法國股市流動性外文文獻翻譯（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　1600單詞，10000英文字符，中文3000字</p><p>　　文獻出處：Ajina A, Lakhal F, Sougné D. Institutional investors, information asymmetry and stock market liquidity in France[J]. International Journal of Managerial

2、 Finance, 2015, 11(1):44-59.</p><p>　　http://www.wenku1.com/news/A69A8AD2CB1FAFE3.html</p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Institutional investors, information asymmetry and sto

3、ck market liquidity in France</p><p>　　Ajina, Aymen, faten lakhal, and Danielle Sougné.</p><p>　　1. Introduction</p><p>　　Institutional investors are considered as a common fea

4、ture of modern capital markets. They play a major role in internationalizing financial markets because they manage huge volume of assets: nearly 62,000 billion dollars at the end of 2006, more than the total GDP of major

5、 industrialized countries. In 2005, institutional investors held 65% of equity in firms listed on the NYSE/AMEX, indicating a compound annual growth rate of 6.3% over the past 25 years (Agarwal, 2009).</p><p&g

6、t;　　Institutional investors have constantly monitored companies for the past few years. Within this context, many studies have focused on the role of institutional investors as main actors on corporate governance structu

7、res (Bozec and Bozec, 2007; Chung and Zhang, 2011). However, few researchers studied institutional investors’ impact on the financial market and, particularly, on liquidity.</p><p>　　The purpose of this pape

8、r is to examine whether institutional investors affect information asymmetry and stock market liquidity in France. On the one hand, institutional investors are often considered as informed agents. Due to their huge volum

9、es of assets, they are able to get private information (Fehle, 2004). The information asymmetry between those who possess private information (institutional investors) and uninformed agents (minority shareholders) can ha

10、ve a negative impact on market liqui</p><p>　　The paper contribution is twofold. Firstly, most previous studies examining the relationship between institutional investors and market liquidity consider instit

11、utional investors as a homogenous group. This hypothesis is restrictive and leads to ambiguous findings. Actually, these actors are various and have different characteristics and behaviour among corporate governance stru

12、ctures. Hence, our paper examines these actors as a heterogenous group, and distinguishes between active and passive in</p><p>　　We identify three major factors likely to influence their behaviors: participa

13、tion level, investment horizons and the nature of the relationship. This study provides insight into the existence of an influence of institutional investors on information asymmetry and on liquidity of the French market

14、.</p><p>　　The findings show that institutional share-ownership seems to reduce bid-ask spreads and improve stock liquidity. Because institutional investors have diversified portfolios, they trade on a frequ

15、ent basis. This should reduce trading costs and therefore improve stock liquidity. Institutional investor ownership is considered as a favorable signal by the market, which increases investors’ mutual trust and improves

16、liquidity. The results also show that there is no significant effect of bank and ins</p><p>　　The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical framework of the relation between in

17、stitutional investors and stock market liquidity. Section 3 describes our sample, variables and methodology. Results, discussion and a conclusion follow these sections.</p><p>　　2. Institutional investors an

18、d stock market liquidity: Literature review and development of hypotheses</p><p>　　2.1. Institutional investor ownership and market liquidity</p><p>　　The relationship between market liquidity a

19、nd institutional investors' ownership is ambiguous. Theoretically, this relationship stems from the information asymmetry between various stakeholders in the company. This is based on the theoretical adverse selectio

20、n, trading and signaling hypotheses.</p><p>　　2.1.1. The adverse selection hypothesis</p><p>　　This hypothesis assumes that institutional investors are considered as informed investors. As block

21、holders, they have access to private information and are able to collect information about firm value (Bae et al. 2002). Bushee and Goodman (2007) find that changes in institutional investors' ownership are consisten

22、t with trading on private information. This should exacerbate information asymmetry, increase the adverse selection costs and decrease stock market liquidity (Ajinkya, Bhojraj and Sengu</p><p>　　The adverse

23、selection hypothesis is confirmed by several empirical studies. Sharma (2005) studies the issue of institutional investors on a sample of 150 Indian companies. He shows that institutional investors’ capital share is not

24、significantly related to stock liquidity. Aslan et al. (2007) find strong evidence that firms with higher institutional ownership have a higher probability of informed trading. Boehmer and Kelley (2009) obtain empirical

25、evidence that institutional investors improve th</p><p>　　In the Australian market, Carole and James (2006) examine the relationship between institutional ownership and liquidity and find a negative impact o

26、f institutional ownership on turnover. In the same vein, based on a sample of 16,911 firm-years over 1995-2006, Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012) find that higher institutional ownership is associated with greater conservatis

