外文翻譯---英格蘭足球俱樂部的公司治理

1、<p><b>　　中文3130字</b></p><p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p>　　The Corporate Governance of Professional Football Clubs in England</p><p>　　We an

2、alyze the corporate governance of professional football clubs operating in England’s Premier and Football Leagues. Good corporate governance is essential if clubs are to be managed effectively and to survive in the diffi

3、cult economic circumstances surrounding the football industry. The past couple of years have been especially testing, as Football League clubs have had to deal with the aftermath of the collapse of the ITV digital contra

4、ct. Our analysis reveals that while there are some noti</p><p>　　The peculiar economics of football</p><p>　　The peculiar economics of professional sports leagues has been long been recognized (

5、see Neale, 1964).Traditionally, the essence of the problem was seen to lie in the fact that sports leagues and the individual clubs that make up the league provide a joint product that depends on effective cooperation be

6、tween competing clubs. Clubs agree to join and to be regulated by a league because co-operation in the supply of a joint product increases the economic value of the product supplied by each indiv</p><p>　　A

7、second major peculiarity relates to the need to balance financial sustainability on the one hand with playing success on the other. This latter imperative introduces an incentive to “invest” (or gamble) on success, throu

8、gh buying players and paying high player wages to attract and retain the best players. This may provide part of the reason; at least, for most professional football clubs in England being unprofitable, since there will b

9、e an incentive to invest any putative profits even before </p><p>　　A final major peculiarity – in addition to many others perhaps less fundamental differences – lies in the “l(fā)abor market”, both with the way

10、 that players are treated in the company’s balance sheet and the effects of the above competitive pressures on player salaries. In Europe over the past few years, regulatory change in the form of the “Bosman ruling”, giv

11、ing greater freedom to players to move between clubs, combined with the rise of broadcasting revenues into the game, have led to huge increas</p><p>　　All these pressures make all the more important the need

12、 for good governance at clubs. The temptation to “l(fā)ive the dream” needs to be kept in check by proper auditing and reporting mechanisms. The need to maintain league balance requires a degree of commitment to common regul

13、atory arrangements, for example with the collective selling of broadcasting rights at present. And the pressure on wages has led to individual clubs and now the Football League introducing guidelines to prevent player wa

14、ges </p><p>　　It is to check the robustness of corporate governance procedures at football clubs, and to consider how well these are managing to deal with the issues that these clubs face, that we have been

15、surveying on an annual basis the corporate governance practices of professional football clubs in England over the past three years.</p><p>　　Our survey of corporate governance practices at football clubs<

16、;/p><p>　　The analysis in this paper is based on the following data and information sources:</p><p>　　I. The results from our questionnaire survey of all clubs in the English Premier and Football L

17、eagues, including those that had been relegated to the Conference League since 2002. The survey was conducted between May and September 2003. Of the 95 clubs surveyed, 53 responded: a response rate of over 56 per cent, w

18、hich is extremely high for an in-depth postal survey of this kind.</p><p>　　ii. The results from our questionnaire survey of supporter groups, including all supporters’ trusts at English Premier and Football

19、 League clubs. Of the 100 supporters’ trusts surveyed, 51 responded, giving a response rate of 51 per cent, which is high for an in-depth postal survey of this kind.</p><p>　　iii. Follow-up interviews with s

20、elected clubs and supporters’ trusts.</p><p>　　iv. Analysis of the corporate governance statements and Annual Reports of clubs listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), AIM and OFEX.</p><p>　　v

21、. The results from PIRC’s analysis of the corporate governance statements of all LSE listed companies published in their December 2002 Annual Review of Corporate Governance</p><p>　　vi. The collation of fina

22、ncial accounts and performance contained in the latest Deloitte and Touch Annual Review of Football Finance.</p><p>　　Our dual surveys of clubs and supporters’ trusts provide comparative data showing analysi

23、s and insights from both perspectives.</p><p>　　This paper reports results from our third annual review of the corporate governance of professional football clubs based on our dual survey methodology. This p

24、aper therefore draws upon a longitudinal data set covering football clubs and supporters’ trusts for these three years. We have provided where appropriate historical comparisons to identify trends in corporate governance

25、 in professional football.</p><p>　　Assessing and managing risk</p><p>　　The Turnbull Guidance was introduced to provide assistance to companies on the types of internal controls they should hav

