金融學(xué)專業(yè)外文翻譯-----股利政策，信號(hào)和現(xiàn)金流量綜合辦法

1、<p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　Dividend policy, signaling and free cash flow: an integrated approach Richard Fairchild</p><p>　　Purpose–Scholars have examined the importance of a fir

2、m's dividend policy through two competing paradigms: the signaling hypothesis and the free cash-flow hypothesis. It has been argued that our understanding of dividend policy is hindered by the lack of a model that in

3、tegrates the two hypotheses. The purpose of this paper is to address this by developing a theoretical dividend model that combines the signaling and free cash-flow motives. The objective of the analysis is to shed light

4、on the com</p><p>　　Design/methodology/approach–In order to consider the complex nature of dividend policy, a dividend signaling game is developed, in which managers possess more information than investors a

5、bout the quality of the firm (asymmetric information), and may invest in value-reducing projects (moral hazard). Hence, the model combines signaling and free cash-flow motives for dividends. Furthermore, managerial commu

6、nication and reputation effects are incorporated into the model.</p><p>　　Findings–Of particular interest is the case where a firm may need to cut dividends in order to invest in a new value-creating project

7、, but where the firm will be punished by the market, since investors are behaviourally conditioned to believe that dividend cuts are bad news. This may result in firms refusing to cut dividends, hence passing up good pro

8、jects. This paper demonstrates that managerial communication to investors about the reasons for the dividend cut, supported by managerial reputatio</p><p>　　Originality/value – This work has been inspired by

9、, and develops that of Fuller and Taker, and Fuller and Blab, which considers the signaling and free cash-flow motives for dividends. Whereas those authors consider the case where firms only have new negative net present

10、 value (NPV) projects available (so that dividend increases provide unambiguously positive signals to the market in both the signaling and free cash-flow cases), in this paper's model, the signals may be ambiguous, s

11、ince firms may</p><p>　　Introduction</p><p>　　Nearly 50 years after Miller and Modigliani's (1961) famous dividend irrelevance theorem, academics and practitioners still have little understa

12、nding of dividend policy and its effect on firm value. Indeed, Black (1976) observed, “The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just don't fit together”. In this p

13、aper, we develop a dividend signaling model that attempts to analyses the various factors that affect dividend policy and firm value.</p><p>　　According to Miller and Modigliani's (1961) theorem, the val

14、ue of the firm is unaffected by its dividend policy in a world of perfect market conditions. Two major assumptions driving the MM irrelevance theorem were that:</p><p>　　1. A firm's management is purely

15、interested in maximizing share-holder value (there are no agency problems). </p><p>　　2. Corporate insiders and outsiders share the same information about the firm's operations and prospects (the “symmet

16、ric information” assumption). </p><p>　　Subsequent theoretical research has analyzed the effects of incorporating asymmetric information and agency problems into the firm's dividend decision. This result

17、ed in two competing approaches; the dividend signaling hypothesis, and the excess cash hypothesis. Our dividend model incorporates both approaches.</p><p>　　The signaling hypothesis states that under asymmet

18、ric information between managers and investors, dividend policy may provide signals regarding the firm's current performance and future prospects. The free cash-flow hypothesis (also known as the excess-cash hypothes

19、is) states that dividend policies address agency problems between managers and outside investors (for example Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Fluck, 1995). In particular, the agency problem in Jensen's (1986) analys

20、is arises from an </p><p>　　Perhaps the reason why a solution to Black's (1976) dividend puzzle remains so elusive is that “we lack an integrated theory that incorporates both the signaling and free cash

21、-flow motivations for dividends” (Fuller and Thakor 2002; Fuller and Blau, 2010). Fuller and Thakor (2002) sketch the first such integrated model. We build on their work by developing a dividend model that incorporates b

22、oth asymmetric information and free cash-flow problems. Particularly, we consider a dual role for dividen</p><p>　　Our model contributes to Fuller and Thakor's (FT 2002) analysis in the following ways. F

