風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本退出和合法性研究外文翻譯

1、<p><b>　　中文3800字</b></p><p>　　出處：Journal of Corporate Finance，Volume 12, Issue 2, January 2006, Pages 214-245 </p><p><b>　　文獻(xiàn)：</b></p><p>　　Legality and

2、 venture capital exits</p><p>　　Douglas Cumming，，Grant Fleming and Armin Schwienbacher</p><p><b>　　Abstract</b></p><p>　　This paper introduces an analysis of the impact

3、of Legality on the exiting of venture capital investments. We consider a sample of 468 venture-backed companies from 12 Asia-Pacific countries, and these countries' venture capitalists' investments in US-based en

4、trepreneurial firms. The data indicate IPOs are more likely in countries with a higher Legality index. This core result is robust to controls for country-specific stock market capitalization, MSCI market conditions, vent

5、ure capitalist fund </p><p>　　Keywords: venture capital; exits ; IPO; acquisition; law and finance</p><p>　　1. introduction</p><p>　　The risks and returns to investing in small priv

6、ate companies and companies with intangible assets are pronounced.3 This is especially the case in smaller and less developed finance markets such as those in the Asia-Pacific region. The legal rights and protections aff

7、orded to entrepreneurs and investors are particularly important in venture capital and private equity markets. Legal structures impact the rights and protections of parties and distribution of financial outcomes under va

8、rious states</p><p>　　That law matters in many aspects of finance is widely recognized, with studies showing that legal institutions and rules influence capital structure, dividend payout ratios, repurchasin

9、g decisions, and capital market returns.4 Much of this literature, however, concentrates on publicly traded companies. The impact of legal institutions and structures on private equity investments (such as those undertak

10、en by venture capitalists) has received less attention.</p><p>　　The exit process is of central interest because venture capital investments typically do not pay dividends; rather, returns are derived from c

11、apital gains upon exit. In fact, a venture capitalist’s decision to invest typically depends on exit potential. Where laws impact exit, they also impact the decision to invest and therefore the entire development of a ve

12、nture capital market. Prior work has not considered private equity exits in more than one or two countries simultaneously, and hence has b</p><p>　　2.1. Legality and venture capital exits</p><p>

13、;　　There are five principal venture capital exit vehicles (see, e.g., Black and Gilson, 1998, and Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003a and Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003b, for discussion): (1) initial public offerings (IPOs)—the en

14、trepreneurial firm is listed on a stock exchange for the first time; (2) acquisitions (or ‘trade sales’)—the company is purchased by a larger firm, typically a strategic acquiror, and both the venture capitalist and entr

15、epreneurs sell their interest in the company; (3) secondary sal</p><p>　　2.2. Economic and governance factors affecting venture capital exits</p><p>　　In addition to country legal factors, a var

16、iety of other variables may influence the exit outcome of a VC backed company, including market conditions and market capitalization, VC fund and entrepreneur characteristics, and transaction-specific characteristics. We

17、 briefly discuss each in turn in this subsection.</p><p>　　Two important types of market variables can affect exit outcomes of VC-backed companies. First, it is well known that favorable stock market returns

18、 and bubble periods increase the probability of IPO outcomes, and therefore we control for country-specific MSCI indices, as well as the Internet bubble in our sample. Second, the country-specific stock market capitaliza

19、tion can increase the probability of IPO exits.9 Black and Gilson (1998) argue that the development of the public equity market perm</p><p>　　It is further important to control for VC fund characteristics in

20、 assessing VC exit outcomes.10 Hsu (2004) shows that entrepreneurial firms chose specific VCs in order to signal their quality and lower the information asymmetries between themselves and market participants. In our empi

21、rics, we control for a large number of factors pertaining to VC fund characteristics, including limited partnership VCs versus captive VCs, fund capital, fund manager experience, US-affiliated funds, and sector or s</