26、e in place to comply with the Accountability and Audit Principles of the CC. The guidance requires the board of directors to consider: “the nature and extent of the risks facing the company” (Turnbull Report, point 18),

27、the chances of the risks actually occurring, the level of acceptable risk, measures to reduce risk and the cost of implementing such measures relative to their</p><p>　　The collapse of the ITV digital contra

28、ct highlighted the changing nature of the risks facing football clubs as they have become more reliant on broadcasting income. Similarly, for Premier League clubs, increased revenue attached to European competitions has

29、opened up new risks for Premier League clubs associated with the uncertainties surrounding qualification for European competitions. We asked clubs about different aspects of their risk assessment procedures (Table 16).&l

30、t;/p><p>　　Table 16: Risk assessment and management: club survey results</p><p>　　There are two striking features of the results. The first is that 29 per cent of listed companies that responded to

31、 our survey do not appear to have a process for evaluating the nature and extent of the risks facing their club. The second is that there is a significant difference in the performance of listed clubs compared to all clu

32、bs, with only 47 per cent of football clubs reporting that they have a risk evaluation process that enables them to identify the nature and extent of the risks they </p><p>　　The performance of listed clubs

33、in regard of procedures to limit exposure to loss of assets and fraud is exemplary at 100 per cent, but this drops to 45 per cent for all clubs. A similar picture emerges on the related question of business planning. We

34、asked clubs whether a three-year business plan was put to the board for approval. Almost 15 per cent of listed clubs do not appear to carry out business planning on a three-year time horizon. This figure rises to 52 per

35、cent for all clubs respondin</p><p>　　Overall, the results on risk management and business planning indicate that the majority of clubs that responded to our survey do not have the risk evaluation and busine

36、ss planning procedures in place to manage the risks facing their clubs, and to plan accordingly.</p><p>　　A “fit and proper person” test for football?</p><p>　　Over the past year there has been

37、much discussion about the need to introduce a “fit and proper person” test for football (see Holt, 2003). Such a test might bar those with certain kinds of criminal records from owning, directing or shadow directing foot

38、ball clubs. It is difficult to estimate how many existing owners and directors might fail to meet the requirements of such a test, but it is likely that the numbers would be small. While such a test would do much to prot

39、ect the football industry,</p><p>　　One area of corporate governance where football clubs are particularly weak regards the need to have clear and transparent procedures for the appointment of directors and

40、non-executive directors, including independent non-executive directors. Clubs are especially weak on the provision of induction and training for new and existing directors. Results from our survey also reveal that clubs

41、need to improve their internal risk control and business planning systems. A set of guidelines-or code of cor</p><p>　　A code of corporate governance for professional football clubs </p><p>　　Th

42、e establishment of a best practice code, tailored specifically to the football industry, would help clubs improve their governance structures and procedures. Such a code would be fairly simple to design and the cost of i

43、mplementing it would be likely to be low. Moreover, unlike most other forms of regulation where predominately third parties benefit from the regulation, the primary beneficiaries of a code of corporate governance for pro

44、fessional football clubs would be the clubs themselves. Su</p><p>　　There are examples of best practice governance structures and procedures that can be found both amongst listed and unlisted clubs, large an

45、d small. These examples could be used to design a code with separate provisions for listed companies, unlisted companies, large and small, as well as for clubs owned by supporters’ trusts. A code of governance for profes

46、sional football could also be developed to take account of the particular role of stakeholders in football.</p><p>　　Football is an especially challenging business because clubs have to balance the needs of

47、the business with the desire to achieve success on the pitch. In order to meet this challenge clubs need to be equipped with best practice governance structures. Our analysis suggests that there is considerable scope for

48、 improving corporate governance in football that would place clubs in a better position to meet this challenge, bringing significant benefits to clubs and stakeholder groups. The development</p><p>　　Source:

49、 Jonathan Michie and Christine Oughton Corporate Governance: An International Review; Jul2005, Vol. 13 Issue 4, pp.517-531.</p><p><b>　　.譯文：</b></p><p>　　英格蘭足球俱樂部的公司治理</p><

