2006年--外文翻譯--激勵對 ceo 報酬與公司業(yè)績的影響（節(jié)選）

1、<p>　　中文3740字，2336單詞，13000英文字符</p><p>　　出處：Nourayi M M, Krishnan S. The impact of incentives on CEO compensation and firm performance[J]. Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali, 2006

2、, 53(3): 402-420.</p><p>　　畢 業(yè) 設 計（論 文）外 文 參 考</p><p><b>　　資 料 及 譯 文</b></p><p>　　譯文題目：激勵對CEO報酬與公司業(yè)績的影響 </p><p>　　學生姓名：學號： </p><p>　　專業(yè)：

3、M會計學 </p><p>　　所在學院：商學院 </p><p><b>　　指導教師： </b></p><p><b>　　職稱： </b></p><p>　　2011 年12 月09 日</p><p>　　RISEC, Volume 53 (200

4、6), No. 3, 402-420</p><p>　　THE IMPACT OF INCENTIVES ON CEOCOMPENSATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE</p><p>　　By MAHMOUD M. NOURAYI and SUDHA KRISHNAN</p><p>　　Abstract: A significant compo

5、nent of a management control system is the incentive mechanism and motivational underpinning of compensation contracts. Most executives are rewarded in the form of cash and company stock. Our data indicate that over 82.5

6、 percent of the observations include a bonus pay to CEOs and an even larger percentage, about 94.5 percent, have stock option grants.</p><p>　　Our analyses indicate that the means of market-based returns are

7、 significantly larger for companies with no stock option incentives. However, the accounting-based returns do not appear to be significantly influenced by stock-based rewards. (JEL: J30, G30, L21)</p><p>　　K

8、eywords: CEO compensation; agency contract; incentives; performance; accounting-based incentives; market-based incentives</p><p>　　Introduction</p><p>　　A significant component of a management

9、 control system is the incentive mechanism and motivational underpinning of compensation contracts. A well-designed incentive system can deal effectively with both adverse selection and moral hazard issues in an agency

10、contract. The degree to which compensation contracts vary in relation to the measure of performance, determines the level of self-confidence and risk-taking attributes of the applicants. The main objective of this study

11、is to identify the in</p><p>　　The relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance has been extensively studied by researchers from various perspectives. Research has confirmed the po

12、sitive relation between firm size and executive compensation as well</p><p>　　as the influence of firm performance on executive pay (Abowd, 1990; Conyon, Peck, and Sadler, 2000; Carpenter and Sanders, 2002;

13、Cordeiro and Veliyath, 2003; Indjejikian and Nanda, 2002; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Murphy, 1985; and Yermack, 1995). For the most part, interest has converged on the implications of agency theory with a concentration on

14、the linkages between executive compensation and firm performance.</p><p>　　Murphy (2000) indicates that a majority of companies use multiple measures of performance in rewarding their executives. The most po

15、pular forms of reward seem to be cash and company stock. Majority of public companies offer stock options or restricted stock in order to assure the congruity of the manager’s welfare and the owner wealth-maximization ob

16、jectives. Cash compensation to executives has two predominant components, fixed salary and bonus. Bonuses are generally linked to some performance m</p><p>　　Stock grants and stock option grants are intended

17、 to reward the executives for choices that influence positive changes in the stock prices and as such may be considered a future-oriented reward system, as opposed to bonuses that are typically based on some accounting m

18、easure of profitability. However, it has been argued that accounting-based measures are ex-post historical measures of performance, and are thus conceptually less relevant from the shareholder’s perspective. Conversely,

19、market retu</p><p>　　Prior research, for the most part, has been limited to the examination of the cash compensation. In this study we analyze the impact of the compensation structure and performance on both

20、 cash and total compensations. Earlier studies have looked at the relationships between size, performance and executive pay, where the compensation has been defined as only cash compensation. Unlike past studies, by anal

21、yzing both cash and total compensations, we note that the cash compensation is influenced by</p><p>　　both the market and accounting measures of performance while the total compensation is significantly affe

22、cted by the market based measures of performance. Further analysis after partitioning the data on the basis of the existence of bonus and stock option plans indicates that the firm size, as measured by sales, is not as s

