中國企業(yè)在歐洲的國際化戰(zhàn)略【外文翻譯】

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Internationalization strategy of Chinese companies in Europe</p><p>　　Material Source:The netherlands / De

2、lft University </p><p>　　Author:Ying Zhang& Sweger Filippov</p><p><b>　　Abstract:</b></p><p>　　Since end of the 1990s, the world has been witnessing a phenomenon of

3、internationalisation of Chinese companies. This internationalisation is often understood through FDI inflows, whereby multinational companies establish their presence in a form of subsidiaries overseas. However, lately m

4、any companies (and Chinese firms in particular) started to use strategic alliances and M&As as a pair of tools of internationalisation. Despite the growing body of literature on this topic in the context of adv</p

5、><p>　　By using the data from Thomson SDC database, we specifically focus on the Single European market as a new prospective location for Chinese companies and provide a quantitative overview of Chinese firms’a

6、lliances as well as M&As in Europe. To illustrate the optimal pattern of internalisation of Chinese firms in Europe, we additionally use a case study of Chinese automotive manufacturer Chery Automobile Co. Ltd.</p

7、><p>　　Keywords: strategic alliances, emerging economies, China, Europe, internationalisation</p><p>　　1. Introduction</p><p>　　China’s spectacular economic growth and unprecedented su

8、ccess in attracting inward foreign direct investment (FDI) has drawn much attention of both academic scholars and policy-makers alike. As China becomes a hotspot of global market, Chinese domestic companies are increasin

9、gly internationalized by establishing a network of subsidiaries abroad. The internationalisation started by entering less-developed economies, particularly the neighbouring Asian ones. Since recently, Chinese companies s

10、tart</p><p>　　In this strategy of internationalisation, Europe represents a particular case, mainly due to the European integration. Firstly, by entering only one member state, Chinese companies de facto get

11、 access to the entire Single European market. Secondly, EU member states are highly idiosyncratic, particularly, a difference in markets is highly pronounced between the western “Old Europe” and the new EU member states

12、of Central and Eastern Europe. Recently, several studies emerged on the Chinese outward</p><p>　　2. Firm Internationalisation: Strategic Alliances vs. Foreign Direct Investment</p><p>　　2.1. Eme

13、rging multinationals: theoretical insights</p><p>　　Firm internationalisation has traditionally been understood through FDI (either greenfield investment or acquisition of a domestic firm) leading to establi

14、shment of overseas subsidiaries / affiliates1. Academic literature first addressed this issue starting from the late 1950s, looking at the internationalisation of US companies and their penetration to Japanese and Europe

15、an markets, i.e. “North-North” flows. The theory has originated from the seminal works by Penrose (1959), Hymer (1976), Verno</p><p>　　internationalisation patterns. The eclectic paradigm has been widely use

16、d to describe the strategic behavior of MNCs.</p><p>　　It should be noted that these two strands of literature (investments by multinationals from emerging economies and strategic alliances with companies fr

17、om emerging economies) remain rather isolated from each other. In the next section we shall elaborate on the nature and features of strategic alliances and further provide a comparative analysis between FDI / subsidiarie

18、s and strategic alliances.</p><p>　　2.2. Strategic alliances</p><p>　　Definition of strategic alliances evolved for a long time since it emerged in the 1960s. A large number of studies have prov

19、ided examples of strategic alliances in forms of internal ventures, joint ventures, minority investments, co-operative agreements and R&D partnerships as well as franchising. Technically, these forms are classified i

20、nto three categories full-equity ownership, partial ownership and no ownership controls.</p><p>　　Yoshino and Rangan (1995) define three necessary & sufficient conditions of strategic alliances to be as

21、the academic basis of strategic alliances’ definition. (1) Two or more firms or organisations try to realise a set of common goals they agreed on; (2) Partners have control over the alliances and share in the generated a

22、dvantages; (3) Partners continuously contribute to one or more strategic areas of the alliance.</p><p>　　Scholars followed these three conditions and there has been an agreement that strategic alliances are

