standards. Section (b)(1) ends by invoking the limitin

42、g factors found in Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii). </p><p>　　The strong rhetoric surrounding this change begs the obvious question-why such polarization? Perhaps one answer is that the Federal Rule-making

43、 process has become increasingly politicized over the years. Indeed, despite the independent empirical projects commissioned by the Advisory Committee to the RAND Corporation</p><p>　　Institute for Civil Jus

44、tice ("RAND") and the Federal Judicial Center ("FJC"), the Committee itself was inundated with extensive studies, proposals, and lobbies from groups squarely on one side of the versus sign or the othe

45、r." The Advisory Committee nevertheless touts this particular committee and its subsequent decision to</p><p>　　submit these scope-narrowing changes as its most well-informed and even-handed. From the

46、Committee's language in its presentation of the amendments, one might even get the feel that the Committee is especially proud of such a balanced, bipartisan effort：</p><p>　　The Committee believes that

47、the process pursued in connection with the discovery rules package created an unusually well-informed Committee that acted most selectively to adopt a modest, balanced package to address identified problems in a manner c

48、omfortable to the practicing bar and to the courts.</p><p>　　While the scope-narrowing provision might intuitively suggest that it was presented in order to address discovery abuse, Judge Niemeyer makes clea

49、r in his memorandum on the rules package that discovery abuse was not heavily considered nor the driving force behind the change. Rather, the Committee sought to address</p><p>　　the growing consensus among

50、lawyers that court intervention provides an important and efficient method of resolving discovery disputes between parties. Thus, the Rule realigns the default bar of discovery request propriety in the attorney-managed p

51、hase of litigation setting a more stringent standard, which necessitates judicial involvement sooner, and more often. Emphasizing the flexibility of the "good cause" standard by which the court may broaden disc

52、overy to the pre-2000 "subject matter" sco</p><p>　　characterizable nature of the standard, the Committee admits that the "dividing line between information relevant to the claims and defenses

53、 and that relevant only to the subject matter of the action cannot be defined with precision." Accordingly, the Committee emphasizes that the "actual scope of discovery should be determined</p><p>

54、　　according to the reasonable needs of the action." By design, this determination should be made by the court, relying on such enumerated factors as case circumstances, nature of claims or defenses, and the scope of

55、 the discovery requests made.</p><p>　　騷動 或沉默 的聲音：評價《美國聯(lián)邦民事訴訟規(guī)則》2000年修正案的第26條（b）節(jié)（1）款中的證據(jù)開示范圍縮小表述的前期修訂預(yù)測和后期修訂效果</p><p>　　作者：克里斯托弗·福斯特</p><p><b>　　國籍：美國</b></p>

56、;<p>　　出處：喬治亞大學(xué)法律評論，第37卷，第3期，第1039-1088頁（2003年 </p><p><b>　　春季）</b></p><p><b>　　中文譯文：</b></p><p>　　我們來比較這兩個主張：（1）在聯(lián)邦民事訴訟規(guī)則第26條（b）節(jié)（1）款中，新的范圍狹窄的條款是一個“激

57、進(jìn)的，傾向于被告的新事物，” 并且它將創(chuàng)造“我們所知道的證據(jù)開示實(shí)踐中未知的混亂?！保?）“現(xiàn)有的絕大多數(shù)證據(jù)開示程序?qū)⒁稽c(diǎn)也不受這種變化的影響?！?這些評論是指向同一個規(guī)則嗎？聯(lián)邦民事訴訟規(guī)則文本當(dāng)然不會在評論家、學(xué)者和法官中產(chǎn)生這種各自為政的響應(yīng)。另一方面，當(dāng)通過有色眼鏡把描述聯(lián)邦民事訴訟規(guī)則第26（b）節(jié)（1）款的文本變化看做是特別有爭議時，這樣的反應(yīng)可能不會顯得如此令人驚訝。</p><p>　　這些具體

58、體現(xiàn)在聯(lián)邦民事訴訟規(guī)則的2000年修正案包裝中的有爭議的改變，是由美國咨詢委員會起草和建議，于2000年5月2日通過美國最高法院批準(zhǔn)，并提交給國會。 雖然包裝中包含了其他規(guī)則的變化，最顯著的變化是控制證據(jù)開示規(guī)則，即聯(lián)邦民事訴訟規(guī)則第26條。 至少從1970年就已經(jīng)存在的修訂前的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)允許證據(jù)開示， 而證據(jù)開示是“包含在未決的訴狀中所涉及的與主題相關(guān)的任何問題，而不是特權(quán)?！?2000年版本至少把對文本認(rèn)知的限制放在證據(jù)開示的范圍上，并允

