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1、原文:原文:OwnershipconcentrationagencyconflictsdividendpolicyinJapan1.IntroductionAgencyconflictsplayanimptantroleincpatedecisions.IntheirseminalpaperJensenMeckling(1976)showthatdecisionmakersmayvaluedecreasingoutcomesthatar
2、ejustifiedonlybecauseofthewealthtransferfromotherstakeholders.Togiveawellknownexamplemanagersmayinvestinunprofitableprojectswhosecostsarebnebyshareholdersifdoingsoenhancestheirownstatusbringthemprivatebenefits.Likewisesh
3、areholdersmaytakeexcessiveriskknowingthatthedownsideisassumedbydebtholderswhiletheybenefitfromtheupside.Agencyconflictscantakemanyotherfms.MyersMajluf(1984)arguethatfirmsactingintheinterestofcurrentshareholdersshouldrati
4、onallypassupprofitableinvestmentprojectsifthebenefitsarecapturedbyoutsideinvests.ShleiferVishny(1997)emphasizetheagencyconflictsbetweenmajityminityshareholderspromptedbyrecentevidencethatdominantshareholdersextractrentsa
5、ttheexpenseofsmallshareholdersthroughthetunnelingofassetsprofitssuchastheuseofunfairtransferpricingbetweencontrolledentities.Johnsonetal.(2000)provideafewexamplesofexpropriationtakingplaceindevelopedcountries.Payoutpolic
6、yisoneareaofcpatedecisionsthatcannotescapetheinfluenceofagencyconflicts.InfactEasterbrook(1984)arguesthatdividendscanbeeithertheresultthesolutiontoagencyconflicts.Becausemanagersprefertoretainearningstoincreaseprivatecon
7、sumptionreducetheriskontheirhumancapitallowgovernancestardsposhareholderprotectionarelikelytoresultinlowerpayout.ThisviewisclearlyestablishedinthecrosscountryanalysisofLaPtaetal.(2000).Converselydividendpayoutcancontribu
8、tetomitigateagencyconflicts.Jensen(1986)advocatestolowerthefreecashflowsavailabletomanagersindertoincreasefinancialdiscipline.Payinghighdividendspreciselyachievesthispurposeholderstoshareholderssinceitdecreasestheamounto
9、fcollateralbackingthefirm’sdebt.Overalltheanalysisofthedividendadjustmentdecisionprovidessomereasonsfthelowerpayoutassociatedwithownershipconcentration.Meimptantlyperhapstheresultssuggestthatasinthecaseofmanycpatedecisio
10、nsdividendpolicyisheavilydeterminedbyagencyconflictsbetweenmajityshareholdersotherstakeholders.Inparticulartheemblematicdebtholdershareholderconflictappearstobeexacerbatedbythepresenceofdominantplayersabletocodinatetheac
11、tionsofshareholders.Therestofthearticleisstructuredasfollows.Section2articulatesthehypothesesregardingtherelationshipbetweenownershipstructuredividendpolicy.Section3Describesthesampledatesources.Theempiricalresultsarepre
12、sentedinSection4.Section5concludes.Relationshipbetweenownershipdividends2.1PositiverelationshipAccdingtoShleiferVishny(1986)ownershipconcentrationcreatestheincentivesflargeshareholderstomonitthefirm’smanagementwhichoverc
13、omesthefreeriderproblemassociatedwithdispersedownershipwherebysmallshareholdershavenoincentivestoincurmonitingexpensesfthebenefitofothershareholders.Becauseofstrictfinancialdisciplinefirmsimprovetheircapitalallocationred
14、uceunprofitableinvestmentsultimatelyexhibithigherperfmance.Indeedseveralstudies(e.g.ClaessensDjankov1999)showthatconcentratedownershipcontributestohigherprofitabilitymarketvaluation.Therelevantconsequenceoffinancialdisci
15、plineisthatfewerresourcesareconsumedinlowreturnprojectsmecashflowscanthusbedistributedasdividends.InsupptofthisinterpretationMitton(2005)showthatfirmswithbettercpategovernancepayhigherdividendsinemergingmarkets.LikewiseL
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