23、used to denote a variety of inter-firm relationships (Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997); or intensive cooperative arrangements between two legally independent entities, aimed at realising competitive advantage for both partner

24、s (De Man et al, 2001); or temporary cooperative agreements in which two or more firms share reciprocal inputs to realise improved competitive positions for the partners involved</p><p>　　Strategic alliances

25、 are considered as the most flexible mode of collaboration. They can be patterned in terms of collaboration with suppliers, customers, competitors, organisations that offer similar products in different markets, organisa

26、tions that offer different products in similar markets, non-profit organisations, governments,universities, and others. Based on the degree of integration, strategic alliances vary from service agreements and licensing a

27、nd franchising to technology exchange agr</p><p>　　Any firms especially the technology- and knowledge-based ones face a series of difficult decisions, such as whether to develop certain product independently

28、 or to collaborate with partners. Collaboration enables firms to achieve the goal at faster rate and at less cost or risk, compare to what can be achieved alone. It is widely acknowledged in the strategic alliance studie

29、s that firms preferring independent development have to pay for much more cost and higher risk than that in the collaboratin</p><p>　　Firstly, opportunities can be offered by inter-firm strategic alliances t

30、o obtain the complementary competence, skills or technology in the fastest way because fewer companies are able to develop all the necessary skills in-house and expand cycle time to develop complementary capability inter

31、nally. Secondly,strategic alliances provide companies with dramatic flexibility and help them reduce the commitment in their assets. This is rather important in today’s technology-oriented markets where inno</p>&

32、lt;p>　　Thirdly, strategic alliances are accompanied by knowledge exchanges between collaborating partners and it offers companies an important chance to execute organisation learning. Close contacts with other firms c

33、an facilitate the transfer of knowledge especially the tacit knowledge between firms and the creation of new knowledge that individual firms could not have created alone (Mowery et al, 1998). Fourth, since technology dev

34、elopment is characteristic of expensiveness and uncertainty, R&D cost </p><p>　　The significance of strategic alliances is explained by the fact that alliances promote the capability growth not only by l

35、everaging existing skills, but more also by quickly and flexibly accessing the capabilities of others.</p><p>　　3. Analytical Framework of Chinese Companies’ Entry into Europe</p><p>　　Combinati

36、on of two types of Europeanisation (Western Europe and Eastern Europe) and three different types of internationalisation (greenfield investment, acquisition and strategic alliances) yield six potential scenarios of Chine

37、se companies’ access to Europe:</p><p>　　??Scenario A – greenfield investment in Western Europe</p><p>　　??Scenario B – greenfield investment in Eastern Europe</p><p>　　??Scenario C

38、 – acquisition of a domestic company in Western Europe</p><p>　　??Scenario D – acquisition of a domestic company in Eastern Europe</p><p>　　??Scenario E – formation of a strategic alliance with

39、a company in Western Europe</p><p>　　??Scenario F – formation of a strategic alliance with a company in Eastern Europe</p><p>　　4. Overview of Chinese Companies’ Entry into Europe</p><

40、;p>　　Traditionally, western companies have sought partnership with their Chinese counterparts. By establishing such strategic alliances, western companies get an opportunity to tap into the enormous 1.3 billion consum

41、ers market. Since recently, however, a reverse trend is increasingly taking shape. This is labeled as“Chinese outward alliances” – strategic alliances initiated by Chinese firms as a goal to access overseas markets, tech

42、nology, managerial know-how and so on.</p><p>　　For our analysis, we chose Thomson SDC as a source of strategic alliances and M&A, as (1) SDC is the alliance & M&As database that has been most co

43、mmonly used in empirical studies and quite identified in 42 articles published in top strategy journals such as Academy of Management Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly, Management Science, Organization Science, a

44、nd Strategic Management Journal between January of 1990 and June of 2008 (Chilling, 2008); (2) half of the alliances reported in SDC </p><p>　　4.1. Chinese outward alliances</p><p>　　Despite the

45、 absolute numbers provided by Thompson Reuters SDC database should be treated with caution,we may have confidence in relative numbers and in the general trends. As Figure 1 indicates, this phenomenon of Chinese outward a

