政府干預(yù)下上市公司高管持股與績效關(guān)系的實證研究.pdf

1、華中科技大學(xué)碩士學(xué)位論文政府干預(yù)下上市公司高管持股與績效關(guān)系的實證研究姓名：管峰申請學(xué)位級別：碩士專業(yè)：企業(yè)管理指導(dǎo)教師：龔樸20090521華 中 科 技 大 學(xué) 碩 士 學(xué) 位 論 文IIAbstract Abstract Abstract AbstractWith the capital market promoting,more and more listed companies's managersholding co

2、mpanies's shares,meanwhile,researchers pay more attention to the researchabout the relationship of managerial ownership and performance of companies.Managerialownership can solve the agency problem,reduce agency cost

3、s and increase coroporatevalue.This thesis summarize the previous analysis.Under the case of governmentintervention,combining the characters of our capital marketet, study the relationshipbetween managerial ownership and

4、 corporate performance,meanwhile,analysis the effectbetween the managerial ownership of state corporate and non-state corporate andcorporate performance.This paper selected 310 listed companies issued before 2003.12.31,o

5、n the Shanghai Stock Exchange and issued A-shares only as research samples.The panelsamples is 2005-2007,picking up the information of the total asstes, managementshareholdings, the corporate leverage, the company size,

6、the rate of top one shareholder,and other relevant information,chosing return on assets (ROA)and Tobin's Q value, as ameasure of corporate performance, chosing the corporate leverage, the company size, therate of top

7、 one shareholder, of listed companies and etc as control variables,buildingmultiple nonlinear model, using quadratic equation iterative method test the relationshipbetween managerial ownership (MS) and corporate performa

8、nce (ROA,Tobin's Q).Empirical studies show that the relationship between the managerial ownership andthe corporate performance is curve relationship.The rate of managerial ownership in statecorporate is lower,and the