知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)相關(guān)外文翻譯--互補(bǔ)貿(mào)易結(jié)構(gòu)與中美知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)談判

1、附錄 外文譯文兩篇譯文一 互補(bǔ)貿(mào)易結(jié)構(gòu)與中美知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)談判 1Ka Zeng張欣 譯為了解釋上文列出的兩個(gè)現(xiàn)實(shí)性問題，我采用“雙層博弈論” （two-level games）來展示國(guó)內(nèi)和國(guó)際政治是如何互動(dòng)來影響談判結(jié)果的。雙層博弈論最初是羅伯特·普特曼提出的，它將國(guó)家領(lǐng)導(dǎo)看作是同時(shí)身處兩層談判中，一層是與其國(guó)際上的對(duì)手，而另一層是與他們各自的國(guó)內(nèi)成員。主要談判人員不僅需要在國(guó)際談判桌上取勝，而且需要保證他們的國(guó)際層面上達(dá)成的任何

2、協(xié)議都能被國(guó)內(nèi)成員接受，而這些成員往往有權(quán)反對(duì)或阻止這些協(xié)議的實(shí)施。通過將一系列過去的獨(dú)立的案例結(jié)合為一個(gè)單一的理論分析框架，雙層博弈論不僅解決了以往由結(jié)構(gòu)現(xiàn)實(shí)主義主導(dǎo)的國(guó)際關(guān)系理論缺乏對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)變量的考慮的缺陷，而且為進(jìn)一步的經(jīng)驗(yàn)分析奠定了基礎(chǔ)。通過將雙層博弈論作為我分析的起點(diǎn)，我建立了一套因果聯(lián)系，將國(guó)內(nèi)的利益和偏好與國(guó)際的談判結(jié)果結(jié)合起來，而這套聯(lián)系中分析了國(guó)內(nèi)的利益團(tuán)體可能支持或反對(duì)一國(guó)在國(guó)際層面上的威脅的條件。本文將證明，中美兩國(guó)

3、之間高度互補(bǔ)的貿(mào)易結(jié)構(gòu)造成了美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)出口導(dǎo)向和進(jìn)口導(dǎo)向的兩大利益集團(tuán)之間的深刻分歧，而這一分歧嚴(yán)重?fù)p害了美國(guó)提出的威脅的可信性；同時(shí)，也使得美國(guó)難以將兩國(guó)在這方面的貿(mào)易糾紛上升為貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)。美國(guó)不同利益集團(tuán)在中美貿(mào)易糾紛之中所處的相對(duì)位置的不同有力地支持了我的假設(shè)。按照我的預(yù)測(cè)，美國(guó)針對(duì)中國(guó)的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)問題提出的威脅收到了來自國(guó)內(nèi)層面的部分反對(duì)。由于兩國(guó)互補(bǔ)的貿(mào)易結(jié)構(gòu)，可能爆發(fā)的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)在美國(guó)的不同產(chǎn)業(yè)之間造成了嚴(yán)重的分歧，其中一方將知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)看

4、作它們擴(kuò)大在中國(guó)市場(chǎng)份額的途徑，而另一方則是美國(guó)的進(jìn)口商和零售商。而另外一些產(chǎn)業(yè)則只要求進(jìn)入中國(guó)而對(duì)中國(guó)的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)現(xiàn)狀沒有其他想法，它們的立場(chǎng)進(jìn)一步增強(qiáng)了反對(duì)方的力量。雖然一美國(guó)唱片業(yè)聯(lián)盟、國(guó)際知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)聯(lián)盟、商業(yè)軟件聯(lián)盟、美國(guó)電影協(xié)會(huì)以及國(guó)際唱片業(yè)聯(lián)盟為代表的美國(guó)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)產(chǎn)業(yè)持續(xù)推動(dòng)貿(mào)易制裁，其他商業(yè)團(tuán)體，特別是高度依賴于中國(guó)市場(chǎng)的勞動(dòng)密集型產(chǎn)品的進(jìn)口1 East Asia, Spring, 2002附原文Complementary T

5、rade Structure and U.S.-China Negotiations over Intellectual Property RightsKa Zeng Spring 2002In approaching the two empirical puzzles outlined above, I draw on the notion of “two-level games“ to show how domestic and

6、 international politics interact to affect negotiation outcomes. The two-level game approach, in Robert Putnam's original formulation, views national leaders as engaging in two sets of negotiations simultaneously: on

7、e with their international counterparts and the other with their respective domestic constituents. Chief negotiators not only need to “win“ at the international table, but also have to make sure that any deal that is cut

8、 internationally will be accepted by those who could veto or block implementation of the deal at home. 9 By integrating a number of previously disparate observations into a single theoretical framework, the two-level gam

9、e approach not only helps to remedy the neglect of domestic variables resulting from the dominance of structural realism in international relations theory, but also provides a basis for organizing further empirical study

10、.Using the two-level game approach as the starting point of my analysis, I develop a causal logic that lays out clearly the linkage between the structure of domestic interests and preferences and international negotiatio

11、n outcomes by specifying the conditions under which threats are likely to be supported and ratified by domestic interest groups. It will be argued that the complementary trade relations between the United States and Chin

12、a created deep schisms between export-seeking and import-using groups in the United States, thus substantially reducing the credibility of American threats. This same factor also constrains the United States from escalat

13、ing the disputes to the level of a trade war. The relative positions of the American industry groups involved in the IPR disputes documented below provide substantial support for my hypothesis. As my theory predicts, Ame

14、rican threats against China on IPR issues suffered from factional conflict at the domestic level. Due to the complementary trade structure between the two sides, the prospect of a trade war had created a deep schism betw

15、een American industries that focused on IP as a means of expanding their share in the Chinese market on the one hand, and American importers and retailers on the other. Opposition by those industries insisting on market