23、irst, we develop the analysis, and derive the equilibrium of the dividend game, in a formal and rigorous manner. Second, FT only considers the possibility that a negative NPV project exists. Hence, they focus on Jensen&#

24、39;s (1986) free cash-flow problem. In contrast, we consider the possibility that the project may have a negative or positive NPV. This enables us to consider the following under-researched area. </p><p>　　H

25、ence, the relationship between dividends and firm value is complex. The market may view an increase in dividends favorably, either as a positive signal of current income (that is dividends reduce asymmetric information p

26、roblems), or as a means of mitigating free cash-flow problems (that is dividends reduce agency problems). However, a dividend increase may be seen as a negative signal (the firm lacks growth opportunities), while a divid

27、end cut may be seen as a positive signal (the firm has sign</p><p>　　Our third contribution is to consider two types of inefficiency (or agency problem) relating to managerial incentives regarding dividend p

28、olicy. Firstly, we analyses a moral hazard problem in which empire-building managers may cut dividends in order to invest in a negative (value-reducing) NPV project due to managerial private benefits. Secondly, we consid

29、er an adverse selection problem, whereby managers may refuse to cut dividends, hence passing up a positive NPV project[4]. Indeed, Cohen and Y</p><p>　　Frankfurter and Wood (2002) observe that, in addition t

30、o analyzing the effects of agency and asymmetric information problems on dividend policy, researchers are beginning to consider behavioral models. They observe that,</p><p>　　Investor behavior is substantial

31、ly influenced by societal norms and attitudes [… ]. According to Shiller (1989), including these influences in modeling efforts can enrich the development of a theory to explain the endurance of corporate dividend policy

32、.</p><p>　　Our fourth contribution is that we include a behavioral dimension in our model. That is, we consider investors who have been conditioned to believe that high dividends signal high quality. In our

33、first case, the investors' beliefs are indeed correct, as the high-quality firm can separate from the low-quality firm by paying a high dividend. In the second case, these beliefs drive the adverse selection problem

34、(the high-quality firm is unwilling to reduce the dividend below that of the low-quality</p><p>　　As an extension to our second case, we consider whether the adverse selection problem can be mitigated by com

35、munication to investors, reinforced by managerial reputation effects. Indeed, Wooldridge and Ghosh (1998) argue that firms may be able to avoid a negative market reaction by communicating to investors that the reason for

36、 dividend cuts is to invest in future growth opportunities. It may be argued that this may be cheap-talk. However, Wooldridge and Ghosh argue that managerial reputation ma</p><p>　　The role of reputation in

37、dividend policy has been explored by Brucato and Smith (1997) and Gillet et al. (2008). In Brucato and Smith, a reputable dividend signal is one where an unexpected dividend increase is confirmed by a subsequent unexpect

38、ed earnings increase. Similarly, in Gillet et al., the reputation mechanism is such that the market punishes a firm that chooses a high dividend (in order to “fool” the market that it is a high-income firm), but subseque

39、ntly reports low profitability. In</p><p>　　The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our model. In section 2.1, we consider our free cash-flow case. In section 2.2, we con

40、sider our adverse selection case, and consider the role of communication and reputation. In section 4, we discuss practical and managerial implications of our model. Furthermore, in the light of our model, we consider so

41、me anecdotal evidence demonstrating the complexities surrounding dividend policy. Section 5 concludes.</p><p>　　Our dividend signaling model demonstrates that dividend policy is indeed complex. We have demon

42、strated that high dividends may have a positive effect on firm value, both by providing a positive signal of current performance (in terms of current income), and in reducing the free cash-flow problem (that is, the temp

43、tation for the manager to invest in negative NPV projects due to private benefits). However, when good positive NPV investment opportunities are available, a high dividend may indeed be</p><p>　　However, man

44、agement may refuse to cut dividends, thereby passing up these positive NPV opportunities, especially if the stock market has been conditioned to believe that high dividends signal a high-quality firm. Our model thus emph

