企業(yè)集團(tuán)子公司績(jī)效信息操縱的委托代理分析.pdf

1、中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)碩士學(xué)位論文企業(yè)集團(tuán)子公司績(jī)效信息操縱的委托代理分析姓名：劉新雨申請(qǐng)學(xué)位級(jí)別：碩士專業(yè)：管理科學(xué)與工程指導(dǎo)教師：@2011-05-12Abstract II Abstract With the high-speed growing of our economic, appears large numbers of enterprise group. In order to manage subsidiaries, hea

2、dquarter needs to establish multi-layer principal-agent mechanism, and performance has become its core direction. Subsidiaries manipulate performance information already becomes the common phenomenon, manipulative motiva

3、tions and forms are more complicated. This bring more internal control and risk to enterprise group, and disturb headquarter make and adjust strategic plan in a certain extent. How to improve the submitting information a

4、uthenticity and accuracy, how to establish incentive compatibility principal-agent mechanism, has become the core problem of modern enterprise group governance. Between parent and subsidiaries, their targets are disagree

5、 in nature and information are asymmetric, this is the root causing principal-agent problem. In order to reduce manipulative performance information, enhance the operational autonomy and initiative, this article establis

6、hes the principal-agent model respectively based on the stages of advance, during and after the event, according to the behavior characteristics of manipulation, tries to analyze the elements of improper performance info

7、rmation control node, reduce manipulative degree, promote subsidiary effort, obtain the principal-agent mechanism arrangement plan and get best incentive contracts. At the stage of after the event, set the principal agen

8、t model including incentive compatible constraint conditions based on the manipulation degree. At the stage of during the event, add the incentive compatible constraint conditions based on the effort degree, extend princ

9、ipal agent model. At the stage of advance the event, bring the credibility to extend principal agent model. The results shows that, only when parent could completely supervising or subsidiary did not share earnings, subs

10、idiary would not manipulate performance, but the effort degree is zero. Therefore, in the enterprise group performance information managerial process, parent should allow some degree of the manipulation, at the same time

11、, Parent can establish the performance information control mechanism by increasing supervision effectiveness, difficulty and manipulative punishment, subsidiary profitability and dig subsidiary efforts, reducing the oper