競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境下的廣告策略研究.pdf

1、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境下的廣告策略研究ResearchontheAdvertisingStrategiesinCompetitiveEnvironments(申請(qǐng)博士學(xué)位)一級(jí)學(xué)科：墨直籃堡學(xué)科專業(yè)：選盔絲盜壟釜壟作者姓名：韭鷹蓮指導(dǎo)教帥：堡堂甚熬撞天津大學(xué)管理學(xué)院二零零五年六月ABSTRACTByemployingmethodsofgametheory，theselectionofadvertisingbudgetincompetitiveenvi

2、ronmentsandcooperativeadvertisingprograminthesupplychainarestudiedinthedissertationThefollowsignificantresultsareachieved：Theeconomiceffectofadvertisingisstudiedfromthepointofmanagementandtheimportantandparticularroleofa

3、dvertisingincompetitionareanalyzedThesystemofadvertisingcompetitionstrategiesarepresentedAtwo—stagegameisconstructedbyemployinggametheorytoinvestigatewhetherafinnshouldsetanadvertisingbudgetsoratargetsaleslevelsinduopoly

4、competitionThesubgameperfectequilibriumofthetwostagegameischaracterizedandtheNashequilibriumpayoffsofthesecond—stagearecomparedTheoptimaladvertisingspendingstrategiesofthefirmsaregiveninsymmetricadvertisingeffectThedomin

5、antadvertisingspendingstrategiesoffinnsarestudiedinasymmetricadvertisingeffectbyexpandingthetwo—stagegameTheresultsshowthatonefirmchooseadvertisingbudgetwhiletheotherfirmchoosetargetsaleslevelsinthiscaseAthree—stagegamei

6、sestablishedbyextendingthepreviousmodeltoinvestigatethedominantstrategiesinadifferentiatedpricecompetitionaswellasadvertisingThereactionfimctiousofthetwofirmsaredepictedandtheprofitchangesalongtheplayers7reactioncurvesar

7、echaracterizebyusingbackwardinductionTheresultsshowthatinthisenvironmenttheoptimalchoiceofabudgetorasaleslevelcruciallydependsonwhetheradvertisingisexpansiveorrivalrousaswellasthedegreeofsubstitutabilitybetweenthetwofirm

8、s’productsDynamiccooperativeadvertisingprogramsinasupplychaininwhichamanufactureandanexclusiveretailerbothCanmakeadvertisingexpendituresonshortandlongtermadvertisingarestudiesbyemployingdifferentialgamesThestationaryFeed

9、backequilibriumoffourscenariosarecharacterizedandcomparedbyusingdynamicprogrammingprincipleThesequenceofthepreferenceoftheoptimalcooperativeadvertisingprogramsisobtainedInviewoftheappearingproblemsthatfrequentpromotionso

10、ftheretailercandamagethemanufacture’Sbrandimage，thepossibilityandfeasibilityofthecooperativeadvertisingprogramsisstudiedbyestablishingdifferentialgamesTheretailerhavetWOkindsofbehavior；oneismyopicandtheotherisfarsightedT