23、ignificant if the company has no bonus or stock option plans. Our analysis reveals larger market-based returns for firms that do not offer stock option incentives.</p><p>　　The remainder of this paper is org

24、anized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the literature relevant to executive incentive compensation and firm performance. This is followed by Section 3 where we present the research design and hypotheses. Section 4

25、is the results of our analyses. We present our conclusions in Section5.</p><p>　　Review of Literature</p><p>　　Many executive compensation studies have analyzed the pay-performance relationship

26、utilizing a model generally specified as follows:</p><p>　　PAY it = α + β (SIZE it) + γ (PERFORMANCEit ) + εit</p><p>　　Where Pay it is the CEO compensation of firm i, year t; SIZE it is the si

27、ze of firm i, year t; PERFORMANCE it is an observable performance measure of firm i, year t; and εit is the error term.</p><p>　　Several empirical studies support the sensitivity of executive pay to performa

28、nce (e.g., Murphy, 1985, 1986; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Ely, 1991; Boschen and Smith, 1995). More specifically, studies have looked at the relationship between the cash compensation and performance measures of the firm s

29、uch as the return on equity, and aggregate earnings, as well as the impact of non-recurring earnings components such as discontinued operations and restructuring charges. Empirical results have shown th</p><p&

30、gt;　　For the most part, research on executive compensation has utilized the sum of salary and bonus as the proxy for the total compensation (Abowd, 1990; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Lambert and Larker, 1987; Mishra, Gobeli,

31、and May, 2000; Murphy, 1985; Sloan, 1993). Many studies have used cash compensation as the dependent variable in their efforts to explain the relationship between a firm’s performance and executive pay. Others have sugge

32、sted the importance of a stock-base in executive</p><p>　　compensation research (Core, Guay, and Verrecchia, 2003; Griner, 1999). The change over time in the composition of compensation contracts and the en

33、ormous increase in non-cash compensation, together with changes in reporting requirements (regarding stock option grants issued to executives), have resulted in increased attention to the relevance of stock-based compens

34、ation in pay-performance studies. The use of cash compensation in earlier studies, as the only dependent variable in compensation m</p><p>　　In the most basic form, our regression model incorporates either a

35、 market-based or an accounting-based measure of performance. We use the market rate of return and the accounting rate of return to proxy the CEO performance. In the next section we present our methodology and research hy

36、potheses.</p><p>　　Research Hypotheses</p><p>　　The amount of compensation realized by the CEO as the result of stock-based incentives such as stock option grants and restricted stock-grants, de

37、pends on the contractual restrictions as well as economic variables that affect restricted stock and stock option values. The stock options’ exercise price, the stock price at the time of grant and exercise, the volatili

38、ty of stock price, competitive market, the fiscal and monetary policies, as well as variables that influence the company’s stock price</p><p>　　Executive compensation research findings to date with respect t

39、o the explanatory power of accounting-based versus market-based measures of performance are not</p><p>　　conclusive. We hypothesize that various performance measures manifest themselves differently depending

40、 on the type of compensation. That is, cash components in the compensation package tend to be measured on the basis of accounting metrics, while stock-based components of compensation are likely to be influenced by stock

41、 market returns (Murphy, 2000; Hall and Murphy, 2002). In conjunction with an evaluation of the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance, we examine the impact of popula</p><p>　　Analyses and Result

42、s</p><p>　　In this section we develop specific models of CEO compensation based on the general example presented earlier. Both cash compensation (CASHCOMP) and total compensation (TOTALCOMP) are used as the

43、dependent variables in empirical examinations. Consistent with prior research, we will use net annual sales as the proxy for firm size in all of our analyses. We use both accounting-based and market-based measures of per

44、formance in our models. More specifically, we include the total one-year shareholder</p><p>　　Initially we include each performance measure in the model as a separate explanatory variable.We then include bo

45、th measures of performance in the models and the year effect was included in every regression in the form of dummy variables as shown below:</p><p>　　ln(CASHCOMP it) = α + β ln(SALES it)+ δ1 TRS it+ γ DUMYEA

46、R t + ε it</p><p>　　ln(CASHCOMP it) = α + β ln(SALES it)+ δ2 ROA it + γ DUMYEAR t + ε it</p><p>　　ln(CASHCOMP it) = α + β ln(SALES it) + δ1 TRS it + δ2 ROA it+ γ DUMYEAR</p><p><