46、lliances has its roots back in the mid-1980s.Comparing to the total number of strategic alliances formed worldwide annually (around nine thousand), the number of Chinese outward alliances is quite small. Nevertheless the

47、 data clearly indicate that the outward strategic</p><p>　　Regarding global alliance activity with regard to China, inward alliances (by foreign firms to China) account for the main part, however outward all

48、iances from China are attracting much more attention. In the traditional understanding, outward alliances are defined as the alliances initiated by Chinese firms with foreign companies either located in China or overseas

49、. In order to clearly look at the trend of outward alliances that Chinese firms conducted with foreign side and overcome the drawbac</p><p>　　According to our definition, the trend of Chinese outward allianc

50、e since 1985 (Figure 1) is overviewed. The trend is unstable, but since 2003 it follows the up way. This is caused by the increased competition in China’s home market as well as strong government encouragement to Chinese

51、 firms going abroad, and Chinese firms’ desire to learn from abroad. Some drastic changes in the trend are associated with changed in China’s macroeconomic environment. For example, the sharp increase from 1992 with</

52、p><p>　　4.2. Sino-European strategic alliances</p><p>　　The Figure 1 provided a global view on the outward Chinese alliances. A sizeable part of these alliances are taking place in Europe. We use t

53、he database Thompson SDC database to study the pattern of formation of strategic alliances between Chinese companies and European partners. We select four five-year time periods to show the magnitude of the Sino-European

54、 alliances. These time periods are 1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2003 and 2004-2008. The results are presented in Table 3. The first column of</p><p>　　Note: EU 15 is defined as a total number for Austria, Belg

55、ium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK. EU12 is defined as a total number for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia

56、, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania,Slovakia and Slovenia. EU27 is the sum of EU15 and EU12. EFTA (European Free Trade Area) is defined as a total number for Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. This is the present regional

57、gr</p><p>　　The outward Chinese alliances in Europe reflect the general trend: slight increase in the first period, growth in the second period (the mid- / late 1990s), and much smaller number in the third a

58、nd fourth period (up until the year of 2008). Chinese firms form alliances with partners in different locations, dominated by the South- East Asian region due to geographical and cultural proximity. Overall, over the per

59、iod of 1989-2008,developing economies attracted 59% of Chinese outward alliances, whi</p><p>　　4.3. Selected Chinese investment projects and acquisitions in Europe</p><p>　　Chinese investment in

60、 Europe is on the rise, and not only in the advanced European economies, but in the East too. For example, according to CzechInvest – Czech investment promotion agency, it negotiated 213 greenfield investment projects in

61、 2008, out of which 3 belong to Chinese investors, with a total investment of 5.14 million USD, and creation of 239 jobs (incl. 37 – for university graduates)2. While Chinese companies invest in greenfield, they more act

62、ively engage in acquisition of European</p><p>　　Analysis of the Figure 4 shows that the acquisition activity of Chinese firms intensified roughly after the year 2003. This is due to the impact of China’s ac

63、cess to WTO in 2001 (time lag of two years) and the corresponding Chinese government policy to encourage domestic firms going abroad. From the data it can be seen that the majority of Chinese investments was located in W

64、estern Europe (and particularly in UK,Germany, France and Italy). This is not only because these countries are technologic</p><p>　　5. Chery Catching-up model</p><p>　　Chery’s development was ac

65、companied by frustration, setbacks and failures. In the initial stage of company development, Chery had virtually no competitive advantages (no government support, sufficient funding source, technology, or skilled and ed

66、ucated workforce). Chery was established by a small panel of young people and was a latecomer automotive manufacturer in a small town that had never been paid as much attention by government as other industrialoriented c

67、ities such as Beijing, Changchun, </p><p>　　To sum up, Chery’s internationalisation comes from many significant factors as indicated in Figure 3. However, the most important element is its persistence in int

68、ernational strategic cooperation. Chery could therefore obtain the basic technological knowledge and access the foreign market. With collaborating with leading players in the automotive market, Chery successfully increas

