我國國有商業(yè)銀行的道德風(fēng)險問題研究.pdf

1、重慶大學(xué)碩士學(xué)位論文我國國有商業(yè)銀行的道德風(fēng)險問題研究姓名：蔡京民申請學(xué)位級別：碩士專業(yè)：技術(shù)經(jīng)濟及管理指導(dǎo)教師：蒲勇健20040409重慶大學(xué)碩士學(xué)位論文英文摘要ABSTRACTTheState—ownedcommercialbanks(SOBs)arethemainbodyofourbankingandtheyrepresentthetrendandfutureofChina’SeconomyBecauseofthis，thefou

2、rSOBs’reformisbeingconcernedbyallsidesofChinaThisthesiscaresaboutthereformfromallangleofviewonmoralhazardasalittleofcontributionfor0111“banking“Moralhazard”meanstheriskthatonepartytoacontractCanchangetheirbehaviortothede

3、trimentoftheotherpartyOrlCethecontracthasbeenconcludedInthisthesis，themoralhazardproblemsconcludenotonlytheSOBs’moralhazardastheagentbutalsothemoralhazardthatothersbringtoSOBsSinceitisnottoolongtimestudyingonmoralhazardi

4、nbankinginChina，thisthesiStalksaboutfromthederivaftonofmotalhazardandsummarizestheliteraturesandpracticesonbanksofabroadandChinaThesearesetinchaptertwoInchapterthee，wedescribethemoralhazardsystematicallyexistinginthefour

5、SOBsandthesesmoralhazardproblemsconcludegovernments，borrowers，regulationinstitutionandcommercialbanksselfandetcInchapterfour，wedemonstratethereasonsofmoralhazardmainlyingametheoryandprincipal—agenttheoryTherearesuchreaso

6、ns：thesupervisionOnthefourSOBsofthewholepeopleastheprincipalisseriouslynotenough；theprincipalagentchainistoolongSOthattheinformationareseriouslyasymmetrically；government’simplicitguaranteeand‘“toobigtofail“’causestheSOBs

7、haveanincentivetotakeonexcessiverisk；borrowers’adverseselectionexanteandbreachoffaithexpost；innercontrolandOuterregulationistoosickThelastsection，weputforwardsomeadviceTheSOBsshallcarryoutpropertyrightsystem’Sreformandch

8、angetheirorganizationframe，provideincentivesandimposingdisciplines，setupdepositinsurancesystem，enhancecreditconstructionandstrengthentheinnercontrolandouterregulationKeywords：moralhazard，stateownedcommercialbank，principa