47、b>　　t+ εit</b></p><p>　　ln(TOTALCOMP it) = α + β ln(SALES it)+ δ1 TRS it+ γ DUMYEAR t + ε it</p><p>　　ln(TOTALCOMP it) = α + β ln(SALES it)+ δ2 ROA it + γ DUMYEAR t + ε it</p>&l

48、t;p>　　ln(TOTALCOMP it) = α + β ln(SALES it) + δ1 TRS it + δ2 ROA it+ γ</p><p>　　DUMYEAR + ε</p><p>　　The results of cross-section time-series random effect regressions on each f

49、ull sample model are presented in Table 3. These results indicate the efficient for size was statistically significant in each and every model.</p><p>　　The market-based measure of performance, TRS, is signi

50、ficant as an explanatory variable for both cash compensation (CASHCOMP) and total compensation (TOTALCOMP) of CEOs. The accounting-based performance measure, ROA, was also significant as an explanatory variable for bot

51、h cash and total compensations but at only the 0.10 level in model 6. However, the coefficient of TRS is slightly larger in relation to total compensation. The ROA coefficient, on the other hand, is slightly larger in re

52、lation</p><p>　　We computed the changes in the natural logarithm of compensation (dependent variable) associated with a one percent change in the performance Measures based on our estimated coefficient(s) of

53、 independent variables in table3. We then computed the monetary change in median executive compensation.8 Our results indicate that the median CEO cash compensation (CASHCOMP) increases (decreases) by $7419 as a result o

54、f a one percent increase (decrease) in market–based return (Model 1) and the increase (de</p><p>　　Concluding Remarks</p><p>　　This study contributes to the literature on executive compensation

55、and firm performance in several ways. Unlike past studies, we included both cash compensation and total compensation in our sample and analyzed the relationship between compensation structure and measures of performance.

56、 Our full-sample results indicate cash compensation is impacted by both accounting and market measures of performance while total compensation is more closely correlated with the market-based measure. We find that</p&

57、gt;<p>　　We extend past studies by partitioning the data into sub-samples based on incentive structures such as the existence of bonus and stock-based compensation components. We find that CEO compensation contrac

58、ts with stock options are more</p><p>　　significantly influenced by the market-based performance measure than by the accounting-based measure. The results also show that for firms with no bonus or stock-base

59、d plans, size does not seem to be as significant a determinant of CEO compensation. Data indicate that firms with no bonus plans are markedly smaller than those with bonus plans. Neither the market-based measure, nor the

60、 accounting-based measure, seems to have any significance for total compensation in firms without incentive plans</p><p>　　These points deserve closer attention. Studies examining the impact of a firm’s char

61、acteristics and CEO tenure on incentives and performance over a longer time period may produce additional insights. Examinations of the relationship between CEO compensation and the performance of new economy firms, as w

62、ell as firms within regulated industries, could produce useful information.</p><p>　　激勵對 CEO 報酬與公司業(yè)績的影響</p><p>　　作者：馬哈茂德·M.·努拉伊和蘇達·克里希南</p><p>　　RISEC，53 卷（2006 年），第

63、3 期</p><p>　　摘要：管理控制系統(tǒng)的重要組成部分是激勵機制和激勵支撐的補償合同。大部分管理人員以獲得現(xiàn)金獎勵和公司股票為主要形式。我們的數(shù)據(jù)表明有超過 82.5％人的認為 CEO 獲得現(xiàn)金獎勵的比例比股票期權更大而約94.5％的人則認為是 股票期權。我們的分析表明以市場回報為基本手段的大公司并沒有股權激勵。然而以會計為基礎的對股權激勵的影響也并不顯著。</p><p>　　關鍵

64、詞：CEO 報酬；代理合同；激勵；性能；以會計為基礎的激勵機制；以市 場為基礎的激勵機制</p><p><b>　　1 簡介</b></p><p>　　管理控制系統(tǒng)的一個重要的組成部分是激勵賠償合約的機制和激勵支撐。一 個精心設計的激勵制度可以有效地處理代理合同中的逆向選擇和道德風險問題。 在任何程度上賠償合同中有關性能的衡量標準不同就決定了自信和冒險申請人 的屬