45、asized managerial communication/education of investors, supported by managerial reputation considerations, as a means of eliminating this problem.</p><p>　　We now consider some anecdotal evidence that provid

46、es a practical perspective to our theory, and demonstrates the real-world confusion surrounding dividend policy.</p><p>　　The “traditional” positive relationship between dividends and firm?4.1 value</p>

47、;<p>　　Lease et al. (2000) provide the following examples where the market reacted in the “standard” way, that is, positively (negatively) to dividend increases (decreases):</p><p>　　Figgie Internatio

48、nal announced a cut in its quarterly dividend. on the announcement Figgie's stock price declined. Bethlehem Steel Corporation announced that it was omitting its quarterly dividend. Its share price fell. Wal-Mart Stor

49、es announced an increase in its quarterly dividend. Wal-Mart's share price increased. Procter and Gamble Company announced an annual dividend increase on the announcement, P and G's share price increased.</p&g

50、t;<p>　　However, Lease et al. (2000) demonstrate that management understands that high dividends may restrict corporate investment in value-creation:</p><p>　　Elisabeth Goth, a dissident member of the

51、 family that controls Dow Jones and Co., raises questions about its dividend policy, contending that Dow Jones has increased its dividends at the expense of re-investing its earnings to fuel future growth.</p><

52、;p>　　However, “shareholders who enjoyed stock run-ups and rising dividends in the 1980s are unhappy that Bell CEOs want to curb dividend growth and use profits to improve their networks and diversify at home and abroa

53、d”. This suggests that investors may understand that dividends may need to be cut to invest in company growth, but they still demand dividends.</p><p>　　Dividend cuts are not always bad news!?</p><

54、;p>　　Our analysis revealed that dividend cuts are not always bad news, especially when a firm has significant growth opportunities available. However, we demonstrated that managers may refuse to cut dividends for fear

55、 of negative market reaction (which may be driven by investors being behaviorally conditioned to believe that dividend cuts are bad news). Our model suggested that the problem may be mitigated if managers can communicate

56、 the reasons for dividend cuts (to invest in new value-adding projec</p><p>　　1. How sensitive is the stock price to dividend changes (the adverse selection problem)? </p><p>　　2. To what extent

57、 can managers transfer information (that is communicate) about the profitable investment opportunity so that investors will understand the reason for the dividend increase? </p><p>　　Indeed, they state:</

58、p><p>　　If the managers believe that the reason for the dividend cut can be effectively communicated to investors in such a manner that it would not result in a dramatic stock price decrease, then they should p

59、refer investing over paying the full amount of the dividend. On the other hand, if they believe that a drastic decline in the stock price may occur, then they should continue with the normal dividend plan and postpone th

60、e investment opportunity. The “flow of information” factor should be derived f</p><p>　　Lease et al. consider two examples of firms changing their dividend policy; Windermere-Durable Holdings, Inc, and Compa

61、q Computer Corporation. Windermere-Durable Holdings, Inc., announced that it was cutting the dividend in order to re-invest all earnings into the business, following a “re-evaluation of its dividend policy in light of th

62、e Company's strategic repositioning for growth and the resulting cash requirement”.</p><p>　　On the release of the dividend-cut announcement, the firm's share price increased from $18.25 to $19.00 (h

63、ence, the dividend cut, supported by positive communication to the market, was seen as good news). In contrast, Compaq Computer Corporation paid a dividend for the first time in 1997, causing its share price to fall (a d

64、ividend initiation was seen as a “bad news” signal that the company had run out of good investment opportunities).</p><p>　　Wooldridge and Ghosh (1998) emphasize the importance of corporate communication and

65、 managerial reputation when cutting dividends to invest in growth. They compare the cases of Gould Inc. and ITT. In 1983, Gould Inc. announced that it was cutting its quarterly dividend in order to “conserve cash that ca

