關于管家機構軸的委托代理關系【外文翻譯】

1、外文文獻翻外文文獻翻譯譯譯譯文原文：PrincipalAgentRelationshipsontheStewardshipAgencyAxisThisarticleprovidesanoverviewoftheliteratureonnonprofitprincipalagentrelationships.Itdepictsthenatureofagencytheystewardshiptheyanalyzestheiginofthei

2、rstrugglewithinthenonprofitstructuremarksdirectionsfaconciliatyapproach.Wetherebycontrastitwithstewardshiptheyelabateontheargumentsthatcanaffectthepositionofnonprofitprincipalagentrelationshipsonthestewardshipagencyaxis.

3、Analysisoftheexistingliteraturepointstoalackofconsensusastowhichtheyshouldbeapplied.Wearguethatthedivisionofnonprofitprincipalagentrelationshipsintoboardmanagermanageremployeeinteractionsmayhelptoclarifythebalancebetween

4、agencytheystewardshiptheymayleadtotheestablishmentofastronglyfoundedtheyonnonprofitprincipalagentrelationships.Weclosewithadiscussionofhowthisarticlemayprovevaluabletononprofitpolicymakersotherempiricalresearchers.WhatIs

5、AgencyTheyIndertoexplainthebasicconceptsuponwhichthefoundationsofagencytheyarebuiltwestartwithadefinitionofprincipalagentrelationships.AccdingtoJensenMeckling(1976)aprincipalagentrelationshipcanbedefinedas“acontractunder

6、whichonemepersons(theprincipal(s))engageanotherperson(theagent)toperfmsomeserviceontheirbehalfwhichinvolvesdelegatingsomedecisionmakingauthitytotheagent”(p.308).Suchrelationshipsarequitecommon.Fexampleaclient(principal)m

7、ighthirealawyer(agent)todefendhiscase.Ahomeowner(principal)mighthireacarpenter(agent)tofixherstaircase.Althoughbothexamplesdescribeinteractionsinaprivatesettingprincipalagentrelationshipsalsocommonlyoccurwithinganization

8、s.Hereliteratureoftenhstheroleoftheprincipaltotheboardofdirectswhichcontractsamanagertoruntheganizationthesametimedamagetheeffectivenessoftheclientthebehaviofotheragents.Malhazardmalfactseconomicactivityisessentiallynotm

9、uchsotheuseofthewdhavedifferentviewsitwassuggestedtouse“covertactions“toreplaceit.Inamarketeconomymalhazardisauniversalphenomenonitisessentiallyaneconomiconehiddenmessageoftheirownrationalresponseto.Theintroductionofanin

10、fmationalasymmetryisnotnecessarilyaproblem.Iftheagent’sinterestsareperfectlyalignedwiththeprincipal’sasymmetrywillnotaffectthelevelofbenefitsstreamedtowardtheprincipal.Howeveroneofagencythey’sbasicassumptionsisthataconfl

11、ictexistsbetweentheinterestsoftheprincipalthoseofhisagent.Theprincipalwilltherebybefcedtoapplynewwaysofcontractingindertominimizethedeviationfromthefirstbestsolution.Inthecaseofmalhazardthedeviationfromthefirstbestsoluti

12、oniselicitedbythefactthatcompensationcannolongerbebasedonthelevelofefft(cloakedfromtheprincipal)exertedbytheagent.Compensationshouldinsteaddependontheoutcome.Outcomebasedcompensationwouldinducetheagenttoexertmethanthemin

13、imumlevelofefft.Thereasoningbehindthisargumentisthatbecausetheprincipalisunabletoevaluatehisagent’seffttheagentdrawsdisutilityfromexertingitafixedfeewouldonlystimulatetheagenttoperfmattheminimumlevel.Raisingthefeeswouldn

14、otalterthissituation.Theagentcanbeexpectedtoaccepthigherwages(sincehigherwagesresultinhigherutility)butalsotominimizeherefft(indertominimizethedisutilityderivedfromit).Raisingthefixedfeewouldtherefeonlywidenthegapbetween

15、gainscostsfacedbytheagent—feedherbankaccount—butwouldnotalterherchoiceofefft.Becausethebasisofthecompensationschemesmustbealteredfromefftbasedpay(fixedfees)tooutcomebasedpay(contingentpay)outcomesarepartlyinfluencedbysta

16、tesofnaturethatarebeyondtheagent’scontroltheagentwillbefcedtoacceptariskfactintohercontractmaybeheldaccountableffactsshecannotcontrol.Suchanarrangementwouldbeinefficient.Whenariskneutralindividualentersintoacontractwitha