65、性水平。這項研究的主要目的是為了找出激勵合同和有關行政賠償?shù)男阅艽?施的影響。同時，我們也評估 CEO 現(xiàn)金獎勵和股權激勵相比的敏感性。</p><p>　　行政賠償和企業(yè)績效之間的關系已被研究人員從不同的角度廣泛研究。研究</p><p>　　已經(jīng)證實企業(yè)規(guī)模和行政賠償和對公司高管薪酬之間上的影響的表現(xiàn)呈相關。在 大多數(shù)情況下，利息匯聚代理理論影響高管薪酬與公司業(yè)績之間的聯(lián)系。</

66、p><p>　　墨菲（2000）表示，多數(shù)公司使用多個性能的措施來獎勵他們的高管。最流 行的獎勵形式似乎是現(xiàn)金和公司股票。大部分公眾公司提供股票期權或限制性股 票是為了保證經(jīng)理人的福利的一致性和所有者財富最大化目標。高管的現(xiàn)金補償 有兩個主要組成部分固定工資和獎金。獎金一般都和一些性能的措施聯(lián)系在一起 與特定的組織目標的管理選擇的信號一致性。在這項研究中，我們專注于股票期 權和獎金激勵計劃。</p>&

67、lt;p>　　股票補助和股票期權的目的是獎勵高管有關的決策能影響股票價格的積極 變化正因為如此才能被視為一個面向未來的獎勵制度，而不是通?；谝恍┯?的會計措施的獎金。然而，從股東的角度來看會計基礎的措施是事后的歷史的表 現(xiàn)。相反，市場回報率是從股票價格的變動中產(chǎn)生在會計術語中并沒有明確定義。</p><p>　　從理論上講，基于市場的措施是事前的具有前瞻性的，因為它們反映的管理決策 會提高未來的盈利能力

68、。而在實踐中，股票價格是一個非常嘈雜的信號因為他們 經(jīng)常受到市場大幅波動，反映商業(yè)周期的財政和貨幣政策的決定因素和條件的影 響，因此不完全反映行政效能。</p><p>　　此前的研究在大多數(shù)情況下僅限于現(xiàn)金補償?shù)臋z查。在這項研究中，我們分 析補償結構和績效在現(xiàn)金和總賠償方面的影響。早先的研究被定義為只有現(xiàn)金補 償著眼于補償?shù)拇笮?、性能和高管薪酬之間的關系。我們通過分析現(xiàn)金和總的補 償，我們注意到現(xiàn)金補償是由市場

69、和會計措施的性能所影響，而賠償總額被市場 基礎措施所影響。進一步分析表明在分區(qū)之后的數(shù)據(jù)、獎金和股票期權計劃存在 的基礎上，企業(yè)規(guī)模、銷售額衡量是不顯著的公司沒有獎金或股票期權計劃。我 們的分析，揭示了市場為基礎的公司回報不提供股票股權激勵。</p><p>　　本文的其余部分安排如下：第 2 節(jié)簡要回顧了 CEO 薪酬激勵與公司業(yè)績相 關的文獻。第 3 節(jié)主要講我們目前的研究設計和假設。在第 4 節(jié)是我們的分析

70、結</p><p>　　果。最后第 5 節(jié)是我們的結論。</p><p><b>　　2 文獻回顧</b></p><p>　　許多行政補償研究分析薪酬績效之間的關系都會利用指定的模型，大致如 下：</p><p>　　PAY it = α + β (SIZE it) + γ (PERFORMANCE it ) + εi

71、t</p><p>　　其中薪酬是首席執(zhí)行官補償；規(guī)模是公司規(guī)模；性能，它是一個可觀察的企 業(yè)績效衡量標準；ε是誤差項。</p><p>　　一些經(jīng)驗性研究支持高管薪酬工作表現(xiàn)的敏感性。（例如，墨菲，1985 年， 1986 年，詹森和墨菲，1990 年，依利，1991 年; BOS 陳和史密斯，1995）更具 體地說，著眼于研究現(xiàn)金補償和該公司的凈資產(chǎn)收益率、總收入以及非經(jīng)常性收 益部分