69、ed their marketing skills and technological capability. With strategically accessing Eastern European market primaril</p><p>　　Chery Caching up Model</p><p>　　Our analysis above is consistent wi

70、th the business principles stated by Chery’s management6.Chery underlines export and serving the foreign markets as a clear strategic priority. Chery follows five fundamental principles in the international activity.<

71、/p><p>　　· Developing country first, then the developed country</p><p>　　· CKD (Complete Knock Down) exports prior to vehicle exports</p><p>　　· Reasonable arrangement a

72、nd regional radiation</p><p>　　· Cooperation first, then joint venture</p><p>　　· Establish wholly owned subsidiary, control overseas marketing channels</p><p>　　6. Conclu

73、sions</p><p>　　Our main findings suggest that internationalisation of Chinese firms is a gradual process, whereby they integrate technology and marketing/logistics alliances in an optimal way. The advantage

74、of this integrated strategy is to leave sufficient time for companies from emerging economies to learn and absorb skills and technology, or tacit and codified knowledge. Strategic alliances play a vital role in this inte

75、grated strategy. They offer a win-win situation for both partners as well for the govern</p><p>　　The role of governments is importance, since acquisition of assets in Europe by newcomers companies from emer

76、ging economies or even prospects of such acquisition has stirred up controversies for a variety of reasons. Commonly cited concerns include the potential of political leverage by home governments and alleged dubious mana

77、gerial practices.</p><p>　　In fact, the phenomenon of emerging multinationals has raised an old problem of “good” and “bad” FDI, in other words, its developmental and detrimental impacts, yet this time in th

78、e context of developed economies as recipients. It has been assumed that costs of FDI from emerging economies outweigh their benefits for host countries. Nevertheless, investment promotion agencies of many European count

79、ries particularly target these investments. For example, a number of German Länder set up dedicated </p><p>　　However, other governments still show a certain degree of concern and reservation. Strategic

80、 alliance may be better received, as they offer an alternative means of internationalisation for emerging multinationals, and, if managed properly, may lead to a win-win situation because they do not entail the loss of o

81、wnership control yet allow for technology learning and market access (Filippov, 2009).</p><p>　　Although the precise nature of the policy response is yet to be investigated and designed, it is critical that

82、policymakers should resist calls for more protectionism and other policies that restrict free flows of FDI. In these times of global economic crisis, with FDI flows on the global scale set to decrease, investments by eme

83、rging multinationals may prove beneficial for European nations (Filippov, 2009).</p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p>　　中國企業(yè)在歐洲的國際化戰(zhàn)略</p><p>　　資料來源: 荷蘭代爾夫特理工大學(xué) 作者:張穎 謝爾蓋*菲利波

84、夫</p><p><b>　　摘要：</b></p><p>　　二十世紀九十年代末, 世界上已經(jīng)見證了中國企業(yè)的國際化現(xiàn)象。國際化的理解往往是外國直接投資, 即以跨國公司建立的境外子公司的形式存在。然而,近來許多公司(尤其是中國企業(yè))開始利用戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟和企業(yè)并購作為國際化的工具。盡管有關(guān)中國企業(yè)利用先進的西方經(jīng)濟體戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟作為國際化的工具的文獻越來越多，但它仍然是一

85、個正在研究的話題。在論文中，我們探討了戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟和并購，尤其是比較傳統(tǒng)的對外直接投資對中國企業(yè)國際化的潛在利益。結(jié)合Thomson議會數(shù)據(jù)庫的數(shù)據(jù)，我們特別傾向于單一的歐洲市場作為中國企業(yè)未來國際化戰(zhàn)略的主要市場。同時，我們把中國奇瑞汽車有限公司作為案例之一來說明中國企業(yè)在歐洲的最優(yōu)模式。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞：戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟，新興經(jīng)濟體，中國，歐洲，國際化</p><p><b>