66、n be used to finance the growth of its electronic businesses the board set the new dividend in the light of the company's transition to a high-technology firm”. On the day of the announcement, its </p><p&g

67、t;　　In contrast, ITT announced a 64 per cent cut in its dividend payment, explaining that its dividend level had “become inconsistent with the intensely competitive high-technology environment”. ITT's share price fel

68、l.</p><p>　　Conclusion</p><p>　　We have developed a dividend-signaling model that begins to address Fisher Black's (1976) dividend puzzle. We demonstrated that the relationship between manag

69、erial incentives, dividend policy and firm value is indeed complex. In our model, dividends served a dual purpose. They signaled current income, and they affected the firm's ability to invest in new projects. We ther

70、efore argued that dividends may provide confusing signals to investors, who may view an increase in dividends favorably, eithe</p><p>　　Our model identified two potential agency problems associated with divi

71、dend policy. First, the manager may cut dividends in order to invest in a negative NPV project, due to private benefits. Second, the manager may be unwilling to reduce dividends to take a positive NPV project, since he i

72、s concerned with the negative signal of current income. We suggested that the latter problem may be mitigated by communication to investors, reinforced by managerial reputation effects.</p><p>　　We believe t

73、hat our integrated model has provided a springboard for future theoretical and empirical research into the complex nature of corporate dividend policy.</p><p>　　資料來源：Emerald Journal of Managerial Finance 201

74、0(05):P394—413</p><p><b>　　譯文 ：</b></p><p>　　股利政策，信號(hào)和現(xiàn)金流量：綜合辦法</p><p>　　Richard Fairchild</p><p>　　信號(hào)假說和自由現(xiàn)金流假說認(rèn)為，股息政策是由一個(gè)模型，集成了兩個(gè)假說缺乏阻礙。本文的目的是為了解釋的理論模型，結(jié)合了

75、股利信號(hào)和自由現(xiàn)金流的。這種分析的目的是為了闡明股利政策，管理激勵(lì)機(jī)制和公司價(jià)值之間的復(fù)雜關(guān)系。</p><p>　　為了考慮股利政策的復(fù)雜性，其中管理人員擁有超過有關(guān)企業(yè)優(yōu)質(zhì)投資者的信息，可投資于價(jià)值減少項(xiàng)目。因此，該模型結(jié)合了信號(hào)和自由現(xiàn)金流的因素。管理溝通和聲譽(yù)的影響也納入模型中。結(jié)果所得，削減股息是壞消息。這可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致企業(yè)拒絕削減股息，因此放棄好的項(xiàng)目。本文表明，在股息削減管理的情況下，由于投資管理和溝通

76、，可能會(huì)緩解這個(gè)問題。</p><p>　　創(chuàng)作成為富勒和布勞這些人們工作和發(fā)展的靈感和動(dòng)力，而那些作者認(rèn)為企業(yè)只有新的負(fù)凈現(xiàn)值方案（使股利的增加提供了明確的積極信號(hào)，市場(chǎng)在兩個(gè)信號(hào)和自由現(xiàn)金流例）本文的模型中，信號(hào)可能是不可靠的，因?yàn)楣究赡苄枰鳒p股息，采取積極的凈現(xiàn)值的項(xiàng)目。因此，該模型有助于了解股利政策的復(fù)雜性。</p><p>　　近50年后米勒和莫迪利亞尼（1961）著名的股利

77、無關(guān)定理，學(xué)者和從業(yè)人員仍然缺乏了解的股利政策及其對(duì)公司價(jià)值的影響。事實(shí)上，黑色（1976）指出，“我們期待在更困難的支付股息局面中，更好像一個(gè)謎與片段，而不是適合在一起。”在本文中，我們?cè)O(shè)立了一個(gè)模型，從股利信號(hào)中分析，試圖找出影響股利政策與公司價(jià)值的各種因素。</p><p>　　據(jù)米勒和莫迪利亞尼（1961）定理，該公司的價(jià)值是由它在一個(gè)完善的市場(chǎng)條件下的世界股利政策的影響。兩個(gè)驅(qū)動(dòng)的MM無關(guān)定理的主要假設(shè)