27、m in firms' financial reporting and that this positive association is more pronounced among firms with higher information asymmetry</p><p>　　2.1.2. The trading and signal hypotheses</p><p>　

28、　According to the trading hypothesis, institutional investors’ portfolios are likely to enhance market liquidity. Institutional investors trade aggressively on their portfolios which positively affect market liquidity. T

29、his hypothesis has been supported by several empirical studies. Rhee and Wang (2009) find that the liquidity on the Jakarta Stock Exchange has improved substantially with the average bid–ask spread more than half and the

30、 average depth more than doubled. Kothare and Laux (1995) con</p><p>　　The relationship between institutional investors and liquidity could also rely on developments from the signal theory. Within the scope

31、of this study, institutional shareholders are able to perform monitoring activities on management, and this is considered as a positive signal to market participants. Institutional investors are able to pay higher monito

32、ring costs to protect their assets (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). As a result, they may encourage managers to take better accounting and financial</p><p>　　H1: There is a positive relationship between institut

33、ional investors' ownership and market liquidity in France.</p><p>　　2.2. Institutional investor ownership and market liquidity: A simultaneous relationship</p><p>　　Institutions are likely t

34、o trade in companies with better visibility and transparency and the most liquid ones. Eakins and al. (1998) highlight that institutions are likely to avoid external risks and select companies with positive expected retu

35、rns. Falkenstein (1996), Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) use cross-sectional analysis to show institutional preference for large liquid stocks.</p><p>　　Based on a sample of 9

36、7 companies studied from 1978 to 1991, Healey and al. (1999) show that good disclosure quality is linked with increasing institutional ownership. Bushee and Noe (2000) document that an increase in a company’s disclosure

37、level attracts institutional investors. Al-Najjar (2010) finds that stock liquidity influences the percentage of shares held by institutional investors in the Jordanian market. Dennis and Weston (2001) use a simultaneous

38、 equation system to examine the relati</p><p>　　Accordingly, we expect the following hypothesis:</p><p>　　H2: Market liquidity in France positively affects institutional investor’s ownership.<

39、;/p><p>　　2.3. Institutional investor type and market liquidity</p><p>　　Institutional investors’ type includes pension funds, collective investment institutions, investment advisers, banks and ins

40、urances (OECD, 2000). The way institutional investors influence managers’ behavior is empirically proved because cases of passive policy (Porter, 1992) or active behavior are found (Bushee and Noe, 2000).</p><

41、p>　　Within the governance theoretical framework, shareholding activism is considered an alternative monitoring mechanism likely to reduce agency costs and conflicts of interests between majority and minority sharehold

42、ers. Institutional investors’ behavior (passive or active) and the incentive to control a company’s governance policy depends on the size of their portfolios, on their investment horizon, which might go from short to lon

43、g term, and the nature of their relationships with a company (Bushe</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p>　　機構(gòu)投資者，信息不對稱和法國股市流動性</p><p><b>　　1.引言</b></p><p>

44、　　機構(gòu)投資者被認為是現(xiàn)代資本市場的一個共同特征。他們在國際化金融市場上扮演了重要的角色,因為他們管理數(shù)量龐大的資產(chǎn):2006年底將近62萬億美元,超過主要工業(yè)化國家國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值。2005年,機構(gòu)投資者持有65%的股權(quán)在紐交所/美國證券交易所上市,表明在過去的25年里復(fù)合年增長率為6.3% (阿格沃爾,2009)。</p><p>　　機構(gòu)投資者在過去的幾年里不斷監(jiān)控公司。在這種背景下,許多研究把重點放在機構(gòu)投資

45、者在公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)中的作用上 (博則克，2007;鐘和張,2011年)。然而,很少有研究人員研究機構(gòu)投資者對金融市場的影響,特別是對流動性的影響。</p><p>　　本文的目的是調(diào)查機構(gòu)投資者是否影響法國股票市場信息不對稱和流動性。一方面,機構(gòu)投資者往往被認為是知情代理。由于他們有大量的資產(chǎn),他們通常能夠得到私人信息(費赫爾,2004)。那些擁有私人信息(機構(gòu)投資者)和無知代理(少數(shù)股東)之間的信息不對稱會對市場

46、流動性產(chǎn)生負面影響,這證實了逆向選擇的假設(shè)。另一方面,股利政策的發(fā)展聲稱這種持股是一種治理機制。它本質(zhì)上應(yīng)該鼓勵投資者投資于這些公司,從而增加交易量和市場流動性。</p><p>　　本文所做出的貢獻是雙重的。首先,大多數(shù)以前的研究考察機構(gòu)投資者和市場流動性之間的關(guān)系認為機構(gòu)投資者是一個同質(zhì)的群體。這一假設(shè)是具有限制性的,可能導(dǎo)致模棱兩可的結(jié)果。實際上,這些活動者不同,他們在公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)中有不同的特性和行為。因此

