我國(guó)上市公司財(cái)務(wù)治理理論及其模式研究.pdf

1、I中文摘要財(cái)務(wù)治理和財(cái)務(wù)管理僅一字之差但研究對(duì)象和內(nèi)容截然不同財(cái)務(wù)治理主要研究債權(quán)人股東和經(jīng)營(yíng)管理者之間的關(guān)系而財(cái)務(wù)管理則主要研究資金的籌集運(yùn)用和分配二者屬于兩個(gè)不同的范疇對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)管理的認(rèn)識(shí)無(wú)論在理論界還是實(shí)務(wù)界都已深入人心但對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)治理的研究并沒(méi)有受到應(yīng)有的重視更談不上深入本文以財(cái)務(wù)治理為主線利用我國(guó)上市公司的豐富資料分析了我國(guó)上市公司存在的治理問(wèn)題對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司的財(cái)務(wù)治理理論及其模式進(jìn)行了深入研究在回顧了公司治理的相關(guān)理論之后本文提出了

2、財(cái)務(wù)治理的理論框架包括財(cái)務(wù)治理的主體客體目標(biāo)模式以及其他相關(guān)內(nèi)容財(cái)務(wù)治理的主體是股東經(jīng)營(yíng)管理者和債權(quán)人客體是財(cái)務(wù)沖突包括股東與經(jīng)營(yíng)管理者的財(cái)務(wù)沖突和股東與債權(quán)人的財(cái)務(wù)沖突兩大類目標(biāo)是協(xié)調(diào)財(cái)務(wù)治理主體之間的財(cái)務(wù)沖突達(dá)到利益相關(guān)者價(jià)值最大化財(cái)務(wù)治理理論框架的提出一方面完善和系統(tǒng)化了我國(guó)關(guān)于財(cái)務(wù)治理的研究另一方面也揭示了在財(cái)務(wù)治理中核心的問(wèn)題是對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)沖突的協(xié)調(diào)依據(jù)財(cái)務(wù)沖突的性質(zhì)將財(cái)務(wù)治理模式分為兩類一類是解決股東和經(jīng)營(yíng)管理者財(cái)務(wù)沖突的財(cái)務(wù)激勵(lì)

3、治理模式另一類是解決股東和債權(quán)人財(cái)務(wù)沖突的財(cái)務(wù)監(jiān)控治理模式針對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司股東和經(jīng)營(yíng)管理者關(guān)系的現(xiàn)狀筆者提出了財(cái)務(wù)治理的第一類模式即從顯性激勵(lì)方面進(jìn)行激勵(lì)報(bào)酬組合將薪酬和期權(quán)結(jié)合實(shí)現(xiàn)短期激勵(lì)與長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)的統(tǒng)一為保證兩方面激勵(lì)作用的發(fā)揮筆者認(rèn)為應(yīng)對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司的財(cái)務(wù)評(píng)價(jià)體系進(jìn)行重構(gòu)從隱性激勵(lì)角度筆者認(rèn)為應(yīng)該增加負(fù)債比例通過(guò)實(shí)證分析間接證明了負(fù)債融資對(duì)于經(jīng)營(yíng)管理者存在隱性激勵(lì)的作用第二類模式的提出也是建立在對(duì)上市公司現(xiàn)狀分析的基礎(chǔ)上的債務(wù)契約

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