78、是：</p><p>　　1．一個(gè)公司的管理純粹是興趣最大化股權(quán)持有人的價(jià)值（沒有代理問題）。 2．企業(yè)內(nèi)部和外部共享有關(guān)公司的業(yè)務(wù)和前景（下稱“信息對(duì)稱”的假設(shè)）相同的信息。 隨后分析了理論研究納入公司的股利政策的信息不對(duì)稱和代理問題的影響因素中。這導(dǎo)致了兩個(gè)相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的做法;股利信號(hào)假說，過?，F(xiàn)金假說。我們的股息模型結(jié)合這兩種方法。</p><p>　　信號(hào)假說，

79、根據(jù)管理者和投資者之間的信息不對(duì)稱，股利政策將可能提供信號(hào)有關(guān)公司當(dāng)前業(yè)績和未來前景。免費(fèi)的現(xiàn)金流量假說（也稱為超額現(xiàn)金假說）指出，股利政策地址管理者和外部投資者的代理問題（例如伊斯特布魯克，1984年;詹森，1986; Fluck，1995）。特別是，在Jensen的（1986）的分析投資機(jī)構(gòu)出現(xiàn)問題負(fù)凈現(xiàn)值（凈現(xiàn)值）項(xiàng)目從帝國大廈經(jīng)理人的激勵(lì)機(jī)制。通過降低股息減輕自由現(xiàn)金流供管理者這個(gè)問題。所指出的富勒和Thakor（2002年），

80、這些假說（信號(hào)和現(xiàn)金流量）均支持多（但不是全部）的實(shí)證證據(jù)表明，股息的增加（或減少）的好（壞）消息，導(dǎo)致股票價(jià)格上漲（減少）。</p><p>　　也許，之所認(rèn)為黑色的（1976）股利之謎的解決方案仍然如此難以捉摸的是，是因?yàn)槲覀內(nèi)狈σ粋€(gè)綜合的理論，“結(jié)合對(duì)股息信號(hào)和自由現(xiàn)金流動(dòng)機(jī)”（Fuller和Thakor 2002年富勒和布勞，2010，富勒和Thakor（2002）得出第一個(gè)這樣的綜合模式。我們的工作通過

81、在建立模型的基礎(chǔ)上，既包含股利信息不對(duì)稱又包括現(xiàn)金流動(dòng)問題。特別是，我們認(rèn)為這兩者對(duì)股息的雙重作用。股息收入提供了投資者（管理者的動(dòng)機(jī)，因此選擇高股息，以提供一個(gè)積極的信號(hào)）電流信號(hào)。然而，在我們的分析中，一個(gè)新的項(xiàng)目是提供給公司，如果企業(yè)想投資這個(gè)項(xiàng)目，它必須從目前的收入的資金。因此，除了目前的收入，信號(hào)的作用，股息水平也可能會(huì)成為影響經(jīng)理人的能力投資于該新項(xiàng)目的重要因素。因此，基金經(jīng)理可能希望削減股息（取好，增值項(xiàng)目），或者他可能希

82、望高分紅派息（為了減少現(xiàn)金流承諾不采取一壞，價(jià)值降低工程）。</p><p>　　我們的模型有助于富勒和Thakor的（金融時(shí)報(bào)2002年）在以下幾個(gè)方面的分析。首先，我們從對(duì)開發(fā)的分析中，獲得了正式的和嚴(yán)格的方式對(duì)股息博弈均衡。其次，金融時(shí)報(bào)的可能性，只考慮負(fù)凈現(xiàn)值的項(xiàng)目存在。因此，他們注重Jensen的（1986年）的現(xiàn)金流問題。與此相反，我們認(rèn)為該項(xiàng)目的可能性，可能有正面或負(fù)面的凈現(xiàn)值。這使我們能夠考慮以下