47、,我們考察作為異質(zhì)的群體的活動者,并區(qū)分主動和被動投資者。其次,本文考察了法國市場不同機構(gòu)設(shè)置的關(guān)系。這個選擇是出于不同法律體系和法國和盎格魯-撒克遜環(huán)境金融市場的發(fā)展。大多數(shù)法國公司的所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)比美國公司更集中。在這種環(huán)境下,機構(gòu)投資者在公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)中可以作為主要活動者。除此之外,法國是一個民用低的國家,那里的投資者利益保護不如其他低于通常水平的國家。機構(gòu)投資者被視為擔保人保護少數(shù)股權(quán)和積極影響公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)。因此，這些投資者并被不認為

48、是知情投資者(逆向選擇假說)作為他們控制經(jīng)理的主要作用。他們作為公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)市場的媒介,可能會對法國股票市場的流動性產(chǎn)生積極影響 (交易和信號假說)。</p><p>　　我們發(fā)現(xiàn)三個主要因素可能影響他們的行為:參與水平,投資的注資期和自然關(guān)系。這項研究提供了洞察機構(gòu)投資者在信息不對稱和流動性的法國市場的依據(jù)。</p><p>　　研究結(jié)果表明,機構(gòu)持股似乎減少買賣價差和提高股票

49、的流動性。因為機構(gòu)投資者有多元化的投資組合,他們之間交易頻繁。這將減少交易成本,因此提高股票的流動性。機構(gòu)投資者所有權(quán)被市場視為一個良好的信號,從而增加投資者的相互信任,提高流動性。結(jié)果還表明,銀行和保險所有權(quán)對股票的流動性沒有顯著影響。作為被動投資者,后者發(fā)現(xiàn)高循環(huán)的投資組合沒有優(yōu)勢。然而, 養(yǎng)老基金的所有權(quán)和股市流動性之間有一個積極的顯著關(guān)系。這些結(jié)果強調(diào)了法國市場上機構(gòu)投資者的作用。</p><p>　　本

50、文的其余部分如下:第二部分介紹了機構(gòu)投資者和股票市場流動性之間關(guān)系的理論框架。第三部分描述了我們選取的樣本,變量和方法論。最后一部分是討論和結(jié)論。</p><p>　　2．機構(gòu)投資者和股市流動性:文獻綜述和發(fā)展假設(shè)</p><p>　　2.1 機構(gòu)投資者所有權(quán)和市場流動性</p><p>　　市場流動性和機構(gòu)投資者所有權(quán)之間的關(guān)系是模糊的。從理論上講,這種關(guān)系源于公

51、司各利益相關(guān)者之間的信息不對稱。這是基于理論的逆向選擇,交易和信號假說。</p><p>　　2.1.1 逆向選擇假說</p><p>　　這一假設(shè)認為機構(gòu)投資者應(yīng)被視為精明的投資者。作為股東,他們可以獲得和利用私人信息,并能收集與公司價值相關(guān)的信息(貝.2002年)。布希和古德曼(2007)發(fā)現(xiàn),機構(gòu)投資者的變化對私人信息的私人信息交易一致。這將加劇信息的不對稱性, 增加逆向選擇成本和減

52、少股票市場流動性(安尼克， 博瑞杰和森古普塔,2003)。在這種背景下,格羅斯頓和米格羅姆(1985)認為, 由于機構(gòu)投資者的存在，做市商面臨逆向選擇成本。此外,由于這些投資者的交易比例高,直接供應(yīng)服務(wù)迫使做市商來以一個較高的價格管理自己的資產(chǎn)。</p><p>　　逆向選擇假說由一些實證研究證實。沙瑪(2005)以150個印度公司為案例研究機構(gòu)投資者的問題。他表明,機構(gòu)投資者的資本份額與股票的流動性不顯著相關(guān)。

53、阿斯蘭 (2007)發(fā)現(xiàn)強有力的證據(jù)表明，企業(yè)機構(gòu)投資者持有更高的股票與知情交易概率更高。博和凱利(2009)獲得的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)表明,機構(gòu)投資者提高價格的信息效率。</p><p>　　在澳大利亞市場,卡羅爾和詹姆斯(2006)考察機構(gòu)投資者持股和流動性之間的關(guān)系,發(fā)現(xiàn)與機構(gòu)所有權(quán)的營業(yè)額成負相關(guān)。同樣,基于對1995 - 2006年16911個公司樣本的調(diào)查,高達和余（2012)發(fā)現(xiàn)機構(gòu)投資者持股較高與更具保守主義