50、;p>　　我們分析了英格蘭職業(yè)足球俱樂部的公司治理現(xiàn)狀，在足球經(jīng)濟(jì)困難的時(shí)期，俱樂部想要有效的進(jìn)行管理并且在存活下來，良好的公司法人治理是必不可少的。過去的幾年，我們一直在進(jìn)行專門的研究，像職業(yè)俱樂部必須處理的與ITV電視臺(tái)轉(zhuǎn)播合同破裂的事情。我們的分析表明，盡管公司治理的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)在改進(jìn)，但俱樂部的收益仍取決于以下信息的披露：俱樂部董事的委任，董事會(huì)的構(gòu)成，俱樂部的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理以及與投資者的交流。盡管在某些領(lǐng)域有改善，但在過去的三年足球俱

51、樂部的治理仍然低于整體上市的公司，俱樂部的法人治理仍需要改進(jìn)。</p><p><b>　　足球經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的獨(dú)特</b></p><p>　　職業(yè)體育聯(lián)賽在經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)上的獨(dú)特是有目共睹的。從傳統(tǒng)上講，該問題的主要特點(diǎn)在于，體育聯(lián)盟和構(gòu)成聯(lián)盟的個(gè)別俱樂部提供一種聯(lián)合產(chǎn)品，而該產(chǎn)品又取決于競(jìng)爭(zhēng)俱樂部之間的有效合作。俱樂部同意加入聯(lián)盟，并且遵守聯(lián)盟的規(guī)定是因?yàn)殡p方聯(lián)合行動(dòng)能夠增加單

52、個(gè)俱樂部提供的產(chǎn)品的經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值。當(dāng)聯(lián)盟中的有序的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)導(dǎo)致比賽帶來的結(jié)果不確定時(shí)，聯(lián)盟以及它的成員輸出的產(chǎn)品才能最大化。</p><p>　　第二個(gè)主要特點(diǎn)是需要平衡俱樂部的財(cái)務(wù)與球場(chǎng)上的成功。而球場(chǎng)上的能夠成功地激勵(lì)投資，通過買新球員和支付球員較高的薪水來吸引并留下最好的球員。這提供了部分俱樂部收益少的原因，至少對(duì)于大部分英格蘭職業(yè)足球俱樂部來說是無利可圖的。因?yàn)榫銟凡繒?huì)去投資任何潛在的利潤，甚至在它出現(xiàn)在資產(chǎn)負(fù)債

53、表之前。在極端情況下甚至?xí)?dǎo)致例如資不抵債的情況，正如利茲聯(lián)足球俱樂部上個(gè)世紀(jì)90年代當(dāng)時(shí)的首席執(zhí)行官描述的在“夢(mèng)想中生活”那樣，這種在球場(chǎng)上成功的要求，對(duì)俱樂部的投資者以及債權(quán)人倆說，相比于其他產(chǎn)業(yè)在投資者所花的費(fèi)用更多</p><p>　　最后一個(gè)最主要的特點(diǎn)是，其他大多數(shù)人很少注意到“勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)”謊言的基本差異，很少看到球員在俱樂部資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表中以及俱樂部在球員薪水上的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)壓力的影響.在歐洲過去幾年，由于“博

54、斯曼法案”使得球員在俱樂部之間的轉(zhuǎn)會(huì)更加自由。結(jié)合在聯(lián)賽中不斷增長的轉(zhuǎn)播費(fèi)用，使得俱樂部付給球員的薪水有了大幅度的提高，至少在頂級(jí)聯(lián)賽中是這樣的。</p><p>　　這些所有的壓力使得俱樂部改善財(cái)經(jīng)營管理變得更為重要?！霸趬?mèng)想中生活”的誘惑需要俱樂部運(yùn)用適當(dāng)?shù)膶徲?jì)和報(bào)告機(jī)制。保證聯(lián)賽持續(xù)經(jīng)營有需要俱樂部與聯(lián)賽相互協(xié)作，共同管理，例如目前的集體銷售電視轉(zhuǎn)播權(quán)。球員工資的壓力使得俱樂部和聯(lián)賽管理協(xié)會(huì)采用某種機(jī)制防止

