[雙語翻譯]--外文翻譯--知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)侵權(quán)對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的影響

1、英文 英文 3300 單詞， 單詞，18000 字符；中文 字符；中文 5800 漢字 漢字文獻(xiàn)出處： 文獻(xiàn)出處：Le Q V, Mclennan P G. The Effects of Intellectual Property Rights Violations on Economic Growth[J]. Modern Economy, 2011, 2(2):107-113.外文文獻(xiàn)： 外文文獻(xiàn)： The Effects of I

2、ntellectual Property Rights Violations on Economic GrowthPatrick G. McLennan, Quan V. LeAbstract This paper examines the relationship between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and the growth rate of per capita GDP du

3、ring the period 1996-2006 in a sample 71 countries. Using software piracy data as a proxy for IPR violations, we find that countries with increasing rates of software piracy have lower growth rates. We also find that sta

4、tes with strong commitments to enact policies to protect intellectual property rights are able to achieve higher growth rates.Keywords: Intellectual Property Rights, Software Piracy, Economic Growth1.IntroductionThis pap

5、er considers intellectual property rights (IPRs) a fundamental institution for economic growth. We also view the state as equally important because implementing laws to protect property cannot be provided through private

6、 means; enforcement must come from a legitimate source. Previous studies focus on the ability of the state to produce and distribute IPR protection, or its inability to enforce them. This paper explores the role of IPR v

7、iolations on economic growth. Specifically, it focuses on the rates at which software piracy is increasing, which demonstrate deteriorations in IPR protection. We hypothesize that countries with rising rates of software

8、piracy exhibit decreasing growth rates of per capita GDP. According to the Business Software Alliance (BSA) and International Data Corporation (IDC), software piracy has many negative economic consequences. IDC and BSA’s

9、 study revealed that decreasing piracy by 10 percentage points over four years would add more than 2.4 million new jobs and almost $70 billion in tax revenues to local governments worldwide. Most of that new employment a

10、nd most of an additional $400 billion in GDP would be added to local economies. Thus, the effects of economic growth in both developed countries and emerging countries.The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provide

11、s a brief overview of the literature. The data and measures used in the empirical analysis are described in Section 3 and the results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 offers the concluding remarks with a discussion

12、on IPRs in China.2.A Brief Overview of the LiteratureIn his earlier work on property rights and economic growth, Leblang shows that countries that protect property rights grow faster than those that do not. Leblang uses

13、credit access to the private sector as a proxy for property rights because it “represents the scope of and support for free enterprise ”. Drawing on the earlier work of Goldsmith he explores the presence of democracy, as

14、suming that democratic states have more protection of property rights, and, thus, grow faster. Leblang finds a strong correlation among property rights, democracy and growth. However, this attempt to correlate protection

15、 of property rights with democratic political regimes falls short. He even claims it as a “fundamental mistake” in current literature, stating that democracy may not ensure property rights, and property rights may not in

16、sure democracy. That is, other types of government’s may provide adequate property rights; his results aren’t only democratic phenomena.Similarly, Svensson’s study finds that countries with unstable governments have few

17、incentives to protect property rights. Political instability reduces the need for incumbents to prepare future regimes for economic development. Park and Ginarte write that IPRs affect growth by encouraging firms to accu

18、mulate more inputs, and conduct research and development. Clague et al.introduces the variable of contract-intensive money to explore private entities’ willingness to invest. They find that economic gains are made when a

19、 government protects private economic actions. Keefer and Knack take this further and look at the role of social polarization and government on property rights. They find that increased social polarization does not affec

20、t investor confidence directly; it influences the policy process, which is ultimately responsible for the distribution of property rights. However, they do contend that property rights may have a bigger impact on investm