72、，以此作為終止經(jīng)營業(yè)務和重組費用的影響等性能之間的措施的關系。實 證研究結果表明，補償（定義為現(xiàn)金補償）更緊密地與會計基礎措施相聯(lián)系。這 樣的結果意味著會計性能的措施是公司高管用來屏蔽來自其控制之外的市場的 大幅波動。（蘭伯特和萊科，1987 年斯隆管理學院，1993 年）。</p><p>　　在大多數(shù)情況下，對行政補償?shù)难芯坷玫墓べY和獎金的總和作為代理的 報酬總額（艾博德，1990 年，詹森和墨菲 199

73、0 年，蘭伯特和萊科，1987;米什拉 哥白林，五月，2000;墨菲 1985 年，斯隆管理學院，1993 年）。許多研究都使用 現(xiàn)金補償作為因變量，用他們來解釋一個公司的業(yè)績和高管薪酬之間的關系，也 有人強調股票在行政賠償研究基礎上的重要性。（核心，格威，威萊瑞查特，2003 年; 格林萊，1999 年）</p><p>　　隨著時間變化，補償合同的組成和非現(xiàn)金補償?shù)木薮笤鲩L連同報告要求的變 化（關于高管發(fā)出的

74、股票期權），導致越來越多的人關注于股票的補償和相關付 費性能的研究。使用現(xiàn)金補償在早先的研究中被視為是因變量，只有在補償模型 的數(shù)據(jù)可用性和現(xiàn)金補償合同組成部分的相對規(guī)模的基礎上，才被認為是適當?shù)?和合理的。然而，在公司提供其主管和員工股票的報酬的補償幅度和 SEC 披露 的要求有關高管股票期權的增加幅度，影響了總的補償（近期研究的選擇在伯克 蘭和米林萊銳，2000 年，2003 年科代羅先生和威林納，蓋伊和威萊瑞查特，2003; 麥克

75、，1995 年）。</p><p>　　在基本的形式下，我們的回歸模型結合市場基礎和會計基礎性能的措施。我 們使用市場回報率和代理首席執(zhí)行官性能的回報結算率來分析計算。在下一節(jié) 中，我們提出了我們的方法和研究假設。</p><p><b>　　3 研究假設</b></p><p>　　由首席執(zhí)行官補償金額作為基礎的股票激勵機制，如股票期權和限制

76、性股票 補助的金多少取決于合同的限制、經(jīng)濟變量的影響和股票期權的限制。股票期權 的行使價是指引起股權與股票價格波動的一種行使價。競爭激烈的市場、財政和 貨幣政策以及公司的股票在授予日和行使日的影響是基于股票補償之間的價格 波動而不是 CEO 可完全控制的。因此，基于股票的補償來引入一個顯著的風險 量的代理關系，并根據(jù) Aggarwal 和 Samwick（1999）補償變得不那么能作為衡 量影響的性能。Bertrand 和 Mullai

77、athan（2000）觀察到股東回報率和 CEO 報酬 的靈敏度較低會使股市變得更加不穩(wěn)定。</p><p>　　高管薪酬的研究成果和以會計為基礎的基于市場措施的性能研究迄今為止 是沒有定論的。我們推測，各種性能的措施由不同類型的補償來體現(xiàn)。也就是說， 補償方案中的現(xiàn)金部分往往是在會計指標的基礎上的現(xiàn)金，而基于股票的補償?shù)?組件卻可能影響股市的回報（墨菲，2000 年霍爾和墨菲 2002）。</p>

78、<p>　　在 CEO 薪酬與公司業(yè)績之間的關系的評價中，我們研究受比較受歡迎的激</p><p>　　勵結構，如獎勵存在的計劃或股票期權。據(jù)預計，這種激勵措施將在 CEO 的決 策過程起到激勵作用，可以反映在該公司的結構和特點。我們將公司分為高利潤 的公司和沒有股票期權和獎金計劃的公司。</p><p><b>　　4 分析和結果</b></p&g

79、t;<p>　　在本節(jié)中基于前面介紹的一般例子我們制定了 CEO 報酬的特定的模型。無 論是現(xiàn)金補償（CASHCOMP）還是總額補償（TOTALCOMP）都作為實證檢驗 的依賴變量。與以前的研究相一致，我們將利用每年的凈銷售額分析我們所有的</p><p>　　公司。我們在我們的模型中不僅使用的會計基礎還使用以市場為基礎的措施。更 具體地說，我們將普通股總額的一年股東回報率（TRS）作為我們衡量資產(chǎn)