83、不足的研究領(lǐng)域。雖然大多數(shù)的理論和實(shí)證研究表明，分紅和股票價(jià)格之間的關(guān)系是正面的（紅利增加是“好消息”），伍爾德里奇和Ghosh（1998）建議，當(dāng)一家公司擁有有利的發(fā)展機(jī)遇，削減股息不一定是壞消息。相反，股息的增加可能是壞消息。例如，艾倫和Michaely（2002）認(rèn)為，“不過，我們注意到，在不對(duì)稱信息情況下，股息也可以看作是壞消息。公司的分紅是那些沒有積極的凈現(xiàn)值項(xiàng)目，其中投資“，并根據(jù)布萊克（1976年），”“如果錯(cuò)過機(jī)會(huì)支付股

84、息，或許沒有一家公司具備已支付股息的自信心，但它已經(jīng)有吸引力的投資可能，”。</p><p>　　因此，紅利和公司價(jià)值之間的關(guān)系是復(fù)雜的。市場(chǎng)可能假說人認(rèn)為相比之下分紅增加情況毫不遜色，無論是作為一個(gè)積極的信號(hào)，當(dāng)期收入（即股息減少信息不對(duì)稱的問題），或作為減輕現(xiàn)金流的問題（即分紅來降低代理問題）的一種手段。但是，股息的增加可能被視為負(fù)面的信號(hào)（該公司缺乏成長的機(jī)會(huì)），而股息的削減可能被視為一個(gè)積極的信號(hào)（該公司

85、具有顯著的增長機(jī)會(huì)提供）看到。我們的綜合信號(hào)/超額現(xiàn)金流量模型的股息嘗試所有這些分析的影響結(jié)果。</p><p>　　我們的第三個(gè)貢獻(xiàn)是考慮兩種類型的低效率（或代理問題）與股利政策方面的管理激勵(lì)機(jī)制。首先，我們分析了道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的問題，由于管理私人利益，使得帝國大廈經(jīng)理可能削減股利，從而投資于負(fù)凈現(xiàn)值（價(jià)值減少）項(xiàng)目。其次，我們考慮一個(gè)逆向選擇的問題，使管理人員可以拒絕削減股息，因此傳遞了一個(gè)正的凈現(xiàn)值項(xiàng)目[4]。事

86、實(shí)上，科恩和Yagil（2006年）確定“一個(gè)新的機(jī)構(gòu)股息成本類型：正凈現(xiàn)值是放棄以支付股息的項(xiàng)目數(shù)為前提的”。</p><p>　　法蘭克福和木材（2002）觀察到，除了分析機(jī)構(gòu)和股利政策的信息不對(duì)稱問題的影響，研究人員開始考慮行為模型。他們觀察到。</p><p>　　投資者的行為大大影響社會(huì)規(guī)范和態(tài)度。根據(jù)希勒（1989），包括建模工作這些影響可以豐富發(fā)展的理論來解釋公司股利政策的影

87、響力。</p><p>　　我們的第四個(gè)貢獻(xiàn)是，我們?cè)谖覀兊哪Ｐ桶ㄒ粋€(gè)行為層面。也就是說，我們習(xí)慣地認(rèn)為，高股利信號(hào)是高品質(zhì)的投資者。在我們的第一種情況下，投資者的信念確實(shí)是正確的，高質(zhì)量的企業(yè)可以從低質(zhì)量的公司單獨(dú)支付高股息演變而來。在第二種情況下，這些信念驅(qū)動(dòng)的逆向選擇問題（高品質(zhì)的公司是不愿意減少低于低質(zhì)量的公司的股息</p><p>　　作為我們的第二個(gè)案例，由于市場(chǎng)當(dāng)時(shí)誤值低質(zhì)