55、球員薪水支出占據(jù)俱樂部營業(yè)額過多的比例。</p><p>　　過去三年，我們一直在以年度為基礎(chǔ)監(jiān)測(cè)職業(yè)足球俱樂部的公司治理策略，并檢查職業(yè)足球俱樂部公司治理的穩(wěn)健性并且去研究如何解決這些俱樂部所面臨的問題。</p><p><b>　　足球俱樂部法人治理</b></p><p>　　本部分的分析是基于以下的信息和數(shù)據(jù)</p>&l

56、t;p>　　1 該結(jié)果來自我們從英格蘭足球聯(lián)賽包括那些2002年降級(jí)的俱樂部在內(nèi)采取的調(diào)查問卷。該調(diào)查從五月開始到2003年9月。95個(gè)俱樂部參與了調(diào)查問卷，有53個(gè)俱樂部送回了問卷，有效率為56%。該調(diào)查采用的通過郵寄的深入調(diào)查。</p><p>　　2 該結(jié)果是從我們的支持者發(fā)起調(diào)查問卷，其中包括所有支持者信任的英格蘭職業(yè)足球俱樂部。在100名支持者中有51人回應(yīng)了調(diào)查.調(diào)查有效率為51%，這在郵件這類

57、調(diào)查中的比例是相當(dāng)高的。</p><p>　　3 進(jìn)一步采訪選定的俱樂部和支持者。</p><p>　　4分析在倫敦證券交易所以及英格蘭創(chuàng)業(yè)板和未上市證券市場(chǎng)上市的俱樂部的年度報(bào)告。</p><p>　　5.PRIC在2002年12月發(fā)表的關(guān)于分析所有倫敦證券所上市公司的公司治理的《公司治理年度審核報(bào)告》</p><p>　　6 最新的德勤公

58、司對(duì)足球俱樂部的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表和業(yè)績的審核報(bào)告以及年度足球財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告</p><p>　　我們從俱樂部和球迷兩個(gè)方面的調(diào)查提供給我們兩種不同的角度分析比較數(shù)據(jù)。本文的報(bào)告結(jié)果是在我們調(diào)查基礎(chǔ)之上的三個(gè)年度的公司治理年度審查報(bào)告，本文的數(shù)據(jù)縱向集合了三年內(nèi)包括俱樂部和球迷的數(shù)據(jù)。我們適當(dāng)?shù)牟捎昧藲v史比較，來確定未來俱樂部公司治理的發(fā)展趨勢(shì)。</p><p><b>　　風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估與管理<

59、;/b></p><p>　　通過特恩布爾指導(dǎo)意見為公司提供有關(guān)內(nèi)部控制的意見，以及他們必須遵守的問責(zé)制和審計(jì)原則。該意見指出董事會(huì)需要考慮的是：“公司所面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)性質(zhì)與類型”；風(fēng)險(xiǎn)實(shí)際發(fā)生的機(jī)會(huì)以及在可接受的程度下，采取降低成本與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的以保證利益的手段。</p><p>　　與ITV的電視轉(zhuǎn)播合同的破裂突出了俱樂部所面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)類型的變化，即俱樂部比以往更加的依賴電視轉(zhuǎn)播收入。對(duì)于英

60、超足球俱樂部來講，歐戰(zhàn)不斷增長的收入同樣也給他們帶來能否參加此項(xiàng)賽事獲得收入的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。我們?cè)儐柫怂麄冴P(guān)于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估的不同方面的問題。（表16）</p><p>　　俱樂部風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估與管理的調(diào)查結(jié)果</p><p>　　這些結(jié)果有兩個(gè)顯著的特點(diǎn)。首先是，有29%的回復(fù)者并沒有對(duì)俱樂部所面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)類型與性質(zhì)進(jìn)行評(píng)估。第二個(gè)是，上市的俱樂部與所有俱樂部相比有著顯著的差異，僅有47%的俱樂部證實(shí)他們有自

61、己的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估措施，以保證俱樂部能夠判斷他們所面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的類型與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)大小，僅有41%的俱樂部會(huì)評(píng)估風(fēng)險(xiǎn)發(fā)生的可能性，同時(shí)僅有26%的俱樂部會(huì)進(jìn)行專門的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)研究。</p><p>　　上市俱樂部在資產(chǎn)流失以及資產(chǎn)欺詐方面可以做到百分之百的的安全。但當(dāng)范圍擴(kuò)大到所有俱樂部視，這個(gè)比例就降到了51%。同樣的情況出現(xiàn)在了俱樂部的商業(yè)規(guī)劃上，我們?cè)儐柧銟凡慷聲?huì)是否有一份三年的商業(yè)計(jì)劃書，僅有15%的上市俱樂部沒有三年的商業(yè)

