制造商與再制造商的競合博弈模型研究.pdf

1、I分類號：F274密級：公開UDC：658學校代碼：11065碩士學位論文制造商與再制造商的競合博弈模型研究制造商與再制造商的競合博弈模型研究葉俊指導教師孫浩副教授學科專業(yè)名稱管理科學與工程論文答辯日期2017年6月3日IIAbstractInclosedloopsupplychain(CLSC)withcollectionremanufacturingofoldproductshowtodealwiththecompetitiveth

2、reatfromtheexternalremanufacturerisanimptantissueftheiginalequipmentmanufacturer(OEM).FatwoperiodCLSCsystemcomprisedofanOEManindependentremanufacturertwocasesthatwhethertheOEMopenstheremanufacturingfieldsnotareconsidered

3、analyzed:(1)WhentheOEMonlyproducesnewproductsthegamestrategiesbetweentheOEMtheremanufacturerundertwotypesofcompetitivemode(competitionwithremanufacturingpatentauthizationcompetitionwithoutremanufacturingauthizationlicens

4、ing)cooperativemodearediscussed.Backwarddeductionmethodisusedtoderivecomparetheoptimalpricestheoptimalcollectionrateundertheabovethreemodes.Theconditionunderwhichtheremanufacturerengagesincollectionremanufacturingisgiven

5、.Theimpactofconsumerpreferenceftheremanufacturedproductsontheequilibriumsolutionstheprofitsofchannelmembersareanalyzedcombinedwithnumericalexamples.Themanagerialinsightsareprovidedfromtheviewofenvironmentalperfmancesmemb

6、ers’profitschannelefficiencyrespectively.(2)WhentheOEMengagesinnewproductsproductionEOL(endoflife)productsremanufacturingsimultaneouslyitisassumedthattheconsumers’willingtopayfthenewproductstheOEM’sremanufacturedproducts

7、theremanuafcturer’sremanufacturedproductsaredifferentiated.Sopricecompetitionbetweenthethreeproductsexistsinthemarket.ThegamemodelsbetweentheOEMtheremanufacturerarebuilttheinversedemfunctionsareutilizedtoobtaintheequilib

8、riumproductionquantitiespricingpolicies.ThecomparisonbetweenthismodelthebenchmarkmodelwithouttheOEM’sremanufacturingaregiven.TheresearchshowsthatwhethertheoutputofremanufacturedproductsisconstrainedbythecollectedEOLprodu

9、ctshassignificantinfluencesonprofitallocations.TheconclusionscanprovidetheeticalsupptsftheOEMStocopewiththecompetitionfromtheexternalremanufacturer.Keywds:iginalequipmentmanufacturerremanufacturercompetitioncooperationpr