54、的企業(yè)財務(wù)報告相關(guān),這種相關(guān)性在高度信息不對稱的公司中更為明顯。拉馮德和瓦茨(2008)也發(fā)現(xiàn)了類似的結(jié)果。布盧姆和凱姆(2012)考察了非流動性和股權(quán)制度之間的關(guān)系。作者表明,機構(gòu)的數(shù)量能提高股市的流動性。</p><p>　　2.1.2 交易和信號假說</p><p>　　根據(jù)交易假說,機構(gòu)投資者的證券投資組合可能會提高市場流動性。機構(gòu)投資者交易的積極投資組合,會對市場流動性產(chǎn)生積極影

55、響。這個假設(shè)已經(jīng)得到一些實證研究的支持。芮依和王(2009)發(fā)現(xiàn),雅加達證券交易所流動性大大提高本質(zhì)上與與超過一半的買賣價差、比一倍還多的深度相關(guān)。卡斯爾和雷克斯(1995)證實了納斯達克的上市公司樣本的正相關(guān)。丹尼斯和韋斯頓(2001)考察了機構(gòu)投資者對股票市場流動性的影響, 他們研究美國上市的5500家公司表明，流動性正受到機構(gòu)投資者持股比例的影響。</p><p>　　機構(gòu)投資者和流動性之間的關(guān)系也可能依賴

56、于信號理論的發(fā)展。在本研究的范圍內(nèi),法人股東能夠執(zhí)行監(jiān)視活動管理,而這被認為是市場參與者的一個積極的信號。機構(gòu)投資者可以支付更高的監(jiān)控成本來保護他們的資產(chǎn)(施萊費爾和維什尼，1988)。因此,他們鼓勵經(jīng)理們采取更好的會計和財務(wù)決策(貝克和瓦拉,2000)。他們被視為治理機制,能夠減少股東之間的代理沖突,重建信任,保證信息透明和良好的公司治理,特別是在投資者利益不受保護的民事低的國家, 在法國就是這樣。這可能鼓勵其他投資者投資于這些公司,

57、增加交易量。上述討論導(dǎo)致以下假設(shè):</p><p>　　H1:在法國，機構(gòu)投資者的所有權(quán)和市場流動性之間呈正相關(guān)。</p><p>　　2.2 機構(gòu)投資者的所有權(quán)和市場流動性:同步關(guān)系</p><p>　　機構(gòu)投資者有可能在好的可見性與透明度，流動性最強的貿(mào)易公司進行交易。埃金斯和艾爾(1998)強調(diào)機構(gòu)可能避免外部風險和選擇公司積極的預(yù)期收益。法爾肯斯泰因(199

58、6)、岡波斯和梅特里(2001)，班尼特和斯塔克斯(2003)使用代表性法分析表明機構(gòu)傾向于流動性股票。</p><p>　　基于對1978年到1991年的97家公司進行的研究,希利和艾爾(1999)研究表明,良好的信息披露質(zhì)量與增加機構(gòu)投資者持股息息相關(guān)。布什里和挪亞(2000)證明,提高公司的信息披露水平能吸引機構(gòu)投資者持股。阿納金(2010)發(fā)現(xiàn),股票流動性影響約旦市場機構(gòu)投資者持有股份的百分比。丹尼斯和韋

59、斯頓(2001)使用聯(lián)立方程系統(tǒng)考察機構(gòu)投資者持股和價格利差之間的關(guān)系。作者發(fā)現(xiàn)傳播的信息不對稱成分與機構(gòu)投資者的股本成正比例關(guān)系。</p><p>　　因此,我們預(yù)期以下假設(shè):</p><p>　　H2:市場流動性在法國對機構(gòu)投資者的所有權(quán)有積極影響。</p><p>　　2.3機構(gòu)投資者的類型和市場流動性</p><p>　　機構(gòu)投資者的

60、類型包括養(yǎng)老基金、集合投資機構(gòu)、投資顧問,銀行和保險公司(經(jīng)濟合作與發(fā)展組織,2000年)。機構(gòu)投資者影響經(jīng)理人行為的方式在被動的政策下已得到經(jīng)驗證明 (波特,1992)或主動行為被發(fā)現(xiàn)(布什利和挪亞,2000)。</p><p>　　治理理論框架內(nèi),股權(quán)運動被認為是一種監(jiān)督機制，可能減少代理成本和多數(shù)與少數(shù)股東之間的利益沖突。機構(gòu)投資者的行為(被動或主動)和控制一個公司的治理策略取決于投資組合的規(guī)模, 從短期到