88、量的這家公司的延伸，我們考慮是否逆向選擇問題可以通過溝通方式，以緩解投資者，通過加強(qiáng)管理的口碑效應(yīng)。事實(shí)上，伍爾德里奇和Ghosh（1998）認(rèn)為，企業(yè)可能能夠避免投資者的溝通，削減股息的原因是投資于未來的增長機(jī)會(huì)的負(fù)面市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)。有人可能會(huì)認(rèn)為，這可能是廉價(jià)的通話。然而，伍爾德里奇和Ghosh認(rèn)為，管理的聲譽(yù)也可以提供一個(gè)信譽(yù)為企業(yè)提供融資決策的重要機(jī)制。</p><p>　　在股利政策的信譽(yù)作用已探索的Bruc

89、ato和史密斯（1997年）和吉萊等 （2008年）。在Brucato和史密斯，一個(gè)有信譽(yù)的股利信號(hào)是在一個(gè)意想不到的收入增加后確認(rèn)的。同樣，在吉萊等人也認(rèn)為：聲譽(yù)機(jī)制是市場(chǎng)懲罰的這樣一個(gè)公司，選擇（以“傻瓜”的市場(chǎng)，這是一個(gè)高收入的公司）的高股息，但后來的報(bào)告獲利能力低。與此相反，在我們的模型，我們認(rèn)為，允許一個(gè)公司溝通，這是削減股息，以投資于新的增值項(xiàng)目中的管理聲譽(yù)的作用。</p><p>　　本文的其余部分

90、組織如下。在第二節(jié)，我們提出我們的模型。2.1節(jié)中，我們認(rèn)為我們的自由的現(xiàn)金流情況。在2.2節(jié)中，我們考慮我們的逆向選擇的情況下，并考慮溝通和聲譽(yù)的作用。在第4節(jié)，我們討論了我們的模型的實(shí)際和管理的影響。此外，在我們的模型，我們考慮一些零星的證據(jù)顯示，復(fù)雜性，周圍的股息政策。第5節(jié)總結(jié)。</p><p>　　我們的股利信號(hào)傳遞模型表明，股利政策確實(shí)是復(fù)雜的。我們已經(jīng)表明，高分紅可能性有，都是由目前的表現(xiàn)提供了積極

91、的信號(hào)（在當(dāng)前的收入而言）對(duì)公司價(jià)值的積極作用，減少現(xiàn)金流動(dòng)問題（即經(jīng)理在私人利益誘惑下投入負(fù)凈現(xiàn)值投資項(xiàng)目）。然而，如果它阻止能夠使這些投資公司，在正凈現(xiàn)值的投資機(jī)會(huì)的情況下，高股息可能確實(shí)使項(xiàng)目價(jià)值降低，。 </p><p>　　然而，管理層可能會(huì)拒絕削減股息，從而放棄了這些積極的凈現(xiàn)值的機(jī)會(huì)，尤其是如果股市一直習(xí)慣于認(rèn)為，高股利信號(hào)是高品質(zhì)的公司。因此，我們強(qiáng)調(diào)管理溝通模式的投資者/教育，提高管理聲譽(yù)因素作

92、為消除這一問題的方法。</p><p>　　我們現(xiàn)在考慮一些零星的證據(jù)表明，提供了一種實(shí)用的角度對(duì)我們的理論，體現(xiàn)了現(xiàn)實(shí)世界的混亂，周圍的股息政策的復(fù)雜。 </p><p>　　“傳統(tǒng)的”積極的紅利和公司股利之間的關(guān)系4.1價(jià)值租賃等。（2000年）提供了那里的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)，在“標(biāo)準(zhǔn)”的方式下，那就是，下面正面（負(fù)面）的例子，以股息的增加（或減少）： </p><p>