86、;　　1.簡介：</b></p><p>　　許多學(xué)者和決策者見證了中國舉世矚目的經(jīng)濟增長和空前的成功外國直接投資(FDI)有巨大的吸引力。隨著經(jīng)濟全球化，中國企業(yè)也日益國際化,不斷在國外建立子公司。開始進入國際化進程欠發(fā)達的地區(qū),尤其是鄰近的亞洲國家。近年來，中國企業(yè)開始以西方國家的高級國際化戰(zhàn)略為目標。在該決策中，歐洲的統(tǒng)一市場使歐洲成為一個特殊的國際化市場。近來，一個新的趨勢正在形成。某些中國公

87、司更愿意進入歐洲，不僅通過外國直接投資，而且通過戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟與歐洲成為戰(zhàn)略合作伙伴。以下以奇瑞汽車有限公司為例。</p><p>　　2.企業(yè)的國際化：戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟與對外直接投資</p><p>　　2.1新興跨國公司的相關(guān)理論</p><p>　　企業(yè)國際化的理解歷來是外國直接投資（無論是新建投資或收購企業(yè)），從而建立海外子公司。從20世紀50年代后期開始，美國研究國際化

88、公司和他們滲透到日本和歐洲市場，即“北北”流。該理論有來自彭羅斯的開創(chuàng)性作品（1959年），海默（1976），弗農(nóng)（1966），洞穴（1971年），巴克利和卡森（1976），Hennart（1982），鄧寧（1977）相結(jié)合，這些在他的許多折衷范式，或公開進修學(xué)院（所有權(quán)-地理位置-國際化）分析跨國公司國際化模式。折衷主義模式已被廣泛用來描述跨國公司的戰(zhàn)略行為。</p><p><b>　　2.2戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)

89、盟</b></p><p>　　Yoshino和Rangan(1995)定義了三個戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟的必需的條件(1)兩個或更多的公司或組織試圖實現(xiàn)他們的共同目標;(2)合作伙伴控制合作并分享產(chǎn)生優(yōu)勢;(3)合作伙伴繼續(xù)促進一個或多個戰(zhàn)略領(lǐng)域的聯(lián)盟。</p><p>　　3 中國企業(yè)進入歐洲</p><p>　　有許多跡象表明，中國企業(yè)在歐洲市場的國際化戰(zhàn)略動機是

90、多方面的。這些動機包括市場準入，技術(shù)，只是，管理技能，品牌，以及收益率。我們綜合考慮其國際化戰(zhàn)略的方式為對外直接投資和戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟。在東歐和西歐市場中，中國的國際化戰(zhàn)略方案有六個：</p><p><b>　　方案A-在西歐投資</b></p><p><b>　　方案B-在東歐投資</b></p><p>　　方案C-在西歐

91、收購企業(yè)</p><p>　　方案D-在東歐收購企業(yè)</p><p>　　方案E-與西歐企業(yè)形成戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟</p><p>　　方案F-與東歐企業(yè)形成戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟</p><p>　　4.中國企業(yè)進入歐洲的概況</p><p>　　傳統(tǒng)上，西方公司尋求與中國同行合作，通過建立這樣的戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟，得到一個進軍龐大的13.0億消費者

92、的市場的機會。然而，近年來，反向趨勢日益形成。這是以“中國對外聯(lián)盟”這個目標為標志的。中國企業(yè)通過戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟向海外發(fā)起訪問市場，技術(shù)，管理訣竅等。在中國，大多數(shù)企業(yè)認為聯(lián)盟協(xié)作的方式相同。在大程度上,他們更有可能與公開宣布聯(lián)盟的企業(yè)的合作。中國的企業(yè)家們,甚至中國學(xué)術(shù)學(xué)者對聯(lián)盟的定義理解不深。根據(jù)調(diào)查，最多5%的中國公司有官方網(wǎng)站面向國際客戶與合作伙伴(歐洲語言),這些5%的絕大部分是已經(jīng)國際化了的公司。這情況反映了一個事實,即中國企業(yè)仍