22、p><p>　　An entrepreneurial firm's characteristics may likewise affect exit outcomes, as this will be directly pertinent to the degree of information asymmetry faced by the new owners, as well as the success

23、 potential and growth options available to the entrepreneur. In our empirical tests we consider a number of entrepreneurial firm characteristics, such as industry market / book ratios, asset intangibility, and

24、size proxies.</p><p>　　Finally, various governance variables, and VC-entrepreneur deal-specific characteristics may impact VC exit outcomes. Our dataset (described in the next section) enables some controls

25、along this dimension, such as syndication and co-investment. Consistent with Gompers and Lerner (1999), we expect syndication to facilitate IPO exits, but not co-investment. Lerner (1994a) shows syndication facilitates d

26、eal screening and due diligence, as well as value-added to the entrepreneurial firm. Gompers and</p><p>　　We recognize that there are limitations in the level of detail in the empirical analysis given the ex

27、treme difficulties in obtaining reliable private (confidential) venture capital data. For instance, entrepreneur versus VC control over exit may also affect exit choice (Black and Gilson, 1998, Smith, 2005, Kirilenko, 20

28、01, Bascha and Walz, 2001a and Cumming, 2002). Funds in our dataset structured their transactions almost invariably with the use of a VC control in at least some dimension, such a</p><p>　　3. Data descriptio

29、n</p><p>　　This paper analyzes a hand-collected dataset involving 468 venture capital-backed companies from 12 countries in the Asia-Pacific: Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zeal

30、and, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. We also study Asia-Pacific venture capitalists' investments in US-based entrepreneurial firms. A common characteristic across these Asia-Pacific countrie

31、s is that their venture capital markets are not well developed, particularly relative to</p><p>　　4. Multivariate analyses of exit outcomes</p><p>　　we present various logit models of the likeli

32、hood of an IPO exit, versus a private exit (an acquisition, secondary sale or buyback) or a write-off exit. considers multinomial logit estimates for IPOs versus private exits versus write-offs. reports the results of sa

33、mple selection models in the spirit of Heckman, 1976 and Heckman, 1979, which accounts for the non-randomness of exited versus unexited investments.</p><p>　　The sensitivity of the results to alternative spe

34、cifications is rigorously considered, and a total of 10 different regression models are explicitly presented to show robustness. The regression tables report the marginal effects (only) to highlight economic significance

35、 alongside statistical significance (standard logit coefficients are nevertheless available upon request). Robustness checks not explicitly presented are discussed herein, </p><p>　　5. Concluding remarks<

36、/p><p>　　This paper provides the first cross-county empirical analysis of the relation between Legality and VC exits outcomes: IPOs, private exits (acquisitions, secondary sales, buybacks) and write-offs. With

37、a sample of 468 VC investments in Asia-Pacific countries, we show an increase in the Legality index from 20 to 21 (e.g., approximately the difference between Hong Kong and Australia) increases the probability of an IPO b

38、y about 1.7%, whereas an increase in Legality from 10 to 11 (e.g., approximatel</p><p>　　In demonstrating this central role of Legality in VC exits, we controlled for many factors, including market condition

39、s, country-specific factors such as moving to the US, VC fund characteristics, as well as entrepreneurial firm and deal-specific characteristics. Our findings on a number of these controls are consistent with prior work.

40、 For example, our data are consistent with the role of the ability of the VC (consistent with Hsu, 2004) and the size and industry market / book value of the entr</p><p>　　It is particularly notewo

41、rthy that none of our summary statistics and/or multivariate models indicated an increase in the probability of an IPO that was directly associated with the size of a country's stock market (although the size of a co

42、untry's stock market is strongly and positively associated with Legality). This complementary finding in our paper is quite significant, because the conventional wisdom. has been that stock markets by themselves faci

43、litate venture capital markets (Black and G</p><p>　　Douglas Cumming School of Banking and Finance, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia</p><p>　　Grant FlemingSchool of Fin

