選擇性內(nèi)部控制可以替代董事會的監(jiān)督作用【外文翻譯】

1、外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯原文：AlternativeInternalControlsasSubstitutesoftheBoardofDirectsCarlosFernndezRubnArrondoEmpiricalliteratureoncpategovernanceoftenassumesindependenceamongdifferentcontrolmechanisms.HoweverdifferentstudiesintheA

2、ngloSaxoncontextfindthatcontrolmechanismsareinterrelated.TheSpanishcpategovernancesystemunliketheAngloSaxononeisacterisedbythedominanceofinternalcontrolsmainlythestockownershipconcentrationtheboardofdirects.Inthisinterna

3、lcontrolcontextwespecificallyanalysethepossiblesubstitutionofthesupervisypotentialoftheboardoutsidersbytheincentiveeffectsderivedfrommanagerialstockownershipthesupervisyroleoflargeshareholders.Ourmainresultsshowanegative

4、relationshipbetweentheproptionofoutsidedirectsmanageriallargeblockholders’ownershipstake.ThesefindingssupptthesubstitutionamonginternalcontrolssuggestthatSpanishfirmsfmanefficientconglomerateofmanagerialcontrolsinwhichde

5、ficienciesinasinglemechanismcanbecompensatedbytheactionofanalternativeone.Arecentgroupofstudiesintheareaofcpategovernancerecognisethepossibleexistenceofinteractionsamongthedifferentcontrolmechanisms.InthissenseWilliamson

6、(1983)statesthesubstitutionhypothesisbetweeninternalexternalcontrolmechanismsaccdingtothatwhenthetakeovermarketisweakasinthecaseoftheSpanishmarketthereisagreaterrolefinternalcontrolmechanisms.Thealternativecontrolmechani

7、smsaregroupedfmingthecpategovernancesystem.Traditionallythesesystemshavebeenclassifiedasexternal(marketiented)internal(wkiented).TheexternalsystemsdominantinAngloSaxoneconomiesarebasedonthecontrolexertedbythemarkets.Thes

8、e1989DailyDalton1992PearceZahra1992BeattyZajac1994GoodsteinBoeker1991).Thesestudiessuggestthatthecompanyisbettermanagedunderthecontrolofaboardthatincludesindependentoutsiders.AdditionallyWeisbach(1988)Gilson(1989)Dhermen

9、tFerereRenneboog(2000)Sudetal.(2001)havefoundevidencerevealingtheexistenceofspecificactionsperfmedbytheoutsidersaimedatprotectingtheshareholders’wealth.Theempiricalevidencesuggeststhatthequalityofthesupervisyactivityperf

10、medbytheboarddependsontheweightoftheoutsidersintheboard.Inthissensetheproptionofoutsidemembersoftheboardcanbeusedasaproxyofthecapabilityoftheboardtocontrolmanagerialactions.Itisgenerallyacceptedthatmanagers’stockownershi

11、pcontributestothealignmentofmanagerialshareholders’interests.Theincentiveeffectscausedbymanagerialstockownershipimplyanalleviationoftheagencyconflictsinthefirm.Inthiswaymanagerialstockownershipreducestheneedfacontrolacti

12、vitybytheoutsidedirects.AccdingtothatZajacWestphal(1994)DenisSarin(1999)findanegativerelationshipbetweenmanagerialstockownershiptheproptionofoutsideboardmembers.Besidesthealignmenteffectsderivedfrommanagerialstockownersh

13、ipitsdispersionamongstthemembersofthemanagerialteamcanalsoaffecttheirincentivefmutualmonitingactivities.AccdingtoFama(1980)thereareincentivesfthemanagerstocontroltherestofthemanagerialteammembers.Ontheonehthereiscompetit

14、ionamongthetopmanagerialteamtoachievethehighestmostprestigiouspositionsinthecompany.Thiscompetitionencouragesmonitingamongstmanagerssincenonvalueenhancingactivitiesbyothermembersofthemanagerialteamcouldgivesomeadvantaget

15、otherestofthemanagerstoachievetoppositions.Ontheotherhthemanageriallabourmarketmotivatesmanagerstosuperviseeachother’sactions.Nonvaluemaximisingactivitiesbyamemberofthemanagerialteamcanhaveanegativeimpactonthefirm’smarke