93、　　Figgie國際宣布將其季度股息削減。關(guān)于公布Figgie的股票價(jià)格下跌。伯利恒鋼鐵公司宣布，它忽略其季度股息。其股價(jià)下跌。沃爾瑪宣布將其季度股息增加。沃爾瑪?shù)墓蓛r(jià)上升。寶潔公司宣布了關(guān)于公布年度股息增加，P和G的股票價(jià)格上升。</p><p>　　然而，管理的理解是租賃等形式于（2000年）表明，高分紅可能會(huì)限制在價(jià)值創(chuàng)造的企業(yè)投資：</p><p>　　伊麗莎白哥特，一個(gè)家庭，控制

94、道瓊斯公司持不同政見的成員，提出了關(guān)于其股利政策的問題，認(rèn)為在道瓊斯以增加紅利為代價(jià)來推動(dòng)未來的再投資的盈利增長。 </p><p>　　然而，“股東誰享有股票運(yùn)行在20世紀(jì)80年代UPS和股息上升不滿，貝爾老總要遏制利潤股利成長和使用，以改善他們?cè)趪鴥?nèi)和國外的網(wǎng)絡(luò)和多樣化”。這表明，投資者可能了解，股息可能需要進(jìn)行切割，再投資于公司的成長，但他們?nèi)匀灰蠹t利。</p><p>　　股息削

95、減并不總是壞消息！</p><p>　　我們的分析顯示，股息削減并不總是壞消息，尤其是當(dāng)公司有顯著的增長機(jī)會(huì)。然而，我們證明了管理者可能拒絕削減負(fù)的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)（可能是驅(qū)動(dòng)被投資者行為上習(xí)慣于認(rèn)為，股息削減是壞消息）擔(dān)心紅利。我們的模型表明，由管理的口碑效應(yīng)的支持，如果管理者能夠溝通股息削減的原因（投資于新的增值項(xiàng)目），問題可能將得到緩解，。事實(shí)上，科恩和Yagil的（2006年）在美國，英國，德國，加拿大和日本的主

96、要公司首席財(cái)務(wù)官國際機(jī)構(gòu)的調(diào)查顯示，這個(gè)問題的存在。作者認(rèn)為，管理者應(yīng)該考慮兩個(gè)因素來決定是否削減股息：</p><p>　　1.如何敏感的是股票價(jià)格，股利變動(dòng)（逆向選擇問題）？ </p><p>　　2.在何種程度上可以轉(zhuǎn)讓管理有關(guān)有利可圖的投資機(jī)會(huì)，讓投資者理解為股利增加的原因信息（即溝通）？</p><p>　　事實(shí)上，他們的狀態(tài)： </p>&

97、lt;p>　　如果管理者認(rèn)為對(duì)股息削減原因可以有效地傳達(dá)這樣的方式給投資者，它不會(huì)導(dǎo)致股票價(jià)格急劇下跌，那么他們應(yīng)該更喜歡支付的股息全額投資。另一方面，如果他們認(rèn)為，在股票價(jià)格可能會(huì)發(fā)生大幅下跌，那么他們就應(yīng)該繼續(xù)進(jìn)行正常的派息計(jì)劃，從而推遲或者失去了最佳的投資機(jī)會(huì)。從過去的經(jīng)驗(yàn)來看，該因子的“信息流”應(yīng)該是來自結(jié)構(gòu)的投資者關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)。</p><p>　　看看兩種改變其股利政策的公司的例子;溫耐用控股公司和

98、康柏計(jì)算機(jī)公司。溫德米爾耐用控股公司宣布，它在切以便重新投入到業(yè)務(wù)的所有收入的分紅，遵循“重新評(píng)價(jià)其股利政策對(duì)公司發(fā)展的戰(zhàn)略定位和由此產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)金光規(guī)定“。 </p><p>　　論股息削減公布后，該公司的股票價(jià)格從十八點(diǎn)二五美元至19.00（因此，削減股息，以積極的溝通，以市場(chǎng)的支持，被視為好消息看到）。與此相反，康柏電腦公司支付1997年第一次股息，導(dǎo)致其股價(jià)下跌（一開始是作為紅利“壞消息”的信號(hào)，該公司已抓住