44、ance and Applied Statistics, Faculty of Economics and Commerce, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia</p><p>　　Armin Schwienbacher University of Amsterdam, Finance Group, Roetersstraat 11, 1018

45、 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands</p><p><b>　　文獻(xiàn)翻譯：</b></p><p>　　風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本退出和合法性研究</p><p>　　摘要：本文介紹了法律效應(yīng)對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本投資退出的影響。截取了468個(gè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資支持的12個(gè)亞太國(guó)家的公司為樣本，包括這些國(guó)家的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家在美國(guó)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)企業(yè)的投資。資料顯示首次公開發(fā)

46、行更有可能具有較高的合法性。這個(gè)核心的結(jié)果反映了特定國(guó)家的包括股票市值的一些情況，比如摩根士丹利資本國(guó)際市場(chǎng)情況，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資基金的基金經(jīng)理人的技能和特點(diǎn)，與企業(yè)和交易特征的引導(dǎo)控制等。Black and Gilson（1998）推測(cè)活躍的股票的市場(chǎng)和活躍的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本市場(chǎng)之間的聯(lián)系， 除此之外，一個(gè)國(guó)家的法律體系的質(zhì)量更直接連接，以便利風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資支持的上市退出。這些數(shù)據(jù)表明合法性是一個(gè)核心機(jī)制，減少外部股東和企業(yè)家之間的代理問(wèn)題，從而促進(jìn)了IP

47、O市場(chǎng)和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本市場(chǎng)的共同發(fā)展。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵字：風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資、退出、首次公開發(fā)行、收購(gòu)、法律和金融</p><p><b>　　1.介紹</b></p><p>　　用無(wú)形資產(chǎn)投資小型私人企業(yè)所承受的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和所得到的收益是顯而易見的。這在金融市場(chǎng)不發(fā)達(dá)的地區(qū)，例如亞太地區(qū)非常典型。給予企業(yè)家和投資者的保護(hù)措施，特別是對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本和私人股權(quán)

48、市場(chǎng)非常重要。在不同的國(guó)家，法律結(jié)構(gòu)影響當(dāng)事人權(quán)利和對(duì)當(dāng)事人的保護(hù)，以及影響財(cái)務(wù)成果的分配。</p><p>　　在金融的許多方面，法律事務(wù)是非常重要的，有研究表明：合法的機(jī)構(gòu)和規(guī)制制度影響資本的結(jié)構(gòu)，股利的支付率，回購(gòu)的決策還有資本市場(chǎng)的收益率。然而，這些法律事務(wù)，主要集中于一些公開上市的公司，對(duì)包括創(chuàng)業(yè)投資在內(nèi)的私人權(quán)益投資重視不夠。</p><p>　　風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資是典型的不支付股利，因

49、此，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的退出是其核心。然而，從投資中獲得收益關(guān)鍵在于退出。事實(shí)上，一個(gè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家的投資決定取決于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資退出的潛力。法律影響著退出，他們也影響著投資的決定，進(jìn)而也影響到整個(gè)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資市場(chǎng)。在同時(shí)，多于一兩個(gè)國(guó)家還沒(méi)有優(yōu)先考慮到私人權(quán)益的退出，因此，很不能全面的解決合法性在多大程度上影響私人股權(quán)市場(chǎng)。</p><p><b>　　2.體制結(jié)構(gòu)和假說(shuō)</b></p><

50、p>　　2.1風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本退出和合法性</p><p>　　文獻(xiàn)資料來(lái)源于澳大利亞，中國(guó)，香港，印度，印度尼西亞，馬來(lái)西亞，新西蘭，菲律賓，新加坡，韓國(guó)，臺(tái)灣和泰國(guó)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資所支持的企業(yè)。資料還包括來(lái)自亞太企業(yè)在美國(guó)的創(chuàng)業(yè)資本投資的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本公司退出的情況。</p><p>　　有五個(gè)主要風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本退出方式（1）首次公開發(fā)行（上市），創(chuàng)業(yè)公司是在股票交易市場(chǎng)首次上市;（2）收購(gòu)（或稱出售）通常