93、在學(xué)習(xí)如何在全球范圍內(nèi)把他們的戰(zhàn)略通知給他們的股東和廣泛地的觀眾。</p><p>　　4.1中國的對外聯(lián)盟</p><p>　　中國從1985年開始對外聯(lián)盟，該趨勢是不穩(wěn)定的。但自從2003年以來，開始上升。這是由于中國國內(nèi)市場競爭加劇和政府鼓勵中國企業(yè)走出國門，以及中國企業(yè)希望向國外企業(yè)學(xué)習(xí)。這些趨勢改變了中國的宏觀經(jīng)濟環(huán)境。例如，從1992年急劇增加，1994年到達高峰期</p

94、><p>　　這是由于在政府的大力支持。當(dāng)時，國有企業(yè)成為第一個走出國門的企業(yè)。 </p><p>　　1999至2001年對外聯(lián)盟顯著增加，是因為政府主導(dǎo)的“走出去”的政策1999年開始研究。在此期間民營成為第二組走出去的企業(yè)，因為私營和國有企業(yè)認識到，先前的政策“市場換技術(shù)”，應(yīng)予以調(diào)整。中國企業(yè)也需要技術(shù)學(xué)習(xí)。即使在20世紀90年代末的亞洲金融危機，對外聯(lián)盟仍然是主要的中國企業(yè)模式。20

95、01年左右，由于中國的加入WTO，戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟面臨的另一個高峰，。2003年對外聯(lián)盟正是由于非典疫情爆發(fā)。自2004年到現(xiàn)在，對外聯(lián)盟已經(jīng)不斷上升</p><p>　　4.2 中歐戰(zhàn)略聯(lián)盟</p><p>　　中歐聯(lián)盟的總趨勢：第一階段略有增加，在第二階段（中期/世紀90年代末）繼續(xù)增長，在第三和第四階段（直到2008年）數(shù)量減少。中國企業(yè)的對外聯(lián)盟分布在不同的地點，由于地理和文化的接近，東南

96、亞聯(lián)盟占主導(dǎo)地位。總體而言，在1989-2008期間，中國對外聯(lián)盟在發(fā)展中經(jīng)濟體中占59％，在發(fā)達國經(jīng)濟體中占41％。</p><p>　　4.3中國在歐洲的投資和收購</p><p>　　中國在歐洲的投資不斷上升，不僅在發(fā)達的西歐地區(qū)，而且也包括東歐。</p><p>　　在2003年后中國企業(yè)并購活動加劇。這是受中國在2001年（滯后兩年時間里）訪問世界貿(mào)易組織

97、和中國政府鼓勵國內(nèi)企業(yè)走出國門的政策的影響。從數(shù)據(jù)可以可見，中國的投資大部分是位于歐洲西部（尤其是在英國，德國，法國和意大利）。這不僅是因為這些國家技術(shù)領(lǐng)先，也與直接收購國外資產(chǎn)有關(guān)?？偟膩碚f西歐比東歐更具吸引力。</p><p><b>　　5.奇瑞趕超模型</b></p><p>　　在本文中，我們著眼于奇瑞汽車有限公司國際化戰(zhàn)略，該公司是一個年輕的私營公司;目前

98、是中國最大的獨立汽車制造商和世界上增長速度最快的汽車制造商。其國際化戰(zhàn)略的特點是起步較晚，行動快和快速進入國際化市場。該公司在取得先進的技術(shù)和建立企業(yè)文化方面一直非常成功。奇瑞的國際化道路沒有政府的鼓勵和財政支持。因此，它成為年輕的中國企業(yè)快速取得技術(shù)的一個很好的例子。</p><p><b>　　技術(shù)聯(lián)盟</b></p><p><b>　　︱</b

99、></p><p>　　創(chuàng)新價值 ---- 自有品牌與全球化 ----- 市場滲透</p><p><b>　　︳</b></p><p><b>　　品牌意識</b></p><p>　　上圖是奇瑞的趕超模型</p><p>　　奇瑞國際化戰(zhàn)略的基本原則是：<

100、;/p><p>　　· 發(fā)展中國家優(yōu)先，其次是發(fā)達國家</p><p>　　·零部件出口優(yōu)先于整車出口</p><p><b>　　· 先合作，再合資</b></p><p>　　· 建立自己的子公司，控制海外市場</p><p><b>　　6.結(jié)論