80、收益 率（ROA）的會計基礎的措施。我們使用對數(shù)轉換補償和一般模型中的銷售數(shù) 據(jù)來減少誤差項的異方差性問題。</p><p>　　最初，我們將每個績效衡量標準作為一個單獨的模型解釋。然后，我們既運 用模型性能的措施又運用列入全年效果的虛擬變量，每一個回歸分析如下所示：</p><p>　　ln(CASHCOMP it) = α + β ln(SALES it)+ δ1 TRS it+ γ

81、DUMYEAR t + εit</p><p>　　ln(CASHCOMP it) = α + β ln(SALES it)+ δ2 ROA it + γ DUMYEAR t + εit</p><p>　　ln(CASHCOMP it) = α + β ln(SALES it) + δ1 TRS it + δ2 ROA it+ γ</p><p>　　DUMYEA

82、R t+ εit</p><p>　　ln(TOTALCOMP it) = α + β ln(SALES it)+ δ1 TRS it+ γ DUMYEAR t + εit</p><p>　　ln(TOTALCOMP it) = α + β ln(SALES it)+ δ2 ROA it + γ DUMYEAR t +</p><p><b>　　εit

83、</b></p><p>　　ln(TOTALCOMP it) = α + β ln(SALES it) + δ1 TRS it + δ2 ROA it+ γ</p><p>　　DUMYEAR t +εit</p><p>　　按橫截面時間序列排列每一個本模型的隨機效應回歸分析。這些結果表明， 在每個模型的大小系數(shù)都具有統(tǒng)計學意義。</p>

84、<p>　　性能的基于市場的措施 TRS 是作為一個為現(xiàn)金補償（CASHCOMP）和 CEO 的報酬總額（TOTALCOMP）的重要解釋變量。會計基礎的表現(xiàn)衡量 ROA 也可 作為現(xiàn)金和總額賠償?shù)慕忉屪兞?，但只有模?6 水平顯著。然而，TRS 系數(shù)與之 相比報酬總額會稍大。在另一方面，居留權系數(shù)稍大。這些結果與以前的研究結 果是一致的。</p><p>　　我們計算賠償?shù)淖匀粚?shù)的變化（因變量）是

85、基于我們的獨立變量的估計系 數(shù)（S）的表現(xiàn)的一個百分比的變化。然后，我們計算高管薪酬中位數(shù)的變化。 我們的研究結果表明 CEO 現(xiàn)金補償?shù)闹形粩?shù)（CASHCOMP）增加（或減少）$7419 相當于一個以市場為基礎的回報率（型號 1）增加（減少）1％或會計基礎的回 報率（2 型）增加（減少）1％增加（減少）16935 元?；谀Ｐ?3 的計算產(chǎn)生的 結果非常接近模型 2。</p><p><b>　　5

86、 結束語</b></p><p>　　這項研究對行政賠償和公司業(yè)績的提高有很大的幫助。與過去的研究不同， 我們的樣本包括現(xiàn)金補償和總補償，分析補償結構和性能之間的關系。我們所有 的樣本的結果表明，現(xiàn)金補償是由會計和市場措施的表現(xiàn)所影響的，而總補償與 以市場為基礎措施密切相關。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，在確定的現(xiàn)金和總額補償下企業(yè)規(guī)模是</p><p>　　一個重要的變量。然而，這些結果似乎會加

87、強公司的獎金或股票期權計劃。我們 過去的研究為激勵結構，如獎金和基于股票的補償。結果還顯示如果公司沒有獎 金或基于股票的計劃，規(guī)模就不是作為影響 CEO 報酬的決定因素。數(shù)據(jù)表明， 沒有獎金計劃的公司規(guī)模明顯小于有獎金計劃的。無論是基于市場的措施，還是 基于會計基礎的措施，似乎都沒總額補償?shù)募钣媱?。具體而言，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)那些 以大市場為基礎回報的企業(yè)是不太可能提供市場基礎激勵的。</p><p>　　以上這幾點都值