51、是由大公司收購(gòu)，通常是一個(gè)戰(zhàn)略收購(gòu)方，無(wú)論是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家和企業(yè)家出售其在公司的權(quán)益;（3）二次出售，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資基金出售其權(quán)益，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家將所持股份轉(zhuǎn)手給另一家風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資公司，將風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本退出。但創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)不會(huì)向其他公司或風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本基金出售自己的利益;（4）回購(gòu)，創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)家從風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資機(jī)構(gòu)贖回他們的利益，有時(shí)也是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資項(xiàng)目公司來(lái)購(gòu)買。（5）清算-投資者幾乎沒(méi)有或根本沒(méi)有回報(bào)的投資。</p><p>　　2.2經(jīng)濟(jì)和治理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本

52、退出的影響因素</p><p>　　除國(guó)家法律因素，其他因素可能會(huì)影響到一個(gè)VC支持的公司退出的結(jié)果，包括市場(chǎng)條件和市場(chǎng)資本化，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資基金和創(chuàng)業(yè)者的特點(diǎn)，交易的具體特點(diǎn)等。我們簡(jiǎn)要地討論每個(gè)環(huán)節(jié)。</p><p>　　兩種重要的變量會(huì)影響風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資支持的公司退市的結(jié)果。首先，這是眾所周知，良好的股市回報(bào)和泡沫增加了首次公開招股結(jié)果的概率，因此，我們加強(qiáng)了對(duì)具體國(guó)家的MSC指數(shù)的調(diào)查，以及加

53、強(qiáng)了對(duì)我們的樣本在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫下的控制。第二，針對(duì)具體國(guó)家的股市市值可以增加上市退出的概率。Black 和Gilson (1998) 稱公共股權(quán)市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展允許風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資通過(guò)IPO退出，這對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)資本市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展是至關(guān)重要。因此，可以合理地假定，公共股權(quán)市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展是與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資退出過(guò)程的選擇緊密聯(lián)系在一起的。同時(shí)，LaPortaetal（1997）和 LaPortaetal（1998）說(shuō)到為了能更好的保護(hù)股東權(quán)利，這些國(guó)家就有相應(yīng)的法律文件，因此這

54、些國(guó)家往往有更好的發(fā)展和更大的股票市場(chǎng)。退出選擇和法律制度的發(fā)展可能會(huì)更好地聯(lián)系在一起，這不是因?yàn)楦玫谋Ｗo(hù)股東權(quán)益的法律，而是由于企業(yè)家與外部股東之間低廉的代理成本，企業(yè)家與外部股東促進(jìn)了IPO的退出方式，均與股市發(fā)展密切相關(guān)。因此，重要的是對(duì)一個(gè)國(guó)家的股票市場(chǎng)規(guī)模的掌握，以了解與VC的退出選擇和法律制度的關(guān)系。</p><p>　　進(jìn)一步把握風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)退出中表現(xiàn)的特性是非常重要的。Hsu (2004)表明

55、，創(chuàng)業(yè)型企業(yè)選擇風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資，以便具體到信號(hào)的質(zhì)量，降低自己和市場(chǎng)參與者之間的信息不對(duì)稱。根據(jù)我們的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，我們掌握了有關(guān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資基金的特點(diǎn)，包括有限合伙制風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資與公司制風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資，基金投資，基金經(jīng)理的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，美屬資金，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資部門或基金的專業(yè)化階段的大量因素。我們期待更多的基金將發(fā)展的更加積極與成熟，增加IPO的退出方式。</p><p>　　創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)的特點(diǎn)同樣可能影響到退出的結(jié)果，因?yàn)檫@將直接影響到新權(quán)益者所面對(duì)的信