62、計(jì)劃，但當(dāng)這個(gè)范圍擴(kuò)大到所有我們所調(diào)查的俱樂部時(shí)，沒有三年計(jì)劃的俱樂部比例上升到了52%。</p><p>　　整體來看，關(guān)于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估與管理的調(diào)查結(jié)果表明，在我們調(diào)查的俱樂部中，大多數(shù)并沒有建立風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估制度和制定商業(yè)計(jì)劃來管理俱樂部所面對(duì)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。</p><p>　　在過去的一年中關(guān)于在足球中引入“適當(dāng)人選”準(zhǔn)則的討論有很多（霍特爾2003），這種測(cè)試可能會(huì)阻止俱樂部的直接或間接擁有者的各

63、種違法行為。我們很難估計(jì)出有多少俱樂部的董事或者負(fù)責(zé)人會(huì)無法滿足這樣的要求，但估計(jì)這個(gè)數(shù)字肯定會(huì)很小。這個(gè)測(cè)試將會(huì)保護(hù)租期產(chǎn)業(yè)的健康平穩(wěn)發(fā)展，特別是防止風(fēng)險(xiǎn)欺詐。我們對(duì)俱樂部的調(diào)查結(jié)果表明，該測(cè)試需要更為廣泛的作為公司治理的一部分引入足球俱樂部的管理中。</p><p>　　鑒于俱樂部薄弱的公司治理，俱樂部在董事以及執(zhí)行董事包括非獨(dú)立執(zhí)行董事的委任上需要更加清晰和透明的程序。俱樂部在新董事和現(xiàn)有董事的培訓(xùn)方面特別

64、的薄弱。我們的調(diào)查結(jié)果還顯示，俱樂部需要提高俱樂部的內(nèi)部風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制和商業(yè)規(guī)劃系統(tǒng)。建立清晰明確，易于管理的俱樂部公司治理制度能夠加快足球運(yùn)動(dòng)的發(fā)展，一個(gè)這樣的制度將補(bǔ)充并且完善俱樂部財(cái)務(wù)工作。同時(shí)它還能提供一個(gè)切實(shí)可行的機(jī)制來幫助俱樂部留在現(xiàn)在的聯(lián)賽中而不至于因經(jīng)營問題被聯(lián)賽管理協(xié)會(huì)處罰扣分。</p><p>　　職業(yè)足球俱樂部的公司治理制度</p><p>　　建立一個(gè)專門針對(duì)足球產(chǎn)業(yè)的公

65、司治理準(zhǔn)則將有助于完善俱樂部的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)和制度。這樣的準(zhǔn)則是易于設(shè)計(jì)的并且它的成本又不會(huì)很高。同時(shí)與其他形式的制度的建立所不同的是，俱樂部公司治理制度的收益方并不是第三方而是俱樂部本身。球迷和其他利益相關(guān)者也有可能受益。</p><p>　　無論是上市俱樂部還是沒有上市的，大俱樂部或者小俱樂部我們都可以在俱樂部公司治理機(jī)構(gòu)以及制度的建立方面找到許多例子。從這些例子我們可以為上市俱樂部或者沒有上市的俱樂部設(shè)計(jì)出專

66、門的準(zhǔn)則，甚至是支持者所擁有的俱樂部。足球俱樂部的公司治理制度的建立同時(shí)也需要考慮到在足球中特定不同的利益相關(guān)者。</p><p>　　足球俱樂部的管理是個(gè)極具挑戰(zhàn)性的工作，它需要平衡俱樂部在商業(yè)上的需要和球場(chǎng)上的成功。俱樂部需要建立最佳治理結(jié)構(gòu)來解決這個(gè)挑戰(zhàn)。我們的分析表明多方面的改進(jìn)公司俱樂部公司治理將使俱樂部更好的迎接挑戰(zhàn)，同時(shí)給還能給俱樂部以及利益相關(guān)團(tuán)體帶來更大的利益。在英國足球經(jīng)濟(jì)中采用俱樂部公司治理