59、許證據(jù)開示，而證據(jù)開示是任何一個“與一方當(dāng)事人的主張或抗辯有關(guān)的”非特權(quán)問題。 然而，“為了找到正當(dāng)理由，法院可以命令當(dāng)事人對任何與該訴訟有關(guān)的事項(xiàng)進(jìn)行開示?！?這個后來的“正當(dāng)理由”的規(guī)定看起來妨礙了冗余和朝著兩個標(biāo)準(zhǔn)之間的明顯的區(qū)別前進(jìn)， 而且它保留了作為在地區(qū)法院法官臀部口袋里的一種擴(kuò)展工具的長期“標(biāo)的物”標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。（b）節(jié)（1）款以援引在聯(lián)邦民事訴訟引規(guī)則第26條（b)節(jié)（2）款的（i)、（ii)、（iii)中找到的限制因素來結(jié)尾。

60、</p><p>　　圍繞這個變化的強(qiáng)烈言辭引出了這個明顯的問題，即為什么會有這樣的兩極分化？也許一個答案是聯(lián)邦規(guī)則制定過程多年來已越來越政治化。 事實(shí)上，盡管獨(dú)立的實(shí)證項(xiàng)目由咨詢委員會委托蘭德公司民事審判司法研究所（“蘭德”）和聯(lián)邦司法中心（“FJC”）進(jìn)行， 委員會本身卻被廣泛的研究和建議所淹沒，并被游說于正視對抗的一個陣營或另一個陣營團(tuán)體中。 咨詢委員會從來沒有兜售這個特別委員會，而且其隨后決定提交這些范圍

61、縮小的變化是最博識和公平的。 從其呈現(xiàn)的修正案語言來看，我們甚至可以感覺得到，委員會對這樣一個平衡的、兩黨的共同努力而感到特別自豪:</p><p>　　委員會認(rèn)為，追求與證據(jù)開示規(guī)則包裝相聯(lián)系的過程創(chuàng)造了一個不同尋常的博識的委員會。這個委員會最有選擇性地進(jìn)行行動來采取一個適度平衡的包裝，以便用一種對執(zhí)業(yè)律師和法院都舒適的方式來解決已經(jīng)確認(rèn)的問題。</p><p>　　雖然范圍狹窄的規(guī)定可

62、能會直觀表明：它被呈現(xiàn)來解決證據(jù)開示的濫用，但是法官尼邁耶在他的關(guān)于規(guī)則包裝的備忘錄中清楚地表示：證據(jù)開示的濫用既沒有被充分的考慮，也沒有在變化的背后導(dǎo)致強(qiáng)迫。 相反，委員會試圖解決律師之間日益增多的共識，即“法院介入”提供了一種重要而有效的解決雙方當(dāng)事人之間的證據(jù)開示糾紛方式。 因此，該規(guī)則被放在訴訟的律師代理階段重新調(diào)整證據(jù)開示請求適當(dāng)性的默認(rèn)欄中，而且設(shè)置了更嚴(yán)格的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，這就需要司法介入越早和越頻繁。 在強(qiáng)調(diào)“正當(dāng)理由”標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的靈活

63、性時，委員會暗示該規(guī)則應(yīng)繼續(xù)被廣泛閱讀，但是實(shí)施這一廣泛閱讀的特權(quán)應(yīng)該由法官享有，而不是當(dāng)事人。而且法院可以通過“正當(dāng)理由”標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的靈活性拓寬證據(jù)開示范圍直至前2000年的“主題事項(xiàng)”。委員會注意到這一轉(zhuǎn)變“向法院發(fā)出信號：它有權(quán)把證據(jù)開示程序與在訴狀中主張和抗辯相結(jié)合；并且向當(dāng)事人發(fā)出信號：他們沒有權(quán)利啟動證據(jù)開示規(guī)程序來發(fā)展在訴狀中未確認(rèn)的新的主張或抗辯?！鄙鲜稣Z言引出了“摸索證明”這個眾所周知的概念，這一問題似乎也被這一改變含蓄地解