56、息不對(duì)稱的情況。對(duì)企業(yè)家而言，適用于他們的能夠成功的退出方式，有時(shí)候他們自己是不清楚的。通過(guò)我們的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，我們考慮了創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)的特征，如行業(yè)市場(chǎng)/賬面價(jià)值比率，無(wú)形資產(chǎn)和代理的規(guī)模，數(shù)量。</p><p>　　最后，各項(xiàng)治理變數(shù)，和VC企業(yè)家并購(gòu)交易的具體特點(diǎn)可能會(huì)影響風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資退出的結(jié)果。我們的資料，如銀團(tuán)和聯(lián)合投資可在這一方面做出控制。與Gompers 和 Lerner (1999)相比，我們期望IPO退出中，銀團(tuán)

57、的參與將更加便利。而不是聯(lián)合投資。Lerner (1994)顯示銀團(tuán)有利于檢查處理和盡職調(diào)查，以及創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的增值。Gompers 和Lerner (1996)解釋與合資相關(guān)的代理問(wèn)題，同一風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資公司的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資基金可能錯(cuò)誤的進(jìn)行他們的附加值活動(dòng)。除其他外，提供給創(chuàng)業(yè)投資公司的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資基金的投資組合，對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者不利。合作投資，因此很可能與降低退出機(jī)制中的IPO與清算的可能性。</p><p>　　我們認(rèn)識(shí)到，在一

58、定的水平條件下，獲得可靠風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本數(shù)據(jù)，以進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析是相當(dāng)困難的。例如，Black 和 Gilson（1998）, Smith（2005）, Kirilenko（2001）, Bascha 和 Walz（2001） and Cumming（2002)說(shuō)到企業(yè)家對(duì)風(fēng)投的控制水平也影響到對(duì)退出機(jī)制的選擇。在我們數(shù)據(jù)樣本中的基金的交易都不可避免的，或者是一定程度上與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的控制有關(guān)。例如從投資者的董事會(huì)席位來(lái)看，一定程度上，從基金樣本中獲得

59、數(shù)據(jù)，對(duì)典型的投資者而言，在證劵選擇與投資者董事會(huì)席位來(lái)看，很少有異質(zhì)性。因此，在這樣的樣本中，這個(gè)因素就不會(huì)影響到退出機(jī)制。我們?cè)紤]通過(guò)基金資金使用虛擬變量的影響，在某些情況下無(wú)法觀察基金表現(xiàn)的差異，但沒(méi)有發(fā)現(xiàn)不同的資金存在著差異。</p><p>　　3．統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)和總結(jié)

60、 </p><p>　　本文截取了468個(gè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資支持的12個(gè)亞太國(guó)家的公司為樣本，包括這些國(guó)家的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家在美國(guó)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)企業(yè)的投資。這些國(guó)家包括澳大利亞，中國(guó)，香港，印度，印度尼西亞，馬來(lái)西亞，新西蘭，菲律賓，新加坡，韓國(guó)，臺(tái)灣和泰國(guó)。一個(gè)在這些亞太國(guó)家的共同特點(diǎn)是，他們的創(chuàng)業(yè)資本市場(chǎng)不十分發(fā)達(dá)，尤其是相對(duì)于美國(guó)。這些數(shù)據(jù)的獲取有些是比較容易的，征求收集機(jī)密信息機(jī)構(gòu)，查詢亞太風(fēng)

61、險(xiǎn)投資發(fā)出備忘錄，詢問(wèn)資金的國(guó)際基金經(jīng)理而來(lái)的。該數(shù)據(jù)集包括53個(gè)亞太風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資基金，但尚未被視為適合投資的，甚至是盡職審查判斷的。數(shù)據(jù)也有通過(guò)威爾希爾的產(chǎn)業(yè)連接而來(lái)。從這個(gè)意義上講，我們這些數(shù)據(jù)作為對(duì)亞太地區(qū)經(jīng)營(yíng)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資公司的代表是合理的，雖然我們沒(méi)有選擇的區(qū)域偏見。威爾希爾的工業(yè)連接使我們與之前記錄的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資退出與回報(bào)相比，能夠獲得更多的私人信息。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資公司向潛在投資者提供高質(zhì)量的數(shù)據(jù)，并報(bào)告，還有有效地退出方式。</p&g

