代理成本和股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)[外文翻譯]

1、外文翻譯AgencyCostsOwnershipStructureMaterialSource:THEJOURNALOFFINANCE?VOL.LVNO.1?FEBRUARY2000page8387Auth:JAMESS.ANGREBELA.COLEJAMESWUHLINI.AgencyCostsamongSmallBusinessesWhencomparedtopubliclytradedfirmssmallbusinessescom

2、eclosesttothetypeoffirmsdepictedinthestylizedtheeticalmodelofagencycostsdevelopedbyJensenMeckling(1976).Atoneextremeofownershipmanagementstructuresarefirmswhosemanagersown100percentofthefirm.Thesefirmsbytheirdefinitionha

3、venoagencycosts.Attheotherextremearefirmswhosemanagersarepaidemployeeswithnoequityinthefirm.Inbetweenarefirmswherethemanagersownsomebutnotalloftheirfirm’sequity.Agencycostsarisewhentheinterestsofthefirm’smanagersarenotal

4、ignedwiththoseofthefirm’sowner(s)takethefmofpreferencefonthejobperksshirkingmakingselfinterestedentrencheddecisionsthatreduceshareholderwealth.Themagnitudeofthesecostsislimitedbyhowwelltheownersdelegatedthirdpartiessucha

5、sbanksmonittheactionsoftheoutsidemanagers.Toillustrateconsiderthosefirmswhereasingleownercontrols100percentofthestockbuthiresanoutsidertomanagethebusiness.Ontheonehagencycostsmaybesmallbecausethesoleownercaninternalizeal

6、lmonitingcostshastherighttohirefirethemanager.Mespecificallysuchanownerincurs100percentofthemonitingcostsreceives100percentoftheresultingbenefits.Ontheotherhthesoleownermaynotbeabletomonitperfectlyfthesamereasonsthathesh

7、ehiredanoutsidemanagersuchaslackoftimeability.Ownersofsmallfirmstypicallylackfinancialsophisticationmaynotbecapableofperfmingromauditsfullyunderstingtheoperatingfinancialresults.Consequentlythesefirmsincurresidualagencyc

8、osts.Ifthesecostsaresignificanttheymustreflectafailureoftheowner’smonitingactivities.Potentialexplanationsfthisfailurearelaxmonitingbytheownersthelackofanadequatemonitingtechnologyavailableftheowners.InthiscasetheII.Data

9、Ourempiricalapproachutilizestwofundamentalassumptionsaboutagencycosts:(1)Afirmmanagedbya100percentownerincurszeroagencycosts(2)agencycostscanbemeasuredasthedifferenceintheefficiencyofanimperfectlyalignedfirmtheefficiency

10、ofaperfectlyalignedfirm.Tooperationalizethisapproachfmeasuringagencycostsweneedcertaindatainputs:(i)dataonfirmefficiencymeasures(ii)dataonfirmownershipstructureincludingasetoffirmsthatare100percentownedbymanagers(iii)dat

11、aoncontrolvariablesincludingfirmsizeacteristicsmonitingtechnology.Ofthesedatarequirementsthemostdemingintermsofavailabilityisitem(ii)becausesoleownershipfirmstypicallyarenotpubliclylistedbecausefinancialinfmationonU.S.pr

12、ivatefirmsusuallyisnotavailabletothepublic.TheFederalReserveBoard’sNationalSurveyofSmallBusinessFinances(NSSBF)ftunatelydoesprovidefinancialinfmationaboutprivatelyheldfirmsincludingtheirownershipstructuredoesincludeaseto

13、ffirmsentirelyownedbymanagers.ConsequentlyweusedatafromtheNSSBFtomeasureagencycosts.TheNSSBFisasurveyconductedbytheFederalReserveBoardtogatherinfmationaboutsmallbusinesseswhichhavelargelybeenignedintheacademicliteratureb

14、ecauseofthelimitedavailabilityofdata.Thesurveycollecteddetailedinfmationfromasampleof4637firmsthatisbroadlyrepresentativeofapproximately5millionsmallnonfarmnonfinancialbusinessesoperatingintheUnitedStatesasofyearend1992.

15、ColeWolken(1995)providedetailedinfmationaboutthedataavailablefromNSSBF.FthisstudywelimitouranalysistosmallCcpationscollectinginfmationonthegovernancestructuremanagementalignmentextentofshareholderexternalmonitingsizefina

16、ncialinfmation.Wefocusoncpationstominimizeproblemsassociatedwiththefinancialstatementsofproprietshipswhichtypicallycomminglepersonalbusinessfunds.WeeliminatepartnershipsScpationsbecauseunlikeCcpationstheyarenotsubjecttoc

17、patetaxationthismayleadownermanagerstotakecompensationinthefmofpartnerdistributionsdividendsratherthansalaryexpensebecausethereisnodoubletaxationofsuchearningsatthefirmlevel.ByfocusingsolelyonCcpationsweavoidthecomplicat