62、t;<p>　　4. 多元方法分析退出</p><p>　　我們呈現(xiàn)了與IPO退出方式有關(guān)的各種模型，通過(guò)股權(quán)交易（收購(gòu)，二次出售或者是回購(gòu)）或是清算，來(lái)自于Heckman（1976） 和Heckman（1979）的文獻(xiàn)的啟發(fā), 我們認(rèn)為大量的模型來(lái)估計(jì)IPO或清算的退出方式。這些也考慮到了風(fēng)投中并不存在的不是偶然的一些因素。</p><p>　　結(jié)果對(duì)一些特殊選擇的敏感性也

63、考慮到了，總共有10種模型來(lái)解釋分析的粗糙型。但粗糙性沒(méi)有準(zhǔn)確的說(shuō)出來(lái)。文中表呈現(xiàn)了回歸分析不僅具有經(jīng)濟(jì)意義，而且具有統(tǒng)計(jì)意義。</p><p>　　分析了投資與退出的同比數(shù)據(jù)，上市方式主要有公開上市，股權(quán)交易，清算。還有一些方式?jīng)]有涉及。全部退出，部分退出都已經(jīng)在文中通過(guò)樣本進(jìn)行討論。在我們的樣本中最具有代表性的的國(guó)家是澳大利亞，臺(tái)灣和亞太風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資所支持的美國(guó)的創(chuàng)業(yè)公司。</p><p>

64、;<b>　　5.總結(jié)</b></p><p>　　文章也說(shuō)明了合法性指數(shù)，股票市值國(guó)家平均值，平均退出的數(shù)量和中位數(shù)的內(nèi)部回報(bào)率，以及在我們每一類型退出的數(shù)量。股權(quán)交易包括收購(gòu)，銷售和回購(gòu)和二次出售。</p><p>　　本文提供了第一個(gè)跨境的合法性和VC退出之間關(guān)系的實(shí)證分析結(jié)果：首次公開發(fā)行。股權(quán)交易（收購(gòu)，二次銷售，回購(gòu)）和注銷。參考468個(gè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資在亞太國(guó)家

65、的樣本，表現(xiàn)出的合法性指數(shù)從20到21（例如，大約是香港和澳大利亞之間的差額），增加了首次公開發(fā)行約1.7％的概率，在增加的合法性從10到11（例如，大約菲律賓和印尼之間的差額）增加了3.3％的首次公開發(fā)行的可能性。</p><p>　　在證明這種合法性在VC退出的核心作用，我們控制的因素很多，包括市場(chǎng)條件下，針對(duì)具體國(guó)家的因素，如把它放到美國(guó)，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資基金的特點(diǎn)，以及企業(yè)家的企業(yè)和交易的具體特點(diǎn)。我們的研究結(jié)果

66、與以前的工作是一致的。例如，我們的數(shù)據(jù)均與以前VC，如 Hsu（2004）所提出的規(guī)模和行業(yè)的市場(chǎng)/公司的創(chuàng)業(yè)能力的賬面價(jià)值與作用是一致的。值得特別注意的是，我們的匯總統(tǒng)計(jì)和或多元模式都表示有在首次公開招股的概率與一個(gè)國(guó)家的股市規(guī)模息息相關(guān)。這種互補(bǔ)性的發(fā)現(xiàn)具有重要的意義，從傳統(tǒng)意義上來(lái)講，一直認(rèn)為是股市促進(jìn)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本市場(chǎng)。這一論點(diǎn)，但是，以前未曾實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)過(guò)。我們的數(shù)據(jù)表明，其中IPO與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本緊密相連，在一個(gè)良好